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ABSTRACT 
 
The EU’s participation in multilateral negotiations became an object of study by 
EU scholars fairly recently. Although EU member states had already started to coordinate 
their positions within the UN in the 1970s, the academic literature in the field is neither 
coherent nor systematic. With intent to contribute to a growing research agenda on the 
EU’s impact in world affairs, this project examines the EU’s effectiveness in what is 
arguably a ‘least likely’ case for the EU’s successful participation: multilateral arms 
negotiations. The international security field of arms and weapons is often viewed as an 
area of ‘high’ politics, where states’ considerations of sovereignty, integrity and survival 
are at the center stage, complicating the role of non-traditional post-modern actors like 
the EU. This study thus postulates the following research questions: to what extent is the 
EU an effective actor in multilateral arms negotiations, and what explains EU 
effectiveness? The thesis applies a small-n comparative research design, assessing the 
explanatory power of agency and structure-related factors alike, borrowed from the 
European integration and international relations theories and merged in a single analytical 
framework. The empirical evidence is drawn from the area of global arms affairs by way 
of triangulating between semi-structured interviews, document analysis and direct 
observation. More specifically, the project examines the EU’s involvement in the 
multilateral negotiations on the Arms Trade Treaty and the latest (2010 and 2015) Non-
Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences. 
In brief, the main claim of the thesis is that the EU is an effective actor in 
multilateral arms negotiations, the level of its effectiveness differs across negotiation 
cases, and the account of this variance cannot be reduced to a mono-causal explanation. 
The EU showed three distinct patterns of effectiveness – outcome, process and damage 
limitation effectiveness – each of which is defined through a particular mix of goal 
achievement, relevance and external cohesion as the main conceptual components of EU 
effectiveness. Agent-based explanations related to power (internal policy) and interests 
(member states’ interest convergence) appeared to be responsible for this diverse picture, 
as their explanatory power was found to be the most instrumental in accounting for 
various instances of EU effectiveness. Far from being irrelevant, the structural factors 
acted as accelerators and breaks on the influence of the internal factors (global distribution 
of power) or even as determinants of the latter (international constellation of interests), 
but by itself the external context did not shape EU effectiveness directly. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Context of the inquiry and the research puzzle 
On 14 September 2010, Belgian diplomat Jan Grauls took the floor at the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to present, on behalf of the European Union (EU), a 
resolution on the EU’s enhanced participation in the UN. The introduced draft resolution 
A/64/L.67 aimed at granting the EU with wide participatory rights, only short of voting 
privileges, effectively transforming the Union’s status of observer into a full non-state 
participant. The need for these changes, as explained by the Belgian representative, 
followed from the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty that entered into force in 
December 2009. The Lisbon Treaty introduced a set of institutional innovations in the 
conduct of the Union’s foreign policy and external representation, directly affecting the 
EU’s participation in international organizations. To the surprise of many in Europe, the 
draft resolution invoked significant resistance from many UN member states, and was 
converted into a failed motion and a serious fiasco for the post-Lisbon European 
diplomacy (Wouters et al., 2011). During the debate of the draft resolution, critical voices 
highlighted the ‘unprecedented’ character of the EU’s initiative due to its alleged potential 
to compromise the work of the UN by granting the Union with powers similar to those of 
UN member states. The representative of Nauru, speaking on behalf of small island states, 
has been outspoken in her skepticism: ‘This is a significant proposal that may have 
profound implications for the very nature of this august body. The United Nations Charter 
is based on the membership and equality of sovereign States and we must ensure that this 
draft resolution upholds those fundamental principles’ (United Nations, 2010, p. 4). What 
Europeans regarded as a procedural and rather self-explanatory matter came out as a 
critical ontological choice for many outside. 
Although the EU’s status at the UN was ultimately upgraded the following year, 
the initial unexpected diplomatic backlash is symptomatic of greater challenges that the 
EU currently faces in international politics. There is little doubt that the EU is a new and 
promising actor on the international stage (Hill and Smith, 2005; Bretherton and Vogler, 
2006). Having emerged as a powerful trading bloc and the biggest market in the world 
(Damro, 2012), it gradually developed multiple foreign policy instruments under the 
umbrella of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), externalized a range of 
internal policies and standards – environmental, energy, migration, competition – linked 
to the functioning of its common market (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008), 
established contractual relationships with key states (Grevi, 2012), regions (Telò, 2007), 
12 
 
international organizations (Jørgensen, 2009) and transformed a large part of the 
continent through the power of enlargement (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). 
Yet, despite this solid track record, the EU is still perceived as a sui generis international 
actor, a supranational organization that remains an exception to the norm of the state-
centric international system. As Jönsson and Hall (2005) have argued, ‘the European 
Union has yet to make an impact on the reproduction of international society. The 
diplomatic world is still, by and large, populated by territorial states, which have been 
granted diplomatic recognition by other states’ (p. 161). The EU does challenge a variety 
of common norms and existing wisdoms – sovereignty and diplomacy, to name a few – 
in the practice of international relations (Bruter, 1999; Bátora, 2005), but unless it 
manages to transform a state-centric Westphalian order or, on the contrary, becomes a 
fully-fledged state, the legitimacy concerns regarding its international participation are 
likely to persist. 
Nowhere else the issues of legitimacy and recognition are more sensitive than in 
the EU’s participation in multilateral institutions. At the center of the wide web of 
multilateral institutions is the UN, which is based on the universal principle of ‘the 
sovereign equality’ of its member states (Article 2 of the UN Charter). Betsill and Corell 
(2008) acknowledge the constraints that non-state actors face in global governance, 
noting that ‘international negotiations […] are largely the domain of states. As UN 
members, only states have formal decision-making power during international 
negotiations’ (p. 6). Given this lack of formal authority, the reasoning behind the EU’s 
participation in multilateral institutions is not straightforward: ‘for many it will come as 
a major surprise to learn that the EU is actually engaged in multilateral institutions. They 
tend to consider the EU itself to be an international organization […] and international 
organisations are not supposed to engage in or develop policies towards other 
organisations’ (Jørgensen, 2013, p. 86). In this thread, international organizations are 
created by states to serve state interests, and therefore the presence of the EU alongside 
its member states in the process of inter-state collective deliberation can indeed be 
confusing. In practical terms, ‘the sui generis nature of the EU means that international 
organisations and fora vary in their willingness to recognize it as an actor in its own right 
as opposed to its constituent member states’ (Marsh and Mackenstein, 2005, p. 56). 
What strengthens the EU’s misfit in the current state-centric international order is 
that, contrary to what skeptics may have expected, the EU has indeed developed specific 
policy objectives towards other multilateral institutions. Since the adoption of the 
European Security Strategy (ESS), the EU argues that strengthening a rule-based 
13 
 
international society, reinforcing existing international organizations and building new 
multilateral institutions is key to ensuring global security and more generally a ‘better 
world’ (European Council, 2013; see also European Union, 2016). These objectives, 
embraced by the overarching headline of effective multilateralism, are based on the 
premise that the EU itself represents the strongest up-to-date example of a successful 
multilateral cooperation project between states that ‘helped to transform most of Europe 
from a continent of war to a continent of peace’ (Nobel Committee, 2012). 
Multilateralism is said to constitute part of the EU’s DNA (Barroso, 2010); it has been 
described as ‘the way of life in Europe’ (Groom, 2006), which triggers policy-makers and 
academic scholars to claim that the EU’s primary role in international affairs is replicating 
Europe’s experience on a global scale (European Commission, 2001; Bailes, 2009). 
While projection of the EU’s multilateral model can serve as a stepping stone for 
establishing its legitimacy in the international system, a more fundamental question is 
whether this task is actually realistic given the predominance of states, rather than 
regional actors, in international affairs. As Laatikainen and Smith (2006) argue, in the 
intergovernmental context of the UN, ‘such ambitious multilateralism is highly unusual’ 
(p. 4). This line of reasoning can be further reinforced considering the field of global arms 
affairs – the policy domain selected for this study – which is directly linked to the issues 
of national sovereignty, security and even survival, rendering the achievement of 
collective goods particularly difficult (Hoffmann, 1966). The puzzle that this research 
addresses is therefore the following: there is a clear will of the EU to actively participate 
in multilateral (security) institutions, but it is unclear whether the EU as a multilateral 
entity and a form of ‘negotiated order’ (Smith, 1996) itself, which practices a distinct 
supranational multilateralism, can perform in a meaningful way within another 
multilateral system of negotiations that is largely based on intergovernmental principles. 
 
1.2 Research question, aims and relevance of the study 
The EU’s participation in multilateral negotiations became a research target of EU 
scholars fairly recently. Although EU member states started to coordinate their positions 
within the UN in the 1970s under the European Political Cooperation (EPC), the academic 
literature in the field is assessed to be neither ‘consistent, coherent nor systematic’ 
(Jørgensen, 2007, p. 509). A significant part of the research was shaped by the discussion 
of the EU’s ‘capacity to behave actively and deliberately’ (Sjöstedt, 1977, p. 16) in the 
international system. Considerable effort followed to define the criteria of EU actorness, 
with an evaluation of the EU’s participation in global politics (Caporaso and Jupille, 
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1998; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). Subsequent research on the EU in multilateral 
institutions predominantly focused on the EU’s role (Laatikainen, 2010; Van Vooren et 
al., 2013), coherence (Mahncke and Gstöhl, 2012), representation (Gstöhl, 2009; Rasch, 
2008), membership (Govaere et al., 2004), presence (Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2011a) 
and position (Wouters et al., 2012) in various multilateral settings. 
From an empirical point of view, there has been a distinct trend in the literature to 
prioritize those policy forums and fields that are linked to the nature and origin of the EU 
(trade and economy), or where EU policy-makers invest a considerable amount of 
diplomatic resources (environment and human rights). ‘In these domains, the Union 
regularly strives to claim a leadership role, whereas it makes its voice arguably less heard 
in areas such as global security governance’ (Wouters et al., 2012, p. 4). The issues of 
arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation are cases in point: they ‘rarely drew 
attention above or beyond the CFSP working groups’ (Balfour et al., 2012, p. 19), are 
less likely to generate external demands or high expectations for EU action (Hill, 1998), 
and have been frequently omitted in the major handbooks on the EU’s role in global 
governance (Wunderlich and Bailey, 2011; Van Vooren et al., 2013; Lucarelli et al., 
2013). For one thing, since the end of the Cold War, these policy concepts have lost their 
previous salience and currency, which also has been reinforced by continuing stagnation 
of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the UN’s main specialized multilateral 
negotiation forum (Zanders, 2010). For another reason, arms affairs have been 
traditionally regarded by EU member states as a defining element of their essential 
security interests, which are exempted from the integration process (Art. 346 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU]). It is not unusual to observe how the 
states’ preponderance in the domain of international security takes scholars to a swift 
conclusion that the EU, almost inexorably, ‘lacks the skills and the will to act effectively 
in the sphere of ‘high diplomacy’’(Whitman, 2010, p. 28). 
The current research challenges this view along with the dominant conceptual and 
empirical approaches to examining the EU’s participation in multilateral negotiations. 
First, even though initially it might be counterintuitive to think about the EU being 
involved in the ‘arms business’, the fact is that the EU regularly prepares common 
positions for multilateral conferences or UNGA plenaries dealing with arms issues 
(Bailes, 2007). Second, unlike most of the previous studies on the EU in multilateral 
negotiations, this research is focused on scrutinizing EU effectiveness as a conceptual 
expression of the EU’s negotiation success or failure. Third, the study departs from the 
premise that EU effectiveness, even in the area of ‘high diplomacy’, is not a one-size-fits-
15 
 
all straitjacket, which renders the explanation of a potential variation another important 
aim of the study. Hence, the research questions that this project pursues are the following: 
(1) To what extent is the EU an effective actor in multilateral arms negotiations? (2) What 
explains EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations? 
The rationale behind studying EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations stems 
from a broader debate among scholars of EU foreign policy, which calls for increasing 
attention to the impact that the EU has on world affairs. Proponents of this impact-
oriented approach to the study of the EU as an international actor argue that scholars 
inordinately contemplated conceptualizing the nature and novelty of the EU’s rise to the 
international stage. As K. Smith (2010) argues, ‘we should […] engage in a debate of 
what the EU does, why it does it, and with what effect, rather than about what it is’ (p. 
343). In a similar vein, Schunz (2010) claims that: ‘[t]he absence of sound conceptual and 
methodological reasoning about the Union’s impact in international affairs stands in stark 
contrast to the plentiful scholarly attempts at identifying what kind of power the EU can 
be or already is in the global arena’ (p. 23). The academic relevance of the research 
question put forward in this study thus lies in its focus on the notion of EU effectiveness, 
of which no clear and systematic definition and operationalization currently exists in the 
literature. An examination of the EU’s distinctiveness as an international actor would not 
be complete without considering effects that the EU produces on the international level. 
Analyzing EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations also brings this study in 
close proximity to a diplomat’s world. Some researchers have noticed that both scholars 
and practitioners of EU foreign policy have been quite inward-looking, focusing on 
institutions, legal competences and processes of internal decision-making (Ginsberg, 
2001; Mahncke, 2014). The benefits of an alternative approach from the policy-oriented 
perspective are all too difficult to ignore: ‘[Assessing effects] will show what the 
ambitions of the EU are, what results the EU is actually achieving, and, last but not least, 
what the Union needs to do if it wants to make a difference’ (Mahncke, 2014, p. 174). 
The policy relevance of the research question examined in this project stems from its 
ability to inform policy-makers and diplomats whether the EU is fit for purpose in global 
security affairs and how it can perform better in multilateral arms negotiations. Studying 
EU ‘high diplomacy’ in arms negotiations, which for many observers would be an a priori 
failed exercise or a ‘least-likely’ case for the EU’s success, can reveal useful insights for 
diplomats in other, less formidable, areas of the EU’s multilateral action. 
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1.3 Research design and methods 
1.3.1 Qualitative comparative design 
 The study is rooted in an empiricist epistemological tradition that supports 
empirically grounded explanatory research, whereby ‘knowledge can be accumulated 
through experience and observation’ (Lamont, 2015, p. 19). As it can be inferred from 
the research question, the study constitutes the Y-centered research, since it aims to 
explain a particular outcome of the EU’s effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations. 
In other words, it follows a typical for qualitative researchers ‘causes-of-effects’ approach 
in the explanation of social phenomena, when a researcher identifies the outcome of 
interest and engages in a retrospective accounting for the particular outcome (Mahoney 
and Goertz, 2006). The Y-centered explanatory design differs from an ‘effects-of-causes’ 
approach, which estimates average causal effects of particular variables, and traditionally 
dominates in quantitative studies.1 The choice of the small-n observational research 
design in this study rests upon the need for in-depth knowledge of selected cases, a greater 
conceptual validity and the necessity to address complex causal relations (Bennett, 2004). 
These are the particular challenges that experimental designs or large-n observational 
studies are ill-suited to address. 
 The project builds upon an integrative comparative case study design combining 
cross-case comparisons and within-case analysis at the theoretical end (Rohlfing, 2012, 
pp. 12–15). On a cross-case level, I will contrast three episodes of the EU’s participation 
in multilateral arms negotiations following the procedure of structured and focused 
comparisons (George and Bennett, 2005). The cross-case inferences will help to 
determine the extent to which EU effectiveness varies across the cases, juxtapose cases 
against the key explanatory factors identified in the analytical framework of the study 
and, most importantly, illustrate a pattern of covariation between varying degrees of EU 
effectiveness and the causal factors. Due to its aggregated character and a high level of 
analysis, a cross-case comparison offers a researcher a possibility to project, under 
specified conditions, its inferences beyond the original context onto a broader number of 
cases (Della Porta, 2008). 
 A within-case analysis is another important source of explanatory leverage in this 
study. Scholars of social science methodology stress that a cross-case comparison (just as 
a large-n statistical analysis) is rather weak in distinguishing association or correlation 
                                                          
1 The distinction between ‘causes-of-effects’ and ‘effects-of-causes’ mirrors a broader scholarly debate 
between advocates of case-oriented and variable-oriented approaches to social science research (Della 
Porta, 2008; Ragin, 2014). 
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from causation (Gerring, 2008). In this light, a within case analysis is presented as a tool 
‘specifically designed to compensate for limitations associated with cross-case methods’ 
(Mahoney, 2000, p. 409). The main currency of the within-case analysis is the ability to 
uncover causal mechanisms that link the outcome with a key explanatory factor. As 
Toshkov (2016) argues, ‘such evidence can extend and complement the covariational 
patterns between variables that cross-case evidence provides’ (p. 261). Through a careful 
examination of within-case observations, I will elaborate upon causal sequences that 
account for different outcomes of EU effectiveness in selected cases. An in-depth 
examination of a single case is also a valuable tool for identifying alternative explanations 
or interaction effects among causal factors (George and Bennett, 2005). Addressing these 
challenges makes a within-case analysis particularly suitable in the context of studying 
multilateral negotiations that commonly feature a high level of complexity in terms of 
actors, activities and processes (Crump and Zartman, 2003). All in all, a within-case 
analysis is a valuable complementary tool for a cross-case comparison; mixing both 
strategies thus holds significant promise of strengthening general explanatory utility of a 
small-n observational research design (Rohlfing, 2012; Toshkov, 2016). 
 
 1.3.2 Specification of the population 
 A logic of a small-n research design entails a purposeful selection of cases to study 
out of a broader pool of cases at which the research is targeted. Prior to this act, however, 
a researcher needs to engage in a ‘casing’ exercise – to answer the question ‘what is the 
case an instance of?’ via scrutinizing the relationship between the case at hand and the 
empirical boundaries of a set of cases relevant for the study, i.e. its population (Della 
Porta, 2008). A clear and explicit definition of the population is important for two inter-
related reasons. First, the specification of the population plays an important role in 
generating causal inferences. It helps to establish a degree of comparability between the 
cases or, in other words, their causal homogeneity, which implies that ‘a cause-effect 
relationship is, on average, expected to hold true for the cases within the population’ 
(Rohlfing, 2012, p. 24). Second, the definition of the population relevant for investigation 
indicates the extent to which the findings of the research can potentially be generalized 
beyond the examined cases. Generation of knowledge about a larger class of units through 
an intensive study of its small sample is widely believed to be the main purpose of the 
case study method (Bennett and Elman, 2007; Rohlfing, 2012; Lamont, 2015). It is 
important to note that, as the boundaries of cases and populations are not pre-given and 
need to be constructed by a researcher, the shape of the population is amendable to change 
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throughout the research process, depending on how a researcher frames results of the 
study in light of the problem of causal heterogeneity (Della Porta, 2008; Ragin, 2014). 
Charles Ragin (2000) argues that ‘the way in which populations are defined and 
delimited has a substantial impact on findings’ (p. 49). At the core of the interplay 
between the population definition and causal inference is a role of scope conditions – 
statements beyond which the relevant causal factors of a case do not operate as causes 
(Walker and Cohen, 1985). In practical terms, the definition of the population implies an 
imposition of a set of boundaries on the entire pool of cases along the dimensions of 
substance, space and time. In terms of substance, the potential pool of cases for this 
research project is limited to a subset of multilateral negotiations in the international 
security policy field, which deals with arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament 
issues, or simply ‘arms affairs’. For example, the negotiations leading to the 2000 UN 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime falls out of the scope of the 
population, although this is a security-related instrument, and the EU participated in the 
negotiations. With regard to space, the research investigates the multilateral arms 
agreements negotiated or concluded under the auspices of the UN principal bodies. In 
other words, the multilateral agreements negotiated outside of the UN umbrella, such as 
the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, also fall outside the scope of the study. 
Moreover, since the study limits itself only to UN-related cases, it also excludes the 
instances of informal arms related regimes (e.g. Nuclear Suppliers Group or Wassenaar 
Arrangement), as patterns of the EU’s diplomatic participation here differ significantly 
from membership in formal multilateral institutions, thereby increasing the risk of causal 
heterogeneity (Kienzle and Vestergaard, 2013). 
Finally, the research also has explicit temporal boundaries. On one hand, member 
states of the European Community (EC) – the EU’s predecessor - acknowledged ‘the need 
to seek common positions wherever possible in international organizations’ (Brückner, 
1990, p. 177) in the 1970s, following the inception of the EPC. Yet, since the EC at that 
time was a very much nascent diplomatic entity and due to the reason of constraints on 
access to the relevant sources of data, the 1970s are not seen as a starting point for the 
investigation. On the other hand, researchers single out the year 2003 as the latest tipping 
point for the study of the EU in multilateral institutions owing to the adoption of the ESS, 
with its headline goal of supporting effective multilateralism (Gowan, 2008; Kissack, 
2010). While recognizing the strength of the argument, the study does not rely on 2003 
as a departure point, as it suggests a very narrow definition of the population, thus 
compromising the maximization of causal inference and the empirical relevance of the 
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study. Hence, acknowledging the need to address a balance between specificity and 
generalizability in the case study research (Bennett, 2004), the project rests upon 1993 – 
the year when the Maastricht Treaty entered into force bringing about the CFSP – as the 
lower temporal bound of the study. 
  
 1.3.3 Case selection 
 This study is based on the premise that the outcome of EU effectiveness in 
multilateral arms negotiations is qualitatively different across cases. A variance-on-Y 
design is argued to have a number of strong advantages in comparison to no-variance-on-
Y approach. First, it allows to identify causal factors that covary with the outcome on a 
cross-case level, thus, contributing to its explanation. As Collier and Mahoney (1996) 
argue, social scientists are predisposed to a variation seeking instinct in their studies, as 
the analysis of the variance promises to ‘produce a more adequate assessment of the 
underlying causal structure’ (p. 67). Second, from the perspective of set-relational logic, 
the variance-on-Y design helps to isolate sufficient conditions that are causal factors, 
presence of which brings about the outcome of interest (Ragin, 2014).  
Given the choice in favor of the variance-on-Y design, the case selection in this 
research follows the distribution-based strategy. The latter implies a selection of cases 
with respect to their location in a distribution of cases based on values taken by the causal 
factors or outcome (Rohlfing, 2012, pp. 61–62). As the current research aims at discerning 
the causes of the outcome and the size of the relevant population is rather limited, an 
intuitive strategy is to choose the cases in a way that will allow to encompass the full 
range of variation of the explanandum. Selecting diverse cases with maximum variance 
on Y fits the goal of maximizing generalization to the rest of the limited population. 
Seawright and Gerring (2008) even admit that ‘the diverse case method probably has 
stronger claims to representativeness than any other small-N sample’ (p. 302). 
While the merit of the diverse case selection is evident, this approach bears 
substantial shortcomings. First, it requires a researcher to have a perfect knowledge of the 
population to be able to identify extreme values of two cases that encompass the entire 
range of other possible scores. Unless a researcher performs a specific study for that 
purpose or enjoys the benefit of being a practitioner-insider, acquiring complete 
information about the population of cases prior to the investigation is usually unrealistic. 
Second, a selection of diverse cases is suitable when the outcome is measured 
continuously or in terms of differences in degree. If, instead, the outcome is assessed in 
multi-categorical terms – as it is done in this project – performing a diverse case study 
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effectively means ‘a comparative case study on typical cases’, because ‘each selected case 
is typical for all other cases from the same category’ (Rohlfing, 2012, pp. 223–224). A 
case can be regarded as typical when it is representative of a larger group of similar cases 
with shared patterns of causal relationships (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Selecting 
typical cases also implies a more cautious approach to generating insights beyond studied 
cases: instead of making a ‘sweeping’ generalization about the entire population, it 
suggests a ‘contingent’ or ‘possibilistic’ generalization about similar cases in the 
population (George and Bennett, 2005; Blatter and Haverland, 2012). A typical case study 
design thus fits more accurately in the approach taken in this project.2 
 The first typical case to be included in the research is the Arms Trade Treaty 
(ATT). It concluded in April 2013 after seven years of negotiations in the UN First 
Committee. The ATT became the first global instrument to regulate international trade in 
conventional arms. The size of the global conventional arms market and the impact of 
uncontrolled and illicit arms flows on the spread of international conflicts and violence 
lent the ATT a high level of importance among the international community. 
Interestingly, the agreement was initiated by two EU member states – the United 
Kingdom (UK) and Finland – and eventually became a priority for the EU’s multilateral 
diplomacy. The conclusion and signature of the agreement was presented on a number of 
occasions – by both EU policy makers and external observers – as the EU’s success story. 
 The second typical case that contrasts with the ATT is a Review Conference of 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT was signed in 1968, and is 
followed by regular review conferences held every five years. The case of interest is the 
2010 NPT Review Conference (NPT I) and the five-year period of time that preceded its 
preparation. The EU, as a traditionally strong supporter of the NPT collective security 
regime, has been visible and outspoken during the negotiations. The Union, however, has 
not been equally strong on all three pillars of the NPT – disarmament, non-proliferation 
and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy – with EU member states attaching different, 
sometimes irreconcilable, priorities to these aspects of negotiations. The 2010 NPT 
Review Conference is thus considered a less successful case of the EU’s multilateral arms 
diplomacy. This case is further contrasted with the 2015 NPT Review Conference (NPT 
II), where the EU’s performance seemed to hit the rock bottom. As one observer admitted, 
                                                          
2 It is important to note that the types of cases are not necessarily exclusive (Flyvbjerg, 2006). A 
comparative study of typical cases is also a study of diverse cases, unless the cases demonstrate an identical 
value on the outcome. 
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the Conference ‘showed the Union most divided ever since it developed a common 
foreign and security policy in the non-proliferation area’ (Müller, 2015). 
A final remark must be made about the issue of selection bias. The literature on 
social science methodology stipulates that it is not recommended to choose cases on the 
dependent variable – cases with the outcome of interest – due to a risk of little or 
undermined inferential leverage (King et al., 1994). On the other hand, Della Porta (2008) 
argues that, unlike in the large-n studies, examining positive cases is quite common and 
legitimate in the case study research. Furthermore, Van Evera (1997) makes a point that 
the most important criterion for the selection of cases is their fit for purpose of the inquiry. 
In this respect, the study of EU effectiveness (rather than non-effectiveness) and its 
complexity in multilateral arms negotiations requires an intensive investigation of 
positive cases, which enables a researcher to make strong choices about conceptualization 
and measurement even against a potential risk of bias in a case selection (Collier and 
Mahoney, 1996). 
 
 1.3.4 Strategy of causal inference 
 The strategy for case comparison in this study rests upon the logic of Mill’s 
methods of comparison. First, all the cases are compared simultaneously based on the 
method of concomitant variation (MoCV). The method represents a correlation test 
between potential causal factors and an outcome measured in terms of multiple 
differences in degree (DeFelice, 1986; Mahoney, 2000). In a subsequent step, two 
pairwise comparisons are performed in line with the method of difference (MoD). The 
main purpose of the MoD is to identify causal factors that are associated with different 
outcomes based on the idea that ‘differences must be explained with differences’ 
(Rohlfing, 2012, p. 110). In other words, ‘a condition present in both cases cannot account 
for the differences in case outcomes’ (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 156). The ideal MoD 
seeks to isolate one causal factor of a phenomenon by choosing cases that share invariant 
scores on all other potential causes. Therefore, the MoD is closely associated with the 
most similar system design of comparisons when a researcher ‘picks cases that are as 
similar as possible but differ in the outcome of interest’ (Toshkov, 2016, p. 266). A great 
advantage of Mill’s methods of comparison is that they allow to control and exclude 
contesting causal factors through careful matching of cases (Anckar, 2008). This explains 
the idea behind including the NPT II case, as its coupling with NPT I maximizes 
similarities between the two, and thus enhances a control of non-causal factors. 
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 Despite recognition and wide application in social sciences, the MoD is 
susceptible to several weaknesses that limit its inferential capacity. First, there is a 
problem of causal complexity, when the phenomenon under study is determined by 
multiple causes, thus turning the MoD into a suboptimal comparison. Second, the MoD 
is ill-suited for identifying and accounting for interaction effects between several causal 
factors (Lieberson, 1991). Interaction effects increase the number of causal inferences 
drawn from the MoD, transforming it into an indeterminate comparison. The bottom line 
is that considering the general complexity of social phenomena, it is difficult to 
approximate selected cases with an ideal typical MoD. As Della Porta (2008) put it, ‘the 
contexts of the compared situations are never similar enough to permit considering as null 
the influence of the environment’ (p. 215). 
 As it was argued earlier, the shortcomings pertaining to the cross-case level of 
comparison is compensated by the application of a within-case analysis. At the within-
case level, a researcher can rely on three types of analysis: pattern matching (congruence), 
causal narrative and process tracing (Mahoney, 2000). The first two instruments are less 
suitable for the parameters of this research, as pattern matching relies on strong theory 
predictions and causal narrative is better applicable to historical research. Process tracing 
is considered among the best suited social science instruments for dealing with problems 
of causal complexity via identifying and analyzing causal chains and causal mechanisms 
(George and Bennett, 2005; Bennett and Checkel, 2015). ‘The core idea of process tracing 
is concatenation. Concatenation is the state of being linked together, as a chain or linked 
series’ (Waldner, 2012, p. 68). Process tracing provides a stepwise test for each element 
of the mechanism, which can be conceived as ‘the underlying entities that generate 
observed processes and outcomes’ (Bennett and Checkel, 2015, p. 10). For this purpose, 
the researcher collects specific types of data – causal process observations – that help to 
infer the existence of observable manifestations of each step in the causal pathway. The 
most important goal is to find a sufficient amount of evidence that would demonstrate 
with high certainty an uninterrupted sequence of steps or, in other words, that each 
element would make a relevant difference for the next part of the mechanism (Rohlfing, 
2012, p. 152). 
 
 1.3.5 Data collection and analysis 
In order to investigate the EU’s effectiveness in the ATT and NPT negotiations, 
the study relies on different data sources. First, a large number of official documents are 
consulted and analyzed. They can be clustered into three groups. The first group includes 
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policy documents, instruments and strategies related to the EU’s policies on non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), arms export control and control of 
small arms and light weapons (SALW). The second collection of documents is comprised 
of files (common positions, position papers, recommendations, press releases) of EU 
institutions, EU member states and other relevant actors adopted in the run-up to or in the 
aftermath of the ATT and NPT negotiations. The third group of documents relates to the 
ATT and NPT draft texts, official statements and interventions, press releases, non-
governmental organization (NGOs) reports, and transcript records of debates during the 
preparatory meetings and UN conferences – in other words, documents produced during 
the negotiations. Most of the documents have been accessed through the relevant web-
pages, while a few have been shared or, in rare cases, merely ‘introduced’ on the spot by 
the relevant interlocutors during the interview conversations. It is important to add that 
some of the documents are kept away from public eye, such as the EU working documents 
on ATT negotiation positions or internal deliberations on negotiation priorities in NPT 
cases, hence rendering confidentiality as a main obstacle in the document-based research 
(Bowen, 2009). 
Second, the study relies on 43 semi-structured interviews with EU diplomats and 
officials, EU member states diplomats, third countries diplomats, researchers and NGOs 
representatives. The interview data was collected between 2013 and 2016, with most of 
the interviews performed during field research in Brussels, Geneva, New York and The 
Hague, with a handful of interviews conducted by means of telephone. The inclusion of 
the interview data adds great value to the research in terms of accurate interpretation of 
documents, enhanced understanding of the negotiation context and, most importantly, 
with regard to bringing new information and insights that otherwise would not have been 
available through the document analysis (Richards, 1996; Rubin and Rubin, 2012). Two 
sampling strategies facilitated the collection of interview data. The first one, which was 
especially useful during the early stages of learning about the cases, is that of snowball 
sampling. It implies a reliance on the first set of interviewed individuals to introduce a 
researcher to new potential interviewees, who in turn, exploring their network of 
professional contacts, can introduce a researcher to other officials. The snowball sampling 
was complemented by targeted sampling, when the interviewees were recruited 
selectively amongst the complete lists of negotiation participants and observers published 
on the relevant UN web-pages. 
Third, in order to increase internal validity of the study, I conducted a direct non-
participant observation of one of the empirical cases. For this purpose, I attended two 
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weeks worth of negotiations of the 2015 NPT Review Conference that took place in New 
York between 27 April and 22 May. Since access to the negotiation site could not be 
granted to individuals, I observed the conference as an affiliated member of an UN-
accredited think tank (after interviewing its director). The observation method is 
considered to be the key research technique in anthropology and sociology, but tends to 
be somewhat neglected by political scientists and international relations scholars, despite 
its comparative advantages as both a data collection technique and an analytical tool 
(Burnham et al., 2004, pp. 221–236; Lamont, 2015, pp. 140–154; DeWalt and DeWalt, 
2011). Direct observation enables a researcher to collect a ‘raw’ data free of subjective 
perception or interpretation of individuals. Similar to the interview method, observation 
is well-suited for inductively generating new knowledge and information that is otherwise 
unavailable when a researcher stays ‘off-site’. 
It goes without saying that despite the outlined advantages, all three research 
methods are inherently susceptible to weaknesses and limitations. Obtaining access to 
relevant documents is the main challenge to the document analysis technique (Yin, 2003); 
reliability is arguably the most serious concern regarding the interviewing method, 
especially when interviewees are inclined to misrepresent motives for their actions 
(Berry, 2002); and direct observation is quite costly in terms of time, energy and financial 
inputs (Prinz and Groen, 2016). It can be argued that in the context of researching 
multilateral arms negotiations that these challenges are even greater, given the culture of 
secrecy inherent to these negotiations and the sensitive nature of the subject matter (Matz, 
2006). 
Relying on each of these techniques separately in a single study might certainly 
be problematic, but combining data gathered from documents, interviews and direct 
observation creates a potentially powerful research package. Using different methods to 
cross-check and compensate each other’s weaknesses is at the core of the idea of 
methodological triangulation (Read and Marsh, 2002; Lamont, 2015). Such triangulation 
is also important for creating synergies between the three. For example, while talking to 
the interviewees, I ‘discovered’ some valuable documents related to negotiation 
proceedings and positions of its participants. In a similar vein, directly attending the four-
week negotiation conference at the UN headquarters enabled me to conduct a new round 
of interviews with diplomats who happened to be physically present at the negotiations. 
In sum, methodological pluralism, including the triangulation of data sources, is essential 
for minimizing bias and increasing the validity of the research. 
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1.4 Outline of the study 
The study is organized as follows. It starts with a literature review that is presented 
in chapter 2. The chapter outlines the evolution of the research agenda on the EU in world 
affairs, identifies and discusses several clusters of academic literature relevant to the topic 
and maps the current study within the existing web of scholarship. By way of conclusion, 
the chapter presents the research gaps that the given study subsequently addresses. 
Chapter 3 outlines the conceptual and analytical framework for analyzing EU 
effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations. At the heart of the chapter is a 
comprehensive conceptualization of EU effectiveness that involves multiple steps of the 
concept-building process related to the definition, decomposition and measurement of the 
main concept. Drawing on the European integration and international relations (IR) 
theories, the chapter also presents a number of internal and external factors that likely 
shape EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations. 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are dedicated to the empirical analysis of the EU’s 
participation in ATT and NPT negotiations. Chapter 4 starts with the investigation of the 
internal factors of EU effectiveness. In each of the selected cases, it evaluates the strength 
of domestic policy, the level of institutional coordination and the degree of member 
states’ interest convergence. Chapter 5 brings forward the external factors of EU 
effectiveness. It examines the distribution of power resources among negotiators, 
explores the rules and procedures of the diplomatic forums under which the EU negotiates 
and assesses the international constellation of interests across the three negotiation cases. 
Finally, chapter 6 is of crucial importance, as it prepares the ground for answering the 
first research question of this study. In short, the chapter evaluates the explanandum of 
the study – EU effectiveness in ATT and NPT negotiations – breaking down the analysis 
along its three dimensions of goal achievement, relevance and external cohesion. 
Chapter 7 builds upon the results of the empirical analysis presented in the 
previous three chapters in order to address the second research question of the study, and 
discerns the explanation of EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations. The 
chapter first begins with the comparative cross-case investigation, with an intention to 
single out factors that associate with EU effectiveness. Afterwards, the chapter proceeds 
with the within-case analysis of selected cases in order to explore causal pathways that 
link potential causal factors with the outcome. Finally, the concluding chapter 
summarizes the main findings of the study in light of the research questions put forward 
in this introduction. In addition, it also outlines broader reflections on the study’s findings 
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from the perspective of external validity and relevance for academic researchers and 
policy practitioners. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This chapter reviews the existing literature related to the study of EU effectiveness 
in multilateral arms negotiations. In particular, it puts forward and discusses three ways 
to map the current project in the existing web of scholarship – chronological, substantive 
and thematic – that form the backbone of the chapter. The three types of the literature 
review are instrumental in exploring the evolution of the research agenda and the current 
state of the art. As a way of conclusion, the chapter summarizes the research gap that the 
current study subsequently addresses. 
 
2.1 Evolution of the research agenda on the EU in world affairs 
From a Darwinist perspective, the focus of the current research on EU 
effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations is a result of a long-term evolution of the 
research trajectory on the EU in world affairs. Since the establishment of the CFSP 
predecessor – the European Political Cooperation – in 1970, the literature on the European 
Community’s (and later the EU’s) external relations and foreign policy has experienced 
a significant growth in number of volumes and authors. The academic interest in the EU 
in world affairs has been further reinforced by the Treaty reforms in Maastricht, 
Amsterdam and Lisbon that consolidated an emergence of the united Europe as a new 
pole in world politics. 
 
2.1.1 What is the EU? 
Generally speaking, the evolution of the academic literature on the EU in world 
affairs has gone through three generations of intellectual inquiry. The first generation of 
scholarship, which surged between the 1970s and 1990s, placed a predominant focus on 
the question of what the EU is. The fundamental leitmotif of this nascent body of literature 
was to understand the EC/EU’s ‘raison d’être’ in international relations (Goodwin, 1977) 
or, in other words, its ‘international identity’ (Whitman, 1997). This research purpose has 
been motivated by the difficulty of conceptualizing the nature of the EC’s external 
relations and its apparent misfit into the traditional categories of international actors, 
given that the Community proved to be more than an international organization, but less 
than a state (Wallace, 1983). This ontological debate was inherently linked to earlier 
discussions among theorists of the European integration as to the various end results of 
the integration process in form of supranational polity, confederal state or federal union 
(Caporaso, 1996). 
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One of the central categories of the first generation of literature on the EU in world 
affairs is the concept of power. François Duchêne (1973) pioneered conceptualization of 
the EC’s place in the world in terms of power. Duchêne introduced the notion of Europe 
as a ‘civilian power’, an identity that sharply contrasted with the dominant realist accounts 
of power in international relations. At the core of the civilian power idea is Europe’s 
ability to pursue its objectives by non-military, predominantly economic means. 
Juxtaposing the EC to the United States (US) and Soviet super-powers, Duchêne argued 
that ‘the European Community must be a force for the international diffusion of civilian 
and democratic standards or it will itself be more or less the victim of power politics run 
by powers stronger and more cohesive than itself’ (pp. 20-21). Galtung (1973) 
characterized Europe as a ‘capitalist superpower’, referring to the growing patterns of the 
EC’s economic dominance and asymmetry in relations with developing countries and 
members of Eastern European socialist block. Similarly to Galtung’s emphasis on 
common market and expanding trade, Feld (1976) referred to the EC as an emergent 
‘economic power’, and explored implications for the Community’s political importance. 
Other scholars investigated whether the EC is or can become an actor in 
international affairs. In their comparative study of the UN and the EC, Cosgrove and 
Twitchett (1970) claimed that both represent a new type of international actor by virtue 
of autonomous decision-making capacities and shaping foreign policies of their member 
states. In case of the EC, the qualities of an actor have been perceived to be even stronger, 
as they were enhanced by ‘Community consciousness’ (p. 50), something that the UN 
was arguably short of. In contrast, Taylor (1982) was more skeptical about the EC’s 
capacity to act in international affairs. Without offering a definition of an international 
actor, Taylor claimed that ‘Europe is capable of producing occasional examples of actor-
behaviour’, but ‘there is little evidence to support the view that the Communities […] 
might be expected to produce actor-behaviour in the long-term’ (p. 41). Sjöstedt (1977) 
developed an extensive theoretical model of the EC’s ‘actor capability’ that supposed to 
fulfill both ‘diagnostic’ and ‘predictive’ functions. Based on the analysis of the model 
and criteria for an actor capability, Sjöstedt cautiously concluded that the EC ‘seems to 
be some sort of half-developed international actor’ (p. 112). Further, Allen and Smith 
(1990) made yet another effort to conceptualize the EC’s place in international affairs, 
introducing the notion of presence. As they put it, the EC is ‘a variable and multi-
dimensional presence, which plays an active role in some areas of international interaction 
and less active in others’ (p. 20). 
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2.1.2 What does the EU do? 
The prominence of the concepts of power, actor and presence underpin the general 
intellectual orientation of the earliest body of scholarship towards understanding the 
nature, sui generis status and place of the EC in world affairs. This explanandum, however 
unambitious it may appear, should not be surprising. In the context in which nation states 
have been seen as nearly the only actors capable of possessing external policies, and given 
the uncertainty surrounding the prospects and outcomes of the European integration, the 
research attempt to map and categorize the EC in the existing system of international 
affairs is fairly legitimate. Yet, this research tradition faced the criticism of an uneven 
preoccupation with the EC’s institutional arrangements and decision-making procedures, 
discounting ‘the substantive policy that they produced (or failed to produce)’ (Allen and 
Smith, 1998, p. 48) or ‘the scope and scale of [the EC’s] foreign policy activities’ (H. 
Smith, 2002, p. 9). As the EU’s international outreach expanded after the Maastricht 
Treaty and the introduction of the CFSP, ‘by the 1990s, […] scholars had become less 
concerned with characterizing the “nature of the beast” than with analyzing what it does 
and how it does it’ (White, 2001, p. 19). Hence, instead of asking ‘what is the EC/EU?’, 
the post-ontological generation of scholarship, which grew between the 1990s and 2000s, 
focused on the question of what the EU does in world affairs. 
The central place in the second generation of scholarship on the EU in the world 
belongs to the body of literature that investigates the EU’s role in the international 
domain. Hazel Smith’s (2002) point of departure was that the EU has clear foreign policy, 
which can be analyzed in the same way as that of any sovereign state. In what he labeled 
as a ‘geo-issue-area approach’, Smith delved into the EU’s policies of security and 
defense, external trade, development aid, interregional cooperation, and enlargement, 
systematically comparing them across regional areas in light of participating actors, 
policy instruments and decision-making procedures. In a similar manner, Karen Smith 
(2003) focused on the substantive elements of EU foreign policy, motivated by the intent 
to explore ‘what the EU actually does in international relations’ (p. 2). Smith analyzed 
‘why and how the EU pursues five foreign policy objectives’ (ibid.), namely the 
encouragement of regional cooperation, promotion of human rights and democracy, 
prevention of violent conflicts and fight against international crime. 
Further, White (2001) claimed that European foreign policy consists of three 
interacting sub-systems of relations: Community foreign policy, Union foreign policy and 
member states’ foreign policies. Applying the foreign policy analysis framework to each 
type, White compares the three sub-systems with regards to their context, main actors, 
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instruments and capabilities, and policy-making processes. Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 
(2008) generally followed the same approach to the analysis of EU foreign policy 
focusing, as previous authors, on wide issues and geographical coverage. In addition, they 
also discussed the external aspects of the EU’s internal policies, thus linking energy, 
environment, health and justice issues to the EU’s foreign policy conduct. The common 
threads shared in these monographs, as well as in the separate chapters of the edited 
volumes published in the same time period (see Peterson and Sjursen, 1998; Rhodes, 
1998; Knodt and Princen, 2003; Hill and Smith, 2005; Bindi, 2010), were a highly 
empirical character and a lack of theoretical sophistication, a focus on the content and 
instruments of EU foreign policy, and a consensual understanding that the scope of the 
EU’s external relations are not limited to the narrow confines of the CFSP pillar. 
 Elgström and Smith's (2006) edited volume advanced the study of the EU’s role 
in world affairs in terms of conceptual analysis. Unlike previously discussed studies that 
used the notion of role as an umbrella concept to refer to general patterns of EU behavior 
in the international domain, Elgström and Smith provided an explicit definition of roles 
‘as patterns of expected or appropriate behaviour’ (p. 5). Hence, they suggested to 
investigate the EU’s role in world affairs as a function of both the EU’s self-imposed role 
conceptions and externally-driven expectations. Similarly, Orbie (2008) underlined the 
utility of the role theory in investigating the EU as an international actor. Highlighting 
their descriptive and explanatory potential, Orbie contended that role concepts ‘constitute 
a pragmatic and convenient way to come to grips with the Union’s international activities’ 
(p. 2). 
Gradually, the literature expanded with specifications of role definitions in which 
the EU is actually engaged. The variety included familiar civilian (Panebianco, 2006), 
normative (Manners, 2006), and multilateralist (Jørgensen, 2006) roles joined by more 
novel conceptions of the EU as a leader (Vogler and Stephan, 2007), norm promoter 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Panebianco, 2006), governance exporter 
(Freyburg et al., 2009), development donor (Carbone, 2007), crisis manager (Emerson 
and Gross, 2007), and peacebuilder (Tocci, 2010). Among these role definitions, the 
concept of EU leadership arguably attracted the greatest degree of academic interest 
(Elgström, 2007; Falkner, 2007; Oberthür and Kelly, 2008), not least because of the EU’s 
own self-perception of the role it plays in international environmental, trade and human 
rights governance. 
 Another way scholars approached patterns of the EU’s external behavior was 
through the concept of actorness. Although the examination of the EU’s capacity to act 
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in international affairs had been conducted earlier (Sjöstedt, 1977), only since the 1990s 
has the conceptualization of EU actorness gained a systematic character that has enabled 
analysts to better grasp the EU’s changing role in the world (Hill, 1993). Considerable 
effort had been undertaken to elaborate criteria for assessing EU actorness. Caporaso and 
Jupille (1998), for instance, argued that in order to analyze the EU’s capacity to act in 
global politics, a researcher needs to delineate a degree of the EU’s recognition, authority, 
autonomy and cohesion. Drawing on the constructivist approach to international relations, 
Bretherton and Vogler (2006) pointed out that the development of EU actorness 
encompasses interrelated components of presence, opportunity and capability. Further 
developing their approach in the context of interregional relations, Doidge (2008) 
suggested other criteria of actorness: action trigger, policy processes/structures and 
performance structures. These parameters were widely applied to explore the extent of 
the EU’s actorness over time and across different policy domains and geographical 
regions suggesting that, as with the concept of role, actorness is a fluid and context-
specific notion. Another feature of actorness research that links this tradition with the 
body of literature on EU roles is a familiar focus on the EU’s external instruments and 
tools. As Toje (2008) put it, ‘actorness cannot and should not be viewed separately from 
actual capabilities’ (p. 204). Reflecting upon the popularity of the approach among 
scholars, the thriving research on EU actorness contributed to a conceptual proliferation 
in the field, as evidenced by the studies on EU regionness (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2002), 
actorship (Hettne, 2008) or actorhood (Krotz, 2009). 
 
 2.1.3 What does the EU achieve? 
 Even though the second generation of literature took the study of the EU in world 
affairs to a considerably advanced level, some have argued that by the end of 2000s, the 
research tradition of studying what the EU does ran out of steam. The argument goes that 
while the examination of the content of EU foreign policy and the way the Union conducts 
its external relations did advance our understanding of the EU in the world, it had less of 
an effect with regards to the extent to which these external policies and instruments 
reached their intended effects. In this context, (K. Smith, 2010a) alleges that ‘too often, 
we lapse into assertions that the EU has either considerable or little influence, without the 
backing of clear, substantial evidence for such influence’ (p. 343). Proponents of the 
impact-oriented approach to the study of the EU in world affairs also claim that thus far, 
the researchers have been too busy with the inputs and processes of the EU foreign policy 
system without sufficiently considering its outputs. As Schunz (2010) observes, ‘[t]he 
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absence of sound conceptual and methodological reasoning about the Union’s impact in 
international affairs stands in stark contrast to the plentiful scholarly attempts at 
identifying what kind of power the EU can be or already is in the global arena’ (p. 23). 
Following similar line of reasoning, Mahncke (2014) also argues that the study of EU 
foreign policy to date has been quite inward-looking, focusing on the processes of internal 
decision-making. He highlights benefits of the alternative approach, calling for 
‘normalization’ of EU foreign policy study: ‘[Assessing effects] will show what the 
ambitions of the EU are, what results the EU is actually achieving, and, last but not least, 
what the Union needs to do if it wants to make a difference’ (p. 174). Interestingly, these 
interventions echo the growing expectations among observers and practitioners related to 
the Lisbon Treaty’s shake-up of EU foreign policy machinery and its diplomatic 
structures in particular. 
 While the third generation of intellectual inquiry about the EU in the world –
driven by the question of what does the EU achieve – started to develop into a systematic 
effort only in the 2010s, analysts might trace its roots to the seminal study of Roy 
Ginsberg (2001), published a decade earlier. Ginsberg examined external political impact 
of the EU on the conflict in former Yugoslavia, the Middle East Peace Process and on the 
US. The relevance of studying political impact rests upon its important function of 
feeding back foreign policy machinery, and hence informing subsequent external actions 
of the EU. ‘Without external political impact, there is no reinforcing link back to new 
sources of action, there is no expectation of effective action, foreign policy decision-
making would not be sustainable’ (p. 2). According to Ginsberg, the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the EU as an international actor is strongly dependent upon the EU’s 
impact, or the ability to affect interests or change the direction or substance of third states’ 
policies. Ginsberg also admits that ‘the concepts of presence and actorness, which help 
measure the EU’s capacity to act, are not sufficient for us to know if [EU] actions have 
effects – or outcomes’ (p. 48). Therefore, a novel analytical framework for defining and 
detecting external political impact needed to be constructed, as Ginsberg demonstrated 
before examining the EU’s empirical record in selected areas. 
 What the EU achieves in world affairs might arguably be best grasped through the 
concept of effectiveness. One of the features of the new research agenda on the EU as an 
international actor is, as Niemann and Bretherton (2013) put it, ‘the shift in focus from 
notions of actorness to effectiveness’ (p. 261). Scholars thus started to explore the links 
between the EU’s capacity to act and its effectiveness in the context of bilateral dialogues 
Brattberg and Rhinard (2013), inter-regional relations (Carbone, 2013) and international 
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institutions (Groen and Niemann, 2013). Others investigated the causal impact of certain 
elements of EU actorness, such as coherence (Thomas, 2012) or cohesiveness 
(Conceição-Heldt and Meunier, 2014) on effectiveness. Unlike earlier texts of the first 
and second generation of the research agenda, these studies are more conscious of a 
necessity to balance the EU-introvert character of the literature with a proper 
consideration of external context and characteristics, including engagement in 
comparative research.3 
 EU effectiveness also has been examined in the broader frame of EU performance 
in world affairs. Inspired by research in the fields of business and organizational studies, 
some (few) scholars have examined not only what the EU achieves in international affairs, 
but also the way it does so (Oberthür et al., 2013; Jørgensen and Laatikainen, 2013; Dee, 
2013; Baltag and Romanyshyn, 2017). Here, effectiveness is assessed along the other 
parameters, such as efficiency, relevance, cohesion or resilience, which are aggregated 
under the overarching label of EU performance. What most studies that address EU 
effectiveness share in common is a rather parsimonious understanding of effectiveness, 
as an ability to achieve intended results or goals.4 Yet, ‘[f]ew scholars studying the EU’s 
international conduct have analysed the concept in a comprehensive and structured way’ 
(Van Schaik, 2013, p. 37). Moreover, ‘systematic empirical analyses of EU effectiveness 
are still relatively rare’ (Niemann and Bretherton, 2013, p. 263). Given the nascent 
character of the growing research agenda on what the EU achieves in world affairs, the 
lack of conceptual and empirical studies of its effectiveness is understandable, but far 
from rewarding. 
 The outline of the evolution of the research agenda on the study of the EU in world 
affairs presented above is intended for mapping and positioning the current study on the 
EU’s effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations within the existing trends in the field. 
It is also meant to elucidate the reasoning behind the focus of this project and to 
differentiate it from the studies of previous research dispositions. Surely, the three 
generations of literature are by no means clear-cut. Likewise, the temporal boundaries of 
each type of research tradition are not set in stone. Scholars can and do continue to 
scrutinize EU actorness (Kristensen and Jovanovic, 2015) and deliberate on the character 
of the EU as an international actor, as the renaissance of the EU-as-a-power debate shows 
(Manners, 2002; Orbie, 2006; Aggestam, 2008; Damro, 2012). Against this background, 
                                                          
3 The tendency of an inside-out bias while downplaying the role of the external environment in the studies 
of the EU in world affairs has been well-highlighted by Jørgensen (2007; 2015). 
4 For a rare exception, see Oberthür and Groen (2015). 
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it is perhaps safer to assume the development of the research agenda on the EU in the 
world taking a stretched spiral shape, rather than evolving in a linear form. 
 
Table 1. The evolution of the research agenda on the EU in world affairs. 
Timeline Key theme Key concepts Key authors 
I generation: 
1970s-1990s 
What is the 
EU? 
Power, actor, 
presence 
Duchêne (1973), Galtung (1973), Feld 
(1976), Goodwin (1977), Cosgrove 
and Twitchett (1970), Sjöstedt (1977), 
Taylor (1982), Allen and Smith (1990) 
II generation: 
1990s-2000s 
What does 
the EU do? 
Role, 
leadership, 
actorness 
H. Smith (2002), K. Smith (2003), 
White (2001), Keukeleire and 
MacNaughton (2008), Elgström and 
Smith (2006), Elgström (2007), Jupille 
and Caporaso (1998), Bretherton and 
Vogler (2006) 
III generation: 
from 2010s 
What does 
the EU 
achieve? 
Impact, 
effectiveness, 
performance 
Ginsberg (2001), Niemann and 
Bretherton (2013), Conceição-Heldt 
and Meunier (2014), Van Schaik 
(2013), Oberthür et al. (2013), 
Jørgensen and Laatikainen (2013) 
 
2.2 The EU in multilateral negotiations 
The study and practice of the EU in multilateral negotiations is inextricably linked 
to the EU’s engagement with the wider world. As one former diplomat asserted, ‘the 
capacity to act internationally includes the capacity to negotiate and contract’ (Plantey, 
2007, p. 256). If bilateral exchanges and encounters always have been a traditional 
element of international relations – and for that matter practiced by the EC as early as the 
1950s – multilateral diplomacy surged to the center stage of world affairs relatively 
recently. By the end of the 1970s, David Allen (1978) spotted ‘the tendency for bloc 
negotiations to replace bilateral dealings as the dominant practice in the international 
system’, which ultimately compelled ‘the European states to organize themselves in order 
to act effectively within this new environment’ (p. 143). The observer status at the UN, 
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granted to the EC in 1974, allowed to transform what has been known as the Commission 
information and communication office in New York into a diplomatic delegation 
(Drieskens, 2012). Since then, the EC/EU has established eight multilateral delegations 
to international organizations and developed a varying pattern of participation and 
membership in multilateral forums, while the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 220 TFEU) called on 
the EU ‘to establish all appropriate forms of cooperation’ with the UN and other 
international organizations. 
As a reflection of the increasing pattern of the EU’s international diplomatic 
activities, the literature on the Union in multilateral contexts also has seen some growth 
and visibility, despite the asserted lack of academic interest (Jørgensen, 2007; Drieskens 
and Van Schaik, 2014). Owing to fuzzy disciplinary boundaries and a somewhat 
unprecise character of the subject of interest, the study of the EU in multilateral 
negotiations does not constitute a clear-cut field of inquiry. In the academic textbooks, it 
is typically subsumed under the headlines of partially overlapping themes, such as ‘the 
EU’s relations with international organizations’, ‘the EU and effective multilateralism’ 
or ‘the EU’s multilateral diplomacy’. For the purpose of mapping the current project 
within the relevant body of literature, it is important to distinguish between two categories 
of studies with different interconnecting prepositions: (1) the EU and multilateral 
institutions as opposed to (2) the EU in multilateral institutions. Each of these bigger 
groups can be further sub-divided into smaller clusters depending on the research question 
and aim of inquiry. 
 
2.2.1 The EU and multilateral institutions 
The first cluster of research examines the extent to which the EU shapes 
multilateral institutions, focusing specifically on the EU’s support and empowerment of 
international organizations. The studies in this area mushroomed after the EU proclaimed 
in 2003 ‘effective multilateralism’ as a headline goal of its foreign policy, distinct to the 
supposedly defective unilateralism of the US (Gowan, 2008). Scholars thus scrutinized 
the EU’s contribution to the UN’s system of collective security and crisis-management 
(Biscop and Drieskens, 2006), the EU’s input to the reform process of the UN Security 
Council (Pirozzi et al., 2014) or the EU’s role in the emerging fiscal multilateralism of 
G20 (Rommerskirchen, 2014). Falkner and Müller (2014), while exploring the EU’s 
potential for shaping global policies, shifted the focus from international organizations to 
international regimes. The way the EU embraces multilateralism also has triggered an 
active debate among communities of practitioners and think tankers, the resonance of 
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which has been reflected in numerous policy reports (Ortega, 2007; Jokela, 2011; Van 
Langenhove and Maes, 2012). Apart from showing the EU’s varying record in 
strengthening multilateral systems, scholars also concluded that in some instances, the 
EU’s policies may well undermine or contribute to dysfunctional activities of 
international organizations (Laatikainen and Smith, 2006; Kissack, 2010). In terms of 
theoretical explanation, this body of studies is fundamentally agent-driven, which lends 
the accounts of the EU’s efforts at building multilateral global order to the EU’s internal 
attributes and the quality of its internal multilateralism (Costa, 2013; Drieskens and Van 
Schaik, 2014; Bouchard et al., 2014). 
The second cluster of literature is rooted in a structure-oriented tradition, and 
focuses on the reverse impact of multilateral institutions on the EU. Although the general 
literature on transnational influences is not scarce (Risse-Kappen, 1995), its application 
in the context of the EU and multilateral systems is less common. In contrast to the 
growing body of scholarship of the former cluster, the literature that explores the causal 
arrows that flow from international organizations towards the EU is underdeveloped: 
‘second-image approaches, not second-image-reversed approaches, are all time favourite 
perspectives’ (Jørgensen, 2015, p. 25). Exploratory studies conducted in this area 
demonstrated how and under what conditions international organizations and multilateral 
agreements, acting through domestic policy entrepreneurs, can trigger a top-down change 
in EU policies and policy-making processes (Costa, 2009; Costa and Jørgensen, 2012; 
Nedergaard and Jensen, 2014). In addition, legal scholars scrutinized the extent to which 
the EU is dependent on the international law and international processes of norm creation, 
despite a widespread assumption of the autonomous character of the EU legal order 
(Wessel and Blockmans, 2013; Young, 2011). 
Finally, the third cluster of research does not attempt to merely isolate one 
direction of influence, but instead approaches the interaction between the EU and 
multilateral institutions from a two-way-street perspective. The contributions in this 
cluster are implicitly informed and guided by inter-organizational theories of cooperation 
that address relations, interactions and links between two or more international 
organizations (Jönsson, 1993). Two prominent volumes investigated, in a comparative 
manner, the relations between the EU and major international organizations (e.g. UN, 
WTO, IMF, ILO), focusing on their temporal evolution and varying internal and external 
factors that conditioned these relationships (Jørgensen, 2009; Blavoukos and 
Bourantonis, 2011a). Other scholars performed single case studies researching inter-
organizational relations within individual dyads, but across several issue areas, such as 
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development, environment, and security in the context of the EU-UN partnership 
(Wouters et al., 2006), or minority rights, terrorism, and data protection in the framework 
of the EU-Council of Europe cooperation (Kolb, 2013). While studying the post-Cold 
War security context, (Biermann, 2008) introduced the concept of inter-organizational 
networking, highlighting dense, and at times overlapping, institutional links between the 
EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and UN in the European arena. Following suit, scholars 
discovered that cooperation is just one possible mode of interaction between the EU and 
other security providers, with inter-institutional rivalry and competition becoming now 
more common (Van Ham, 2009; Koutrakou, 2011; Græger, 2014; Van Willigen and 
Koops, 2015). 
Two characteristics are shared across the three strands of research that effectively 
allow them to jointly stand out as a distinct body of literature on the EU and multilateral 
institutions. First, the EU is viewed as a partner (or sometimes a competitor) of 
multilateral organizations. In other words, a researcher approaches the former and the 
latter as actors on an equal footing, which makes this body of research particularly 
suitable for a theoretical import of IR perspectives. Second, the three clusters are 
predominantly policy – and to a lesser extent politics – oriented. That is, the processes of 
bottom-up or top-down influences between the EU and multilateral institutions are linked 
to specific changes in ideas, norms and rules that constitute policy priorities and 
preferences. The type of studies outlined in this section is not of immediate relevance for 
the current project, as they refer to multilateral negotiations in an incidental and sporadic 
manner. What is of interest, however, is the specific understanding of strength and weight 
of multilateral institutions as components to the EU’s effectiveness in multilateral 
systems (Laatikainen and Smith, 2006), something that will be discussed in a greater 
detail in the Chapter 3. 
 
 2.2.2 The EU in multilateral institutions 
 The fourth strand of research examines the EU’s participation in international 
organizations, and arguably has the longest record of all research clusters discussed in 
this section. Focusing mostly on the UN and its agencies, scholars tracked the modalities 
of the EC and its member states’ participation as early as following the introduction of 
the EPC and the EC’s observer status in the 1970s (Lindemann, 1976; De Gara, 1979; 
Gregory and Stack, 1983; Brückner, 1990). In that respect, Lindemann (1976) recalled an 
anecdotal situation when the Soviet Ambassador to the UN could not make sense of one 
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of the first joint declarations of the EC’s member states, asking ‘who are these Nine?’ (p. 
262). Over time, studies of this cluster of literature grew in numbers and volumes, 
reflecting the complexity and multi-faceted nature of the EU’s participation in 
multilateral organizations. 
Given the composite nature of the EU as an actor, coherence between EU 
diplomatic actors and its member states, in terms of voting, statements and other means 
of diplomatic exchange, became an omnipresent concern of scholars (Luif, 2003; 
Johansson-Nogués, 2004; Mahncke and Gstöhl, 2012). Besides the ability to speak with 
one voice in multilateral settings, the issues related to extensive patterns of coordination 
among EU actors also prominently featured in this body of research (Farrell, 2006; 
Taylor, 2006; Luif and Radeva, 2007; Degrand-Guillaud, 2009). Another popular topic, 
not only among political scientists, but also legal scholars, is representation of the EU in 
multilateral organizations. Whether and how the European Commission, member states, 
rotating EU Presidency or the European External Action Service (EEAS) sit in the EU’s 
chair and speak on its behalf entails the discussion of the intricate division of competences 
between national and supranational levels, as well as the rules of participation in 
international organizations (Rasch, 2008; Gstöhl, 2009; Nedergaard and Jensen, 2014). 
Other studies focused on explaining the variation and modalities of the EU’s 
membership status, some of them drawing on substantial legal expertise (Govaere et al., 
2004; Wessel, 2011; Debaere et al., 2014). Relying on the insights of the role theory and 
its application in the broader study of EU external affairs, scholars also explored the EU’s 
role performance in multilateral forums (Elgström, 2007; Laatikainen, 2010). Wouters et 
al. (2012) went somewhat further by conceptualizing position as the intersection of the 
EU’s legal status and role, and subsequently scrutinizing the concept in the context of the 
UN human rights and environmental bodies. Yet, other scholars drew upon well-
established concepts, such as presence (Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2011a) or actorness 
(Reiter, 2005; Gehring et al., 2013), to examine the EU’s participation in international 
organizations. If anything can be inferred from this brief review of the fourth cluster of 
literature, it is a considerable fragmentation and eclecticism in terms of a research target 
and approach, which motivates new edited volumes to aim at aggregating findings by way 
of combining multiple facets of the EU’s participation in international organizations 
(Orsini, 2014; Kaddous, 2015). 
The fifth and final cluster of research comprises studies that examine the EU’s 
participation in international regimes. More specifically, they investigate the EU’s 
involvement within a set of multilateral conferences that unfold in the framework of 
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multilateral treaties, conventions and agreements. Studies of this type are rare in 
comparison to the previous cluster, not least because of the perceived preponderant 
importance of the agentic qualities of international organizations and a difficulty of 
analytically separating ‘sets of rules meant to govern international behavior’ from formal 
organizations embedded in those rules (Martin and Simmons, 2012, p. 328). This is 
regrettable, as the examination of the EU in international regimes is closely linked with 
the study of multilateral negotiations. ‘Regimes are the result of continuous negotiations 
between actors. They are also major arenas for multilateral negotiation games’ (Smith 
and Elgström, 2013, p. 303). Smith and Elgström (2013) put forward an examination of 
EU roles and engagement modes linked to its participation in international regimes. In 
empirical terms, the existing studies of this cluster predominantly centered on the EU’s 
participation in multilateral environmental regimes (Delreux, 2011; Schunz, 2012), 
although, since recently, the focus lies to also cover other issue areas (Hivonnet, 2012; 
Debaere and Orbie, 2013; Kienzle and Vestergaard, 2013). 
 Several propositions can be formulated about the two reviewed clusters of 
research that constitute the literature on the EU in multilateral institutions. First, the EU 
is viewed as a participant in multilateral forums, whereas multilateral institutions are 
arenas that provide a platform for the EU’s participation. Hence, both clusters bring to 
the forefront the phenomenon of multilateral negotiations as a continuous process that 
enables participants of international organizations or regimes to shape behavior and 
outcomes in collective decision-making. Therefore, this body of literature is the most 
central for the current project, and it is here where the current study positions itself and 
contributes to the greatest extent. Second, the literature on the EU in multilateral 
institutions is predominantly polity-oriented, as can be inferred from the outlined survey 
of explanandums. The overwhelming majority of them concern the EU’s internal 
arrangements and characteristics, rather than portray the EU’s diplomatic interaction and 
its outcomes, reflecting a well-established tendency evident from the analysis of general 
EU external relations literature in the previous section. In this light, Laatikainen's  (2015) 
argument that ‘the dominant scholarly preoccupation in the field has been to establish the 
EU’s actorness within the UN’ (p. 707), which ‘has obscured the EU’s substantive 
actions’ (p. 712) can be extended to a broader context of the EU in multilateral 
institutions. 
 Given this state of art, it is not surprising that the studies on EU effectiveness that 
are explicitly linked to the context of multilateral negotiations are in their infancy. The 
most comprehensive attempt to date to explore the EU’s effectiveness in multilateral 
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negotiations was undertaken by Louise Van Schaik (2013). She studied the impact of the 
EU’s unity of external representation on its effectiveness across a set of negotiations on 
food safety, climate change and public health. In turn, the degree of unity as the main 
causal factor was believed to be determined by the type of EU competence, the level of 
preference homogeneity among EU member states and the degree of socialization among 
EU actors. Although Van Schaik developed a meticulous approach to analyzing EU 
effectiveness, the lack of conceptualization of the external context’s causal power stands 
out as a particular shortcoming. 
In similar vein, Conceição-Heldt and Meunier (2014) examined varying patterns 
of relations between EU cohesiveness and effectiveness in multilateral institutions. Panke 
(2014) studied the EU’s external effectiveness in negotiating UNGA resolutions, 
revealing a critical role for a negotiation strategy for the EU’s success. Effectiveness also 
has been examined as one of the dimensions of EU performance in multilateral arenas 
(Dee 2013; Oberthür et al., 2013; Jørgensen and Laatikainen, 2013). Although the 
existing studies on EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations made an important 
contribution, not least due to breaking away from a dominant in the field actorness-
oriented perspective, they do lack a comprehensive understanding of effectiveness, 
reducing the latter to the EU’s goal achievement. Furthermore, apart from Dee (2013), 
none of these studies drew on the international negotiation literature that can shed a great 
deal of light on the context and its implications for the EU’s multilateral diplomacy. 
 
Table 2. Overview of the literature on the EU in multilateral negotiations. 
Strand of 
Literature  
Key features Research cluster Key authors 
The EU and 
multilateral 
institutions 
The EU as a 
partner (or 
competitor) 
 
Policy-oriented 
 
The EU shaping 
multilateral 
institutions 
Laatikainen and Smith (2006), Gowan 
(2008), Kissack (2010), Costa (2013), 
Falkner and Müller (2014), Drieskens 
and Van Schaik (2014), Bouchard et 
al. (2014) 
Multilateral 
institutions 
shaping the EU 
Costa (2009), Young (2011), Costa 
and Jørgensen (2012), Wessel and 
Blockmans (2013), Crespy (2014) 
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Multilateral 
negotiations at the 
periphery 
Interaction 
between the EU 
and multilateral 
institutions 
Wouters et al. (2006), Jørgensen 
(2009), Blavoukos and Bourantonis 
(2011), Koutrakou (2011), Kolb 
(2013), Græger (2014), Van Willigen 
and Koops (2015) 
The EU in 
multilateral 
institutions 
The EU as a 
participant 
 
Polity-oriented 
 
Multilateral 
negotiations at the 
core 
The EU in 
international 
organizations 
Lindemann (1976), Bruckner (1990), 
Luif (2003), Johansson-Nogués 
(2004), Farrell (2006), Degrand-
Guillaud (2009), Rasch (2008), Gstöhl 
(2009), Govaere et al. (2004), 
Elgström (2007) Laatikainen (2010), 
Wouters et al. (2012), Gehring et al. 
(2013), Orsini (2014), Kaddous (2015) 
The EU in 
international 
regimes 
Delreux (2011), Hivonnet (2012), 
Schunz (2012), Smith and Elgström 
(2013), Debaere and Orbie (2013), 
Kinzle and Vestergaard (2013) 
 
2.3 The EU in multilateral arms negotiations 
The policy area of arms affairs – an umbrella term that includes issues of arms 
control, non-proliferation and disarmament – is widely believed to possess a set of special 
characteristics that enable it to stand out among the various international policy areas. 
Moreover, it is a set of distinct features that puts the military field of arms affairs 
somewhat at odds with the collective action logic intrinsic to multilateral negotiations 
(Rittberger, 1983). According to Avenhaus et al. (2002), security ‘issues representing a 
threat against the integrity or survival of a nation (high politics) are treated differently in 
international political interaction from other issues’ (p. 5). Weapons-related security 
challenges are set to be handled in an environment in which states are clearly the key 
stakeholders. The central position of states is grounded in their dual roles as actors that 
develop, deploy and diffuse weapons on one hand, but also regulate, control and negotiate 
over arms on the other (M. E. Smith, 2010). Moreover, multilateral arms agreements often 
involve core aspects of states’ sovereignty related to monitoring and sanctioning. This 
increased sensitivity of arms negotiations, coupled with a culture of secrecy, perversity 
of power and other attributes, reinforces states’ perceived exclusive positions in this 
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domain, and their resistance to any significant role of non-state actors (Burroughs and 
Cabasso, 1999; Avenhaus et al., 2002). 
The outlined characteristics of multilateral arms negotiations thus constitute a 
‘hard’ test case for the EU’s participation and ability to make a difference. Naturally, 
these circumstances generate no high expectations of the EU’s effectiveness, which may 
well be a reason why the study of the EU in multilateral arms negotiations is less popular 
compared to areas in which the EU is (or perceived to be) more visible and active. In 
addition, even within the international security field, arms affairs seemingly have lost 
their former weight and prestige in academic and policy-making circles and are now 
overshadowed by, for instance, issues of military conflict and terrorism. To some extent, 
the logic of the field is still informed by paradigms and elements of thinking developed 
during the Cold War period, which is also reflected in the lack of a new generation of 
researchers and experts other than those who were already active before the fall of the 
Berlin Wall (Bailes, 2013). 
The first diplomatic experience that exposed the then EC and its member states to 
arms related issues and found its reflection in the literature was the negotiation of the 
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Resulting from the 
rapprochement of the two superpowers, the Conference spread over the course of four 
years from 1972 to 1975, touching upon a wide variety of issues ranging from military 
confidence-building measures to humanitarian issues. Although essential policy 
proposals and positions were worked out in the context of NATO, for the EC and its 
member states, the CSCE was nonetheless of high significance ‘as the first major attempt 
to test their ability to work together’ (Tickell, 1975, p. 115), especially regarding 
representation and spokesmanship rights. Underlined by the EPC process, EC member 
states’ experiences of consensus-seeking consultations ‘brought them in the front row’ 
and ‘gained the European Community de facto recognition by all participants, including 
the East’ (Walschap, 1976, p. 41; see also Taylor, 1979). 
It was not until the launch of the CFSP by the Maastricht Treaty that scholars 
started to engage more systematically with the EU’s involvement in international arms 
affairs. The body of literature that has grown since then shares several distinct 
characteristics. First, the existing research is overwhelmingly policy-oriented. A ‘default’ 
design of such studies rests upon a general survey of the EU’s arms-related policies, 
discussion of their aims and instruments, shortcomings, and achievements, be it WMD 
non-proliferation (Anthony, 2009; Rhode, 2010; Quille, 2013), nuclear non-proliferation 
(Michel and Müller, 1996; Müller and Van Dassen, 1997; Tertrais, 2005; Portela and 
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Kienzle, 2015), export control of conventional arms (Hansen, 2016) or dual-use items 
(Micara, 2012). Other studies analyze specific EU policy instruments, such as WMD 
Strategy (Álvarez-Verdugo, 2006; Kienzle, 2013; Cottey, 2014) or Code of Conduct on 
Arms Exports (Bauer, 2003; Bromley and Brzoska, 2008), or focus on regional 
dimensions of EU arms policies (Kile, 2005; Zwolski, 2011; Hassan, 2013). Second, the 
existing research is largely empirically-driven. Although examples of rigorous 
application of concepts – such as, actorness (Zwolski, 2011) and performance (Blavoukos 
et al., 2015) – and theoretical perspectives – for example, institutionalism (Rosa, 2001) 
and intergovernmentalism (Bauer and Remacle, 2004) – do exist, the lack of conceptual 
analysis and theorization is a tendency that currently defines the state of the art. Hence, it 
is not surprising that non-academic reports and papers produced by think tanks and expert 
communities became dominant sources of knowledge, ideas and information in the field.5 
The abovementioned studies refer to multilateral arms negotiations in a cursory 
manner, as a mere element of the EU’s external arms policies, providing only a general 
indication of the EU’s assessment in terms of success or failure. Standalone research that 
specifically addresses the EU’s participation in multilateral arms talks is extremely rare. 
One notable exception is Alcalde and Bouchard's (2008) study of the EU’s coherence in 
the 2006 UN Small Arms Conference. Through the lenses of a multiple-level game 
approach, Alcalde and Bouchard identified problems in the EU’s coherence of 
representation and negotiation priorities that affected its ability to bring the Conference 
to the consensual outcome. Further relevant research is that of Dee (2012; 2015), who 
analyzes the EU’s participation in multiple NPT Review Conferences. What is 
particularly interesting is Dee’s shifting conceptualization of performance as consisting 
of recognition, relevance, followership and effectiveness to a more linear understanding 
in terms of output, outcome and impact. Several non-academic articles also targeted 
various episodes of the EU’s conduct in multilateral arms forums (Müller, 2005a; 
Schmitt, 2005; Katsioulis and Mölling, 2010; Delaere and Van Schaik, 2012; Depauw, 
2012). These papers can provide useful insights into narrative accounts of the negotiation 
processes, but are less helpful when it comes to developing analytical arguments for 
causal explanation. 
 
2.4 Summarizing the research gap 
                                                          
5 Of numerous think tanks that work on the EU in international arms affairs, three stand out particularly: 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and 
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). 
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With a purpose of mapping the current project within the established scholarship, 
this chapter scrutinizes the existing relevant literature in light of several distinct 
dimensions. First, from the perspective of chronological review, the current study is 
embedded into a broader evolution of the research agenda on the EU in world affairs. The 
review shows that the research on the EU’s effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations 
is a reflection of a long-term development of the research trajectory that traversed three 
generations of intellectual inquiry – ontological (‘what is the EU?’), behavioral (‘what 
does the EU do?’) and consequential (‘what does the EU achieve?’). The underlining 
thread of this evolution is a shift from an introvert study of the EU – an approach that 
puts EU-internal factors and characteristics at the center of the inquiry – to a broader 
outward-oriented focus that assigns equal weight to results of EU foreign policy and 
external environment to which an EU external action is directed. Although the impact-
driven approach facilitates ‘widening the horizon of the contemporary research agenda to 
one “that is profoundly more international than European” (Jørgensen and Laatikainen, 
2013a, p. 4)’ (Orbie et al., 2015, p. 723), it also opened up space for considerable 
conceptual proliferation. Such notions as ‘influence’, ‘impact’, ‘outcome’, and 
‘effectiveness’ are used by scholars almost interchangeably and without sufficient attempt 
to define their conceptual boundaries. Against this background and in a rather simplistic 
sense, effectiveness is often defined through the lenses of performance as an achievement 
of goals. The lack of comprehensive conceptualization of EU effectiveness tailored to the 
context of multilateral negotiations is one important research gap that this project 
addresses. 
Second, the substantive literature review maps the current study within the 
relevant bodies of scholarship related to the EU in multilateral negotiations. It has been 
shown that the relevant literature can be divided into two large groups and further sub-
divided into five research clusters. The first group of studies – the EU and multilateral 
institutions – views the EU as a partner (or competitor) to multilateral institutions, is 
primarily policy-oriented, and lends itself to the analysis of multilateral negotiation 
processes only to a minor extent. In contrast, the second category of studies – the EU in 
multilateral institutions – examines the EU as a participant in multilateral settings, is 
considerably heterogeneous in terms of various dimensions of polity as research targets, 
and brings multilateral negotiations to the forefront. It is therefore this second body of 
literature to which the current study talks the most, and to which it contributes to the 
greatest extent. Yet, the latter group of studies is characterized by a set of lopsided 
research tendencies. First, there is a strong preoccupation with various elements of EU 
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actorness in multilateral institutions at the expense of studying the effects of the Union’s 
diplomatic activity and its engagement with external negotiation contexts. Second, there 
is a lack of research on the EU’s participation in international regimes, which stands in 
contrast to a vast focus on international organizations as multilateral settings for the EU’s 
diplomacy. These are the two particular elements of another research gap that the current 
study on EU effectiveness in multilateral arms regimes intends to fill. 
Finally, the thematic literature review exposed this project to nearly non-existent 
academic studies on the EU’s effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations. This 
infelicitous state of the art draws its origin from the unpopular character of arms affairs, 
particularly in comparison to other areas of the EU’s multilateral conduct, among EU 
scholars. The adjacent literature on the EU’s involvement in international arms affairs is 
dominated by policy concerns and empirical analyses and, most importantly, it addresses 
the EU’s participation in multilateral arms talks in a rudimentary way. A widespread 
reliance on the non-academic knowledge produced by expert communities and think 
tanks is another particular feature that underlies the unsatisfactory state of the art. Hardly 
any research exists that integrates WMD and conventional arms negotiations in a 
comparative design, despite the promise of ‘multiple case studies potentially [producing] 
more condensed knowledge’ and cumulative results (Jørgensen, 2007, p. 517). 
Addressing these deficiencies in the literature is yet another aim of this study. 
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CHAPTER 3. CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 This chapter outlines the conceptual and analytical framework for analyzing EU 
effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations and, by doing so, sets a foundation for the 
empirical analysis performed in the subsequent chapters of the study. First, the chapter 
addresses basic pitfalls in studying the EU in multilateral negotiations. In particular, it 
sheds light and clarifies meaning of the key conceptual units – the EU, negotiations, 
multilateral negotiations – used throughout the study. Second, the chapter develops an 
elaborate conceptualization of EU effectiveness, the outcome that this study seeks to 
explain. A reader is guided through a multi-step and multi-level concept-building process 
including the definition, decomposition and measurement of EU effectiveness. Third, the 
chapter draws upon a number of explanatory factors, which most likely shape EU 
effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations, before summarizing main features and 
characteristics of the chosen analytical framework. 
  
3.1 Studying the EU in multilateral negotiations 
Analyzing EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations is hampered by a number 
of conceptual and empirical bottlenecks, foremost related to the difficulties with defining 
and measuring effectiveness. An examination of the EU’s participation and influence in 
the area of international affairs that is typically perceived to be a domain reservé of nation 
states is a challenge in itself. The traditional dominance of states in the functioning of 
various multilateral forums largely explains the lack of analytical and methodological 
tools available to EU scholars that seek to investigate the role of world’s most 
institutionalized form of regional integration – the EU – in multilateral institutions. 
Before delving into the core of this study’s analytical framework, several conceptual and 
epistemological clarifications ought to be made with regard to the subject of the 
investigation. Studying the EU in multilateral negotiations raises basic questions and 
concerns about how the EU as such is conceived, what is the essence of negotiation and 
when it is appropriate to speak of multilateral negotiations. 
What to analyze as ‘the EU’ in multilateral negotiations is not always 
straightforward. The heart of the controversy lies in the non-traditional nature of the EU 
as a global diplomatic actor that is neither a state nor an international organization. What 
complicates the analysis is that apart from being an international negotiator, the EU is 
also a negotiation arena for national state actors when it comes to internal coordination 
and deliberation of diplomatic standpoints (Elgström and Jönsson, 2005). The practical 
consequence is a frequent parallel participation of the EU and its member states in 
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multilateral forums, with an uneasy division of competences and tasks between them. 
This study follows a broad definition of the EU as a multilateral negotiator, which lends 
itself not only to the collective actions and diplomatic activities of EU institutional actors 
(the European Commission, the European Council, the EEAS and the High 
Representative for Union’s Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), but also incorporates 
member states’ diplomatic contributions that are developed (at least to some extent) 
through a certain interaction with the EU (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014, p. 14). This 
broad understanding of the EU in the context of multilateral negotiations foresees a 
potential for tension between supranational and intergovernmental elements of the EU’s 
diplomatic conduct, with important implications for its effectiveness. 
Negotiation can be conceived as an ‘identifiable mode of joint decision-making’, 
where ‘the parties […] combine their conflicting points of view into a single decision’ 
(Jönsson, 2002, p. 217). The classic understanding of negotiation presupposes an 
existence of both commonalities and differences among participants, who seek to 
reconcile them ‘for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the 
realization of a common interest where conflicting interests are present’ (Iklé, 1987, pp. 
3–4). Negotiations occur at every corner of public and private life, from bargaining at the 
market to dispute settlement between employer and employee to coalition-building in a 
parliament. In the international arena, negotiation is commonly viewed in a conjunction 
with or through the prism of diplomacy. Berridge (1995), for example, defines diplomacy 
as ‘the conduct of international relations by negotiation rather than by force, propaganda, 
or recourse to law, and by other peaceful means’ (p. 1). Contrary to war and coercion, 
negotiation is a more legitimate means for conducting international affairs or, as some 
even claim, ‘a tool that generates order in international relations’ (Meerts, 2006, p. 341). 
The EU is the most prominent epitome of such an order due to a densely institutionalized 
character of negotiation processes within the EU (Smith, 1996). 
 In a strict sense, multilateral negotiations can be most clearly understood through 
what they are not – bilateral negotiations. Unlike bilateral encounters that occur between 
two parties, multilateral literally means ‘many-sided’ (Hampson and Hart, 1995, p. 4). In 
other words, multilateral negotiations are joint decision-making processes with a purpose 
of reaching an agreement among three or more actors. Yet, focusing solely upon the 
numerical criterion of the definition, however helpful in terms of clarity, risks missing an 
important qualitative dimension that allows to distinguish multilateral negotiations from 
synonymous labels, such as plurilateral or multiparty negotiations (Crump and Glendon, 
2003). 
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The key to understanding multilateral negotiations is in the term ‘multilateral’. 
Robert Keohane (1990) defines multilateralism as ‘the practice of coordinating national 
policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of 
institutions’ (p. 731). While Keohane underlines the institutional dimension of 
multilateralism, John Ruggie (1993) defines multilateralism through the role of 
organizing principles – generalized principles of conduct – that guide the relations among 
its participants. In particular, Ruggie refers to indivisibility and diffuse reciprocity, as 
multilateralism generates a wide scope of collective goods that benefit its participants in 
the long run and across many issues, thus going beyond particularistic interests. In the 
last two decades, numerous scholars (Newman et al., 2006; Bouchard et al., 2014) have 
proposed modified definitions of multilateralism based on the need to accommodate the 
growing role of non-state actors in global governance, yet the component of rules and 
principles still remains at the core. As a form of multilateralism, multilateral negotiations 
can be understood as a collective decision-making process with a purpose of reaching an 
agreement among three or more actors, wherein the process is bound by certain rules and 
guided by certain principles. 
Two essential features of multilateral negotiations are important to consider in the 
context of studying the EU’s participation. First, multilateral negotiations are inherently 
complex and uncertain processes. In this sense, multilateral negotiations, especially those 
conducted under UN auspices, are different from bilateral (e.g. EU-US talks) or 
minilateral (e.g. EU-US-China talks) encounters that are relatively straightforward in 
terms of identifying negotiating parties and their preferences. Complexity in multilateral 
negotiations is displayed through multiple negotiation actors, which discuss multiple 
issues performing multiple roles that are informed by multiple norms (Raiffa, 1982; 
Zartman, 1994). In addition to – or owing to – their complex nature, multilateral 
negotiations are often surrounded by many uncertainties due to the difficulty of acquiring 
and managing relevant information by their participants (Underdal, 1983). The instances 
when no single actor has a monopoly on ideas, issues, agendas, bargaining tools and 
negotiations unfold on multiple levels and in a variety of groups, simultaneously 
complicating the tasks of a researcher in navigating the negotiation processes. More 
specifically, conducting research in the context of multilateral negotiations is challenging 
in terms of identifying causal relationships and singling out the individual effects of the 
EU’s participation. 
Second, multilateral negotiations stand out as a particular form of multilateralism 
along with multilateral institutions – international organizations and international 
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regimes. While negotiations represent a procedural form of multilateralism, organizations 
and regimes embody multilateralism’s organizational shape. The functions and meanings 
of the three are closely intertwined: international organizations and regimes are both 
products of and arenas for multilateral negotiations (Smith and Elgström, 2013). 
According to Hampson and Hart (1995), the fact that the hallmark of modern multilateral 
diplomacy takes place under the aegis of international organizations provides them 
‘special power and leverage to shape prenegotiation processes and influence the terms of 
subsequent negotiations’ (p. 4). For a researcher of the EU in multilateral negotiations, 
this implies that a proper consideration needs to be paid to the institutional context – the 
UN setting in this study – of the EU’s multilateral diplomatic conduct. 
  
3.2 Conceptualizing EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations 
‘Concept formation lies at the heart of all social science endeavor’ (Gerring, 1999, 
p. 359). As it is impossible to conduct research without concepts, the undisputed rule of 
thumb before commencing any in-depth investigation is to specify and define concepts 
(Sartori, 1970). Hence, before directly addressing the aim of this study of evaluating EU 
effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations, it is important to decide what EU 
effectiveness is. However, as Goertz (2006) argues, ‘to develop a concept is more than 
providing a definition: it is deciding what is important about an entity’ (p. 27). Similarly, 
Gerring (1999) claims that building a concept includes defining the events or phenomena, 
their attributes or properties and a label that covers all. To explicate ontology of a concept 
is thus to deliberate on the nature and structure of a phenomenon, drawing on both 
theoretical and empirical insights. Given the complex character of most social science 
concepts, Goertz (2006) suggests breaking down their analysis into three levels. At the 
basic level, a concept represents a noun or a label of a variable that is used in theoretical 
propositions. At the secondary level, a researcher analyzes multiple dimensions that 
constitute a basic-level concept. At the third level, there are indicators that specify the 
concept with regard to the acquisition of empirical data. This framework forms the 
structure of the following discussion. 
 
3.2.1 Defining EU effectiveness 
 Effectiveness is a cross-cutting concept that is widely used in a variety of 
disciplines, although its meanings and forms vary depending on the context, purpose and 
field of study. The literature on public policy and policy-making ties the notion of 
effectiveness to the achievement of specific policy goals that are formulated to solve 
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social problems (Héritier, 2012). It links effectiveness to policy implementation 
(outcomes) in the context of a policy cycle, distinguishing it from political decision-
making (outputs) and policy evaluation (impact). Similar rationalistic understanding of 
effectiveness is demonstrated by scholars working in the fields of organizational studies 
and public management (Lusthaus, 2002; Meyer, 2002). Here, effectiveness is conceived 
as an ability of an organization to successfully fulfil its objectives. Other scholars refer to 
effectiveness in the context of evaluating policy success (Marsh and McConnell, 2010). 
If the notion of success is defined ‘in terms of favourable or desired outcomes’, then 
effectiveness is understood as a necessary ingredient of success (Baldwin, 2000, p. 171). 
 The international relations literature also widely discusses the concept of 
effectiveness (Hasenclever et al., 1997; Young, 1994). Analysing the performance of 
international environmental regimes, Young (1999) suggests to examine regime 
effectiveness from the perspective of its problem-solving capacity: an international 
regime is effective when it alleviates the problem that triggered the regime’s creation. 
Scholars, for example, discuss the effectiveness of international institutions in dealing 
with environmental pollution, global epidemics or inter-state conflict (Young, 1994; 
Harman, 2012; Boehmer et al., 2004). Young (1999) further argues that effectiveness is 
a multi-faceted concept that may take on different forms: legal effectiveness (compliance 
with contractual obligations), economic effectiveness (the ratio between meeting the 
objectives and amount of resources spent), normative effectiveness (achievement of 
justice, participation and other values), political effectiveness (changes in the behaviour 
and interests of actors). 
Apart from the blurred conceptual foundations of effectiveness, another challenge 
in studying effectiveness is methodological. Since effectiveness does not appear to be a 
concept with a commonly agreed and accepted meaning, evaluation of effectiveness is 
susceptible to what some scholars may call ‘the eye of the beholder problem’ (Gutner and 
Thompson, 2013, p. 59). It means that definition and assessment of effectiveness 
frequently depend on who is conducting an evaluation. Finnemore (2014), for example, 
argues that scholars should necessarily ask the questions ‘effective for whom’ and 
‘effective for what’ in their analysis. Similarly, March and McConnell (2010) assert that 
ideas about success and effectiveness ‘are contested and that such contestations, in part, 
reflect power relations’ (p. 567). Further, Jørgensen (1998) claims that an evaluation of 
success or failure in world politics depends on whether an assessment comes from actors 
involved in the political process or from outside observers. In relation to this, Hegemann 
et al. (2013) point to an apparent gap between think tankers and policy-oriented scholars 
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who rely on case-specific empirical knowledge in dealing with effectiveness, and those 
scholars who engage in deductive theory-informed conceptualization of effectiveness. In 
light of defining and applying a common understanding of effectiveness among scholars, 
Hegemann et al. (2013) cautiously conclude that ‘a certain degree of flexibility and 
ambiguity is probably inevitable and may also be desirable with a view to the diverse […] 
contexts in which [effectiveness] is applied’ (p. 19). 
The illustrated conceptual and methodological challenges inherent in defining 
effectiveness in a systematic way are most certainly echoed in the literature on EU 
external relations. Van Schaik (2013), for example, highlights the lack of conceptual 
clarity of EU effectiveness, given that ‘few scholars studying the EU’s international 
conduct have analysed the concept in a comprehensive and structured way’ (p. 37). The 
most common definition of effectiveness among EU scholars is related to the achievement 
of objectives. While studying the EU’s performance in international institutions, 
Jørgensen et al. (2011) define effectiveness along these lines as ‘the extent to which 
organization is able to fulfill its goals’ (Jørgensen et al., 2011, p. 603). Effectiveness as a 
goal achievement has also been presented in the two recent special volumes that surveyed 
the EU’s external relations beyond international institutions (Niemann and Bretherton, 
2013; Conceição-Heldt and Meunier, 2014). The central argument of this chapter, 
however, is that goal achievement is only one possible attribute of EU effectiveness and 
that the over-reliance on this parsimonious definition, no matter how beneficial in terms 
of analytical clarity, risks downplaying other parameters of the concept. 
That EU effectiveness is a complex and not a unidimensional term is signaled by 
several case studies. While studying the EU’s role in the Human Rights Council, Karen 
Smith (2010) puts at the forefront of her definition of effectiveness a leadership element. 
She maintains that effectiveness is ‘the extent to which the EU can garner support for its 
position among the wider UN membership’ (K. Smith, 2010, p. 225). Others, like 
Laatikainen and Smith (2006), avoid providing a specific definition of EU effectiveness, 
but illustrate several kinds of it: effectiveness in acting collectively, in achieving 
objectives, in strengthening the UN and in acting through the UN (pp. 9-10). In the study 
of the EU’s support of the International Criminal Court, Thomas (2012) utilizes the 
mainstream definition of EU effectiveness as a goal achievement acknowledging, 
however, that it is necessary to maintain a certain level of flexibility while 
conceptualizing EU effectiveness, taking into account that its understanding ‘will vary 
according to the issue and forum in question’ (p. 460). 
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It seems plausible to argue that the concept of effectiveness – and, by extension, 
EU effectiveness – possesses the qualities of an ‘essentially contested concept’: it is 
linked to a normative notion of success (appraisiveness), it is likely to contain multiple 
dimensions (complexity) and its application is subject to interpretation (openness) 
(Gallie, 1956; Collier et al., 2006). Other scholars use similar descriptions, such as ‘a 
background concept’ (Adcock and Collier, 2001) or ‘an umbrella concept’ (Mair, 2008) 
to discern a term that due to its vague boundaries and disputed meanings resists clear 
definition and specification. Nonetheless, I do provide a specific definition of EU 
effectiveness in multilateral negotiations, which in this study is understood as an 
aggregate range of significant (observable) effects (direct or indirect, intended or 
unintended) that the EU produces while being part of multilateral negotiations. This 
definition serves two important purposes. First, it is an empirical definition that aims at 
mitigating the pitfalls of dealing with essentially contested concepts, and primarily helps 
to facilitate an empirical analysis. In contrast to a normative definition, the empirical 
conceptualization aspires to neutrality and tends to minimize contestations over value-
loaded meanings of the concept (Skinner, 1973). Second, it is a comprehensive definition 
that allows for inclusion of multiple dimensions beyond the conventional understanding 
of effectiveness as goals achievement dominant in the literature on EU external relations. 
Part of the concept-building endeavor is to determine the negative concept of the 
outcome, or the absence of the outcome of interest. According to Goertz (2006), thinking 
counterfactually about the negative pole helps to sharpen boundaries of the basic level 
concept. In this regard, Sartori (1970) claims that the best way to define any concept is to 
think about what the concept is not: ‘[A]ny determination involves a negation’ (p. 1041). 
The negative concept of EU effectiveness reads as EU ineffectiveness. As a negation of 
the positive concept, EU ineffectiveness means a failure of the EU to produce any effects 
while participating in multilateral negotiations. In this sense, the EU is ineffective when, 
although present in negotiations, it does not engage in diplomatic interaction so that any 
change or stability in the negotiation parameters cannot be attributed to the EU. Clearly, 
just as there is a long way from failure to success, there is a substantial theoretical and 
empirical gap between ineffectiveness and effectiveness. Hence, rather than treating EU 
effectiveness as a dichotomous concept, it is more proper to think about a continuum – 
or, as Goertz (2006) calls it, ‘a gray zone’ – that underlies the space between the positive 
pole (EU effectiveness) and the negative pole (EU ineffectiveness). Determining the 
negative pole of the concept and acknowledging the existence of the continuum between 
the poles helps to increase the coherence of the basic level concept and to avoid significant 
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measurement errors with regards to the cases that fall into the gray zone (the cases in 
which the EU is more or less effective). 
According to Gerring (1999), one of the criteria that distinguishes a good concept 
from a sloppy one is its external differentiation. The latter refers to the extent to which 
the concept is distinguished from similar concepts in the field. Similar to the utility of 
analyzing the negative pole, establishing relations with external concepts helps to further 
determine the boundedness of the given concept. In the context of multilateral 
negotiations, EU effectiveness can overlap or conflate with terms like output, outcome, 
impact and performance. Output is most commonly conceived as policy decisions 
(Easton, 1957), establishment of norms, principles and rules (Underdal, 2002) or 
specification of goals and tasks (Hegemann, 2013). Outcome refers to actors’ behavioral 
changes (Kahl, 2013), compliance with established rules (Underdal, 2002) or simply 
implementation of the output (Blavoukos, 2015). Impact is the most ambitious concept, 
which builds upon the former two, and describes (a contribution to) problem solving 
(Underdal, 2002). In the context of the EU in multilateral negotiations, output can be 
understood as a product of the EU’s internal deliberation (for example, a common 
position) with which the EU enters the negotiations; outcomes, in turn, can refer to the 
attainment of the EU’s position through diplomatic engagement; impact can be linked to 
the long-tern effects evident through the implementation of the negotiated agreement 
and/or follow-up rounds of negotiations. As output stands prior to the start of multilateral 
negotiations and impact refers to the phase after the negotiations are finished, EU 
effectiveness better fits the concept of outcome since the latter is linked to a single time 
period of negotiations. However, EU effectiveness and EU outcome are identical only to 
a certain degree, since the definition of EU effectiveness in this study goes beyond the 
achievement of goals (see Figure 1). Finally, performance also partially overlaps with 
effectiveness, although performance is a broader concept that in addition to output, 
outcome and impact also includes input (e.g., actors’ costs and resources) (Eckstein, 
1971). 
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Figure 1. Effectiveness in relatios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Decomposing EU effectiveness 
While the basic level concept essentially lies at the top of the conceptual pyramid, 
it is at the secondary level where the concept’s multidimensional structure appears 
(Goertz, 2006; Adcock and Collier, 2001). As it follows below, three secondary level 
attributes of EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations are considered. Each attribute 
presented below is linked to a particular kind of effect that the EU produces while being 
part of negotiations: effects on the outcome, effects on the process and effects on EU 
member states (see Figure 2). 
Among EU scholars, a dominant way to think about effectiveness is to associate 
it with the extent to which the EU reaches its objectives in multilateral diplomatic forums 
(Jørgensen et al., 2011; Van Schaik, 2013; Niemann and Bretherton, 2013). The EU is 
considered an effective actor if as many points as possible of the EU’s position are 
reflected in the negotiated agreement. Effectiveness as goal achievement is based on a 
rationalist epistemology of an actor with a certain set of interests and norms, which are 
pursued by means of multilateral diplomacy so as to shape the outcome of the negotiation 
process. Goal achievement thus shares common foundations with the rational image of 
the foreign policy implementation described by foreign policy scholars as ‘a “scientific” 
matching of agreed means and instruments with agreed objectives’ (Webber and Smith, 
2013, p. 82). According to this viewpoint, in order to learn about the degree of EU 
effectiveness, it is sufficient to compare the EU’s declared negotiating aims with an 
outcome document. Despite its reductionist character, the outcome perspective on 
effectiveness is important since the results of multilateral negotiations frequently produce 
binding rules for its participants. Goal achievement enhances understanding of EU 
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Figure 1. Effectiveness in relation to other concepts. 
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effectiveness, although its analysis can raise some challenges, especially when the goals 
are not clearly formulated, contradict each other, or enjoy a different level of ambition 
(Jørgensen et al., 2011; Oberthür and Rabitz, 2014). 
An alternative view on effectiveness beyond the attainment of goals shifts the 
focus from the results of multilateral negotiations to the way the negotiated agreement is 
achieved. For the EU to be called effective, it needs to comply not only with ‘internal’ 
standards of effectiveness, such as an achievement of the EU’s own objectives, but also 
to be seen as such in the eyes of external stakeholders. In this sense, the EU is an effective 
actor when it creates and enhances value through a multilateral process, which is 
considered a collective benefit in itself. As multilateral negotiation is a joint decision-
making enterprise, an actor’s ‘effort in this arena is meant not only to benefit the actor’s 
interests, but also the interests of the international community at large’ (Van Willigen and 
Kleistra, 2013, p. 107). Effectiveness as relevance in the negotiation process thus implies 
building trust, confidence and reciprocity among negotiation participants. As this is much 
about managing relationships between negotiation participants, relevance can be closely 
linked to what Walton and McKersie (1965) call ‘attitudinal structuring’, or ‘the system 
of activities instrumental to the attainment of desired relationship patterns between the 
parties’ (p. 5). Effectiveness as relevance breaks away from the rational-choice logic and 
its instrumentalist attitude towards multilateralism: the EU may give up the prospect of 
some of its individual gains for the sake of the contribution to the collective good of 
having a strong and persistent multilateral platform for institutionalized dialogue and co-
operation (Pouliot, 2011). Relevance therefore diversifies standards against which EU 
effectiveness in multilateral negotiations is assessed from individual and inward-looking 
to collective and outward-oriented. 
The third dimension of EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations is related to 
the effects the EU’s participation produces on its constituent entities. The complex nature 
of multilateral negotiations is characterized by situations when diplomatic delegations, 
represented by multiple units and agencies, frequently need to negotiate with themselves 
(Winham, 1977; Raiffa, 1982). In line with Brighi and Hill (2008), an actor’s participation 
in multilateral negotiations is as an act of constant balancing and interplay between what 
goes on inside an actor, and its projection towards the outside world (pp. 124-5). Hence, 
it is important that negotiators and members of their teams abide by common standpoints 
and messages to minimize the risk of being divided from within. Effectiveness as external 
cohesion refers to the ability of EU actors to ‘sing the same tune’ in support of a common 
position and act collectively in multilateral settings. Coordinating and crafting a single 
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voice among 28 member states is a challenging exercise; therefore, the mere fact of 
‘getting consensus within the EU is already a big negotiation achievement by itself’ (Van 
Willigen and Kleistra, 2013, p. 111). The extent to which such a minimalistic requirement 
can be considered to be a benchmark for effectiveness is contested, with some even 
describing it as a ‘delusion of success’ (Macaj and Nicolaïdis, 2014, p. 1072). Yet, since 
the EU is a not state, there always is a need to discount or adjust effectiveness standards 
that may work well for state actors – just as goal achievement and relevance do – with 
EU-tailored attributes that take into account the distinct nature of the EU as an 
international actor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The structure of the EU effectiveness concept is close to a prototypical formula of 
a family resemblance approach: the concept is present ‘if m of n characteristics are 
present’ (Goertz, 2006, p. 36). In contrast to necessary and sufficient condition structures, 
the family resemblance assumes sufficiency among concept attributes, which thus can be 
linked by a logical OR connector. The latter implies that in order to be assigned under the 
label of the basic level concept, empirical cases need not share all defining attributes of 
the concept in question. The consequence of opting for the family resemblance approach 
to concept-building is that it allows constructing, in Goertz’s words, ‘a substitutability 
continuum’. The latter implies that ‘the absence of one dimension can be compensated 
by the presence of other dimensions’ (Ibid., p. 45). The substitutability continuum is an 
important tool for a researcher since it is linked to the issue of relationship between 
defining attributes and their comparative significance. According to Goertz (2006), ‘in 
any concept-building enterprise one must directly address at the theoretical level the 
question of weighting’ (p. 47). It is assumed that insofar as the concept holds multiple 
dimensions at the secondary level, one or several attributes can be more important than 
the others. With regards EU effectiveness, it can be argued that external cohesion stands 
out in relation to the other two attributes: it is ontologically (not causally) prior to 
relevance and goal achievement. The ability to sing the same tune and act collectively in 
Figure 2. Secondary level dimensions of EU effectiveness. 
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multilateral forums is the bare minimum for the EU to be effective, which may lay the 
foundation for the EU’s effects on the process and outcome. If goal achievement and 
relevance are sufficient for EU effectiveness, the external cohesion carries greater 
conceptual (but not necessarily empirical) weight, being a necessary condition of the 
concept.6 Since by definition a necessary element cannot be substituted, it becomes clear 
that the concept structure does not enjoy complete substitutability. Hence, rather than 
falling fully under the prototype of family resemblance, the concept of EU effectiveness 
displays traits of a hybrid structure.7 
 As a last step in analyzing the secondary level concept, it is important to consider 
how the three different dimensions combine to form the basic level concept of EU 
effectiveness. As the generic definition of EU effectiveness suggests, the basic level 
concept is something equal to an ideal type. It contains all possible defining attributes of 
EU effectiveness in general, even though in reality not all can be found in any empirical 
case. Goal achievement and relevance are sufficient – and, hence, substitutable – 
components, the absence of which leads to the emergence of ‘diminished subtypes’ 
(Collier and Levitsky, 1997) or, in other words, subsets of EU effectiveness. If goal 
achievement is missing, the combination of relevance and external cohesion is referred to 
as EU process effectiveness. By the same token, in the absence of relevance, the 
combination of goal achievement and external cohesion is associated with EU outcome 
effectiveness. In the absence of both goal achievement and relevance, the subset will 
contain only one attribute (external cohesion), and can be entitled EU damage limitation 
effectiveness to describe cases in which the EU’s participation in multilateral negotiations 
has led only to significant effects on its member states, rather than the process or outcome 
of negotiations.8 If all three attributes are missing, EU effectiveness disappears altogether, 
turning into its negative pole of EU ineffectiveness (see Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 It can be argued, however, that the external cohesion is a trivial necessary condition of the concept, as 
trivial characteristics, according to Goertz (2006), is defined as elements ‘which are easy to obtain or which 
are almost always present’ (p. 48). 
7 In this respect, one can argue that the internal structure of EU effectiveness shares similarities with a radial 
concept, as it is built around a core or anchor attribute of external cohesion (Collier and Mahon, 1993). 
8 This subtype suggests that at times, EU effectiveness can be understood not as much through the extent 
to which the EU attempts to tackle an external challenge, but rather as a damage limitation process – 
preventing outside conflicts from causing internal problems (Jørgensen, 1998; Bickerton, 2007; 2010). 
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3.2.3 Measuring EU effectiveness 
The third step in the concept-building process includes a design of indicators, or 
measures to operationalize attributes of the given concept. According to Goertz (2006), 
descending to the third level of the concept structure implies converting an abstract 
conceptual discussion of the previous levels into empirical practice: ‘the indicator/data 
level is where the concept gets specific enough to guide the acquisition of empirical data’ 
(p. 62). In other words, concept measurement entails a collection of empirical 
observations that help to distinguish real-world referents of the concept and of its 
attributes. Apart from selecting indicators, an important task in the concept measurement 
procedure is to choose an appropriate measurement level. In this regard, Munck and 
Verkuilen (2002) warn against ‘the excesses of introducing distinctions that are either too 
fine-grained, […] or too coarse-grained’ (p. 17), as the two extremes can lead to a risk of 
either increasing measurement error or loosing valuable case specific features. Hence, in 
this study, if not stated otherwise, a three-value (high, medium, low) ordinal measurement 
scale is applied throughout as an acceptable middle ground between interval (fine-
grained) and dichotomous (coarse-grained) measures. Finally, any assessment of the 
concept measurement needs to be conducted against the standards of validity and 
reliability. If measurement validity refers to the ability of a measure to adequately tap into 
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EU full 
effectiveness 
+ GA 
+ R 
+ EC 
EU outcome 
effectiveness 
+ GA 
‒ R 
+ EC 
EU process 
effectiveness 
‒ GA 
+ R 
+ EC 
EU damage 
limitation 
effectiveness 
‒ GA 
‒ R 
+ EC 
EU 
ineffectiveness 
‒ GA 
‒ R 
‒ EC 
Basic level 
 
Second 
level 
GA = goal achievement 
R = relevance 
EC = external cohesion 
+ attribute present 
‒ attribute absent 
Note: Based on Goertz (2006) 
Figure 3. Conceptualizing EU effectiveness across two levels. 
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the concept we intend to gauge (rather than some other concept or phenomenon), 
measurement reliability stands for robustness of a measure over multiple replications and 
by different researchers (Adcock and Collier, 2001; Schmitter, 2008; Beach and Pedersen, 
2013, p. 122). 
 To measure the first attribute of EU effectiveness – goal achievement – one can 
rely on a congruence between EU goals and negotiation outcome. The indicator implies 
a comparison between the EU’s negotiating position (in the form of binding Common 
Positions or less binding Council Conclusions) and the outcome document of negotiations 
(an agreed upon text or the latest draft of the negotiated document). Goal achievement is 
considered to be high if more than half of the EU’s key position points are reflected in 
the outcome document. Consequently, goal achievement is considered to be medium if 
around half of the EU’s objectives ended up in the negotiation outcome. Finally, a low 
score of goal achievement means that only a small fraction – less than half – of EU key 
position points are reflected in the outcome document. 
It can be argued that, as an indicator of goal achievement, congruence between 
EU goals and negotiated outcomes enjoys a high level of reliability. The measure has 
been widely applied by scholars studying EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations 
(Van Schaik, 2013; Delreux, 2014; Conceição-Heldt and Meunier, 2014). In contrast, 
validity of this indicator is slightly problematic. First, there are some reservations with 
regard to the nature and quality of an actor’s objectives. If continuity is preferred to 
change, the EU can be deemed effective by simply sticking to the status quo. The 
argument goes that in multilateral negotiations, it is normally easier to maintain the status 
quo rather than to make an attempt to push it through (Oberthür and Rabitz, 2014). 
Second, the link between an actor’s objectives and a negotiation outcome can also be 
contested. Van Willigen and Kleistra (2013) criticize goal achievement for its arguably 
simplistic linear understanding of the connection between the two. In a similar vein, 
Gutner and Thompson (2013) argue that a mere focus on goal attainment says little about 
causality, as the given outcome might have been reached due to the behavior of other 
actors. 
This study addresses these challenges in a twofold way. As to the first criticism, a 
second indicator – ambitiousness of EU objectives – is introduced to complement the 
goal-outcome congruence. It gauges the overall distance of the EU’s position from the 
status quo in a given field of negotiations, and can vary from a progressive to conservative 
score. Hence, any assessment of a match between EU goals and negotiated agreements 
needs to be discounted or upgraded in light of the underlying level of EU ambition. With 
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regard to the second challenge, it is addressed on the level of the methodological and 
analytical framework of the thesis. As it is mentioned in Chapter 1, this study utilizes 
process tracing, which is arguably the best placed tool to causally link the EU’s 
participation in multilateral negotiations and negotiation outcomes (George and Bennett, 
2005). Moreover, a complex nature of multilateral negotiations with a multiplicity of 
actors and their interests will be well-reflected in the choice of causal factors presented 
later in this chapter. 
 In comparison to goal achievement, indicators of the second attribute of EU 
effectiveness – relevance – are less straightforward. One reason for this is that scholars 
rarely include the dimension of relevance in the concept of EU effectiveness; hence, the 
measures to capture empirical fingerprints of this attribute remain underdeveloped. 
Jørgensen et al. (2011) and Dee (2012) are among few who relied on relevance to study 
the EU’s international performance. However, their operationalization of EU relevance 
as an ability to gain support of its priority stakeholders, mainly EU member states, is not 
particularly valid for my definition of relevance, which puts at the forefront the EU’s 
effects on the negotiation process. In order to operationalize EU relevance in multilateral 
negotiations, it is useful to consider the following questions: did the EU matter in the 
negotiation process? What kind of benefits, if any, did the EU’s participation produce in 
terms of managing relationships between negotiating parties? How did it contribute to the 
negotiation process in terms of enhancing collective benefit? In other words, EU 
relevance might be examined by way of looking at what kind of role definition the EU 
acquired in the negotiations, and how it was practically applied in the negotiation process 
(Elgström, 2007). 
In the context of assessing EU relevance, two further notes are important. First, 
following international regime scholars, it can be added that in order to get a better grip 
on empirical manifestations of EU relevance, a researcher needs to map a hypothetical 
state of affairs when the EU does not participate in the negotiations (Underdal, 1992). 
‘No EU participation’ as a reference point requires counterfactual reasoning that will 
allow the identification of observable effects of the EU’s presence on the negotiation 
process. Second, drawing on Arts and Verschuren's (1999) methodology of evaluating an 
actor’s political influence, it is important to distinguish between the EU’s own perception 
of relevance (ego-perception) and other negotiators’ perspectives on it (alter-perception). 
Thus, relevance is considered to be high if the EU contributed on multiple occasions to 
the advancement of the negotiation process, and this was recognized not only by EU 
negotiators, but also by external parties. Consequently, relevance is considered to be 
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medium when the EU sporadically acted in terms of collective interests, which has not 
been uniformly acknowledged by EU and non-EU negotiators. Finally, relevance scores 
low if the EU was not able to generate any perceived collective benefits in the negotiation 
process. 
The third attribute of EU effectiveness – external cohesion – consists of two 
indicators. The first indicator evaluates the compatibility between the EU and its member 
states’ interventions on the floor as the proxy of an ability to sing the same tune in support 
of a common position. It implies a comparison between EU statements as a manifestation 
of a common line on one hand, and member states’ statements on the other hand. The 
compatibility is considered to be high when member states’ statements on the floor reflect 
the language of the EU statement with no or just a few meaningful contradictions. The 
compatibility is considered to be medium if member states’ interventions only partially 
reflect the common line expressed by the EU statement, deviating from it on a number of 
significant points. Finally, the compatibility is considered to be low when the content of 
member states’ interventions and the key messages of the EU statement by and large go 
apart. 
The second indicator of external cohesion evaluates the ability of member states 
to act collectively in multilateral settings through the EU channel, rather than alternative 
means (e.g., opting for other diplomatic groupings and coalitions existing in particular 
multilateral forums). The range of joint EU diplomatic actions in multilateral forums can 
range from participating and organizing meetings to undertaking démarches to 
supporting, sponsoring or initiating proposals, resolutions and papers (Van Willigen and 
Kleistra, 2013). The aptitude for joint diplomatic actions is considered to be high when 
member states consistently and systematically rely on the EU in pursuing collective 
initiatives in multilateral negotiations. The aptitude for joint diplomatic actions is 
considered to be medium if member states occasionally utilize the EU platform, preferring 
at times to pursue their preferences through alternative collective channels. Finally, the 
aptitude for joint diplomatic actions is considered to be low when in the course of 
multilateral negotiations, member states consistently and systematically rely on 
diplomatic groupings and coalitions other than the EU. The final score of external 
cohesion as an attribute of EU effectiveness is calculated by averaging the scores of its 
two indicators. 
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 Once the disaggregated three-level structure of EU effectiveness becomes clear, 
it is important to clarify how the reverse aggregation of the concept back to the basic level 
works in light of its measurement. It is important to emphasize that this study does not 
assume an equal empirical weight among all three components of EU effectiveness. It can 
be argued that the external cohesion possesses the least empirical clout of all three 
(although conceptually-speaking, it is considered to be an essential element of the 
concept), given that it requires a minimal amount of effort from the EU to be considered 
present, hence, a relatively high empirical extension – the range of cases covered – of this 
one attribute alone. In contrast, goal achievement and relevance are more demanding 
elements of EU effectiveness, but their comparative empirical weight differs. It can be 
assumed that potentially, all negotiators would prefer to shape outcomes of negotiation 
(direct effects), rather than a negotiation process (indirect effect). In light of a larger set 
of potential obstacles and as the component of EU effectiveness, goal achievement 
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Figure 4. Three-level structure of EU effectiveness concept. 
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appears to be more ambitious than the relevance. Gutner and Thompson (2013), for 
example, rank, albeit implicitly, effects on the outcome ahead of effects on the process, 
arguing that ‘process can be used by IOs [international organizations] to mask substantive 
outcomes’ (p. 63). Similarly, Betsill and Corell (2008), while determining levels of NGO 
influence in international environmental negotiations, assume greater importance of 
shaping the outcome rather than the process. 
One can therefore assume a ranking among the three attributes of EU effectiveness 
with goal achievement on top (3 points on a scale from 1 to 3), external cohesion at the 
bottom (1 point) and relevance in-between (2 points). The empirical weights assigned to 
the attributes eventually allow to rate different subtypes of EU effectiveness, with a view 
on their relative importance. In this regard, EU outcome effectiveness scores the highest 
(3 [goal achievement] + 0 [relevance] + 1 [external cohesion] = 4), which permits to 
evaluate it as high EU effectiveness on a cross-case level of analysis. Correspondingly, 
EU process effectiveness receives a medium score (0 [goal achievement] + 2 [relevance] 
+ 1 [external cohesion] = 3), and is regarded as medium EU effectiveness on a cross-case 
level. Lastly, EU damage limitation effectiveness scores the lowest among all subtypes 
(0 [goal achievement] + 0 [relevance] + 1 [external cohesion] = 1), and is assessed as low 
EU effectiveness on a cross-case level. 
 
3.3 Causal factors shaping EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations. 
The choice of explanatory factors of EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations 
is based on two main premises. First, it is assumed that a sufficient account of EU 
effectiveness cannot be reduced to singular explanations. Given the complex and multi-
faceted character of the explanandum, it is likely to be influenced by multiple causal 
factors, as demonstrated by the research on various types of agents (states, NGOs and 
international organizations) acting in multilateral environments (Karns and Mingst, 1990; 
Betsill and Corell, 2008; Gutner and Thompson, 2013). Second, a comprehensive 
explanation of EU effectiveness requires an examination of EU-internal factors, as well 
as explanatory conditions related to the external context. As it has been shown in the 
previous chapter, the dominant pattern in the literature on the EU’s participation in 
multilateral institutions is a preoccupation with EU-specific variables and characteristics 
overlooking the influence of multilateral settings in which specific sets of negotiations 
take place. Prominent studies in the field either neglect causal powers in the external 
context (Van Schaik, 2013) or underestimate their role (Jørgensen et al., 2011) or examine 
external factors in isolation rather than as part of an integrated explanatory framework 
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(Jørgensen, 2009).9 The current study therefore not only seeks to provide a balanced 
account of EU effectiveness by incorporating both EU-internal and EU-external factors, 
but also through exploring the links between them. To explain the level of EU 
effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations, six causal conditions are suggested: three 
are EU-specific (internal policy, institutional coordination, member states’ interests) and 
three are related to the multilateral context (global power distribution, legal institutional 
setting, international constellation of interests) (see Table 3). 
The first factor relates to certain types of resources – political strategies or 
domestic legislation – that the EU has at its disposal (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 29; 
Oberthür and Rabitz, 2014). In the policy areas of conventional arms and WMD, this boils 
down to the development of EU common rules, standards and instruments that regulate 
and control a broad range of activities regarding the safe and secure exploitation of arms. 
Together, these elements are grouped under the label of EU internal policy. With respect 
to the association between internal policy and EU external effectiveness, Jørgensen et al. 
(2011) have pointed out that in multilateral forums, it is hard for EU member states to 
argue against the objectives of the policy that they have already endorsed internally. 
Furthermore, they add that member states ‘also have a vital interest in “internationalising” 
or “uploading” domestic EU regulations in order to create a level playing field 
internationally’ (p. 613). Similarly, Woolcock (2012) argues that ‘if there is a well 
developed acquis that establishes an agreed internal policy this will often provide the 
basis for the EU external policies’ (p. 27). Therefore, it can be expected that a high level 
of internal policy development pushes EU actors to promote similar policy objectives at 
the international level (goal achievement) and provides a platform for building a single 
voice and acting collectively at multilateral forums (external cohesion). It also can 
enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the EU’s external position, and thus positively 
shape perceptions of the EU by outsiders (relevance). 
The second factor that shapes EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations 
is the degree of institutional coordination between the major EU actors: the European 
Commission, the EEAS, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament. The variable 
incorporates political and legal aspects of the division of competences and the patterns of 
external representation (Jørgensen and Wessel, 2011). A high degree of inter-institutional 
coordination is a prerequisite for effective EU external action in virtually all areas of EU 
foreign policy, especially that which concerns multilateral institutions. Gstöhl (2009), for 
                                                          
9 For a recent exception, see Debaere (2015), who explores internal and external forces shaping the level of 
EU coordination in international institutions. 
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example, argues that there is a direct causal link between EU competences coupled with 
internal coordination mechanisms and the EU’s ability ‘to speak with one voice’ in 
international forums. As the issues negotiated at the international level frequently crosscut 
areas of exclusive and shared competences within the EU legal order, the Union and its 
member states often find themselves in a series of legal disputes, which can be detrimental 
to the EU’s ability to produce effects in multilateral negotiations. As Wessel (2011) 
contends, ‘the complex division of competences between the EU and its member states 
often block the EU from fully taking over and thus affect its relevance’ (p. 633). A high 
degree of institutional coordination with regard to a clear division of responsibilities and 
representation is likely to increase the effectiveness of the EU in multilateral negotiations. 
 Despite the significant progress in the integration of European foreign policies, 
EU member states continue to play a gate-keeping role in this field. When it comes to the 
security and defense domain, of which arms affairs is an essential part, national capitals 
traditionally are hesitant in relinquishing any of their sovereignty, thus reserving the right 
to act autonomously in pursuit of national objectives. As major international crises have 
shown, when there is a strong division between member states, as it was the case with the 
war in Iraq in 2003 and Kosovo’s independence in 2008, EU foreign policy tends to be 
suboptimal. Examining the EU’s record in a multilateral context, Whitman (2010) argues 
that ‘when Member States disagree, or are at cross-purposes, this can be a disaster for EU 
foreign policy’ (p. 28). Thus, member states’ interest homogeneity appears to be another 
powerful factor that shapes the effectiveness of the EU in multilateral negotiations. 
Blavoukos (2015) considers member states’ interest congruence as one of the main 
conditioning parameters of EU effectiveness, arguing that the former ‘clearly improves 
the EU’s international performance’ (p. 23). Further, Weiss (2013) elaborates on potential 
risks and dangers of conflicting interests among member states that, among others, can 
lead to a lack of streamlined and coherent EU representation at the international level or 
subject the EU to divide-and-rule tactics by third actors. If the EU’s preferences in 
multilateral forums are accepted, shared and upheld by a large majority of member states, 
primarily by France, Germany and the UK, the EU will have a better chance to deliver on 
its declared objectives, enhance its relevance in the negotiation process and increase its 
external cohesion. 
 Distribution of power among actors is a structure-related factor that traditionally 
features in international negotiation studies. The impact of power on the behavior of 
actors and its ability to shape foreign policy outcomes is typically emphasized by the 
realist school of international relations (Rose, 1998; Waltz, 2000). As Doran (2010) put 
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it, ‘the higher the level of its power, the more foreign-policy roles a state is able to perform 
and the greater the intensity of its participation in world affairs’ (p. 43). The broad 
assertion that power matters is also shared by international negotiation scholars (Zartman 
and Rubin, 2002). Sjöstedt (1999), for example, discusses conditions necessary for actors 
to exercise influence in multilateral negotiations. He distinguishes between three 
dimensions of power: competences/resources (diplomatic, administrative, informational), 
issue-specific power (values at stake in negotiation) and structural power (status). Sjöstedt 
emphasizes the importance of issue-specific power as a source of influence, since an 
accumulation of the latter can lead to ‘a situation in which a country’s share of the values 
at stake is so large that an agreement without the acceptance of this country would have 
only limited value’ (p. 248). It is important to note that a comprehensive understanding 
of issue-specific power entails not only material resources, such as a number of military 
personnel, possession of nuclear weapons and arms export shares, but also non-material 
capabilities including skills, knowledge and norms (Young, 2010, p. 5; Hampson and 
Hart, 1995, p. 10). 
EU scholars also have been vocal about the significance of power distribution for 
EU effectiveness. Blavoukos (2015) and Oberthür and Rabitz (2014) argue that a high 
number of structural assets or a high weight in an issue area increase the EU’s bargaining 
power in multilateral negotiations, which is crucial for accomplishing the EU’s 
objectives. Similarly, Elgström and Strömvik (2005) and Conceição-Heldt (2014) discuss 
the impact of the balance of power in multilateral negotiations, contending that power 
asymmetry in favor of the EU positively affects its ability to succeed in shaping the 
negotiation outcomes. Hence, it can be expected that the level of EU effectiveness in 
multilateral negotiations can be facilitated or constrained by a relative distribution of 
power among negotiators. 
The fifth factor that is crucial for determining the degree of EU effectiveness in 
multilateral negotiations is the formal rules and procedures of participation in a given 
international forum. The fact that the EU is not a nation state often creates obstacles and 
constrains possibilities for its participation in multilateral institutions. Recently, the EU 
acquired a legal personality and pushed for an ‘enhanced observer’ status in the UN. The 
Union eventually obtained the right to attend informal meetings, the right to speak and to 
make interventions, as well as the ability to propose amendments (Wessel, 2011). 
However, the EU still has no voting rights in the UN, and its amendments may be put on 
vote only at the initiative of an EU member state. Scholars tend to disagree as to whether 
and to what extent the legal institutional setting of a negotiation forum impacts EU 
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effectiveness. On one hand, Gehring et al. (2013) conclude that the EU is able to shape 
policy outcomes and have an added value for collective deliberation and decision-making 
in many multilateral forums, regardless its formal membership status. On the other hand, 
Reiter (2005), Gstöhl (2009) and Jørgensen et al. (2011) argue that rules and procedures 
that do not grant the EU full rights to participate or privilege certain EU member states 
are detrimental for EU effectiveness, in particular undermining its relevance in the 
negotiation process, the level of goal achievement and the ability to act collectively. 
Nevertheless, as a widely accepted explanation of EU effectiveness and due to its 
ambiguous explanatory power, it is worthwhile to include the rules and procedures of 
international forums in the analysis. Hence, it can be expected that EU effectiveness will 
be higher in the negotiation forums in which the rules and procedures grant the EU full 
membership rights and do not privilege some EU member states over others. 
 The final factor that belongs to the cohort of EU external conditions is an 
international constellation of interests. Any set of multilateral negotiations is 
characterized by a combination of common and conflictual interests that, if put along a 
continuum, can vary ‘from completely identical interests to totally incompatible interests’ 
(Hopmann, 1996, p. 25). The distribution of interests among negotiation participants 
allows to distinguish two situations that underlie the negotiation context. The first is a 
polarized negotiation environment that is characterized by an increased intensity in the 
conflictual preferences, with negotiation participants moving towards extreme positions 
(poles). Formation of homogeneous groups or blocks with opposing interests is one of the 
features of polarized negotiations (Duro and Padilla, 2008). An alternative situation 
presupposes a less polarized and more consensual negotiation environment, in which 
participants share moderate positions and a basic motivation to find and build upon 
common and complementary interests in an integrative manner (Meunier, 2000). It can 
be hypothesized that in the context of a polarized multilateral situation, the ability of the 
EU to achieve its objectives is lower, as high levels of tensions among participants induce 
a propensity to fall back to their national (or block’s) positions rather than to compromise. 
This tendency has already been demonstrated by the research on multilateral human rights 
negotiations in which the EU faces difficulties in exercising its influence in a divided 
environment of the Human Rights Council (K. Smith, 2010). By the same token, a 
polarized negotiation context complicates the provision of common goods and benefits 
(relevance) in the negotiation process, as exemplified by the research on international 
mediation (Bercovitch, 1991), and puts at risk an effective exercise of the united front by 
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EU member states (external cohesion). By extension, a consensual multilateral context 
will be more permissive for a higher level of EU negotiation effectiveness. 
 
Table 3. Operationalization of the explanatory factors of EU effectiveness. 
Explanatory 
factors 
Explanatory 
category 
Measurement 
label 
Observable implications 
Internal policy  EU internal 
Strong 
Policy rules and standards are codified into a 
legally binding document; 
Policy rules and standards are positively 
evaluated by EU actors; 
Policy rules and standards are perceived as ‘best 
examples’ to be emulated by others. 
Weak 
Policy rules and standards are voluntary and lack 
authority; 
Policy rules and standards lack consensual 
endorsement of EU actors; 
Policy rules and standards are not perceived as 
‘best examples’ to be emulated by others. 
Institutional 
coordination 
EU internal 
High 
The coordination process is intense and well- 
conducted by the responsible EU bodies; 
EU institutions find a smooth agreement over 
the division of competences and external 
representation. 
Low 
The coordination process is loose and ill-
prepared by the responsible EU bodies; 
EU institutions do not find an agreement over 
the division of competences and external 
representation. 
Member states’ 
interest 
convergence 
EU internal 
High 
EU member states share a common view with 
regard to strategic objectives. 
Low 
EU member states disagree with regard to 
strategic objectives. 
Global 
distribution of 
power 
EU external 
Symmetrical 
The EU’s relative issue-specific power is not 
higher than those of other major actors. 
Asymmetrical 
The EU’s relative issue-specific power is high in 
comparison to other major actors. 
Legal institutional 
setting 
EU external 
Inclusive, 
loose, equal 
Rules and procedures of the negotiation forum 
allow the EU to participate on an equal basis 
with other actors; 
Rules and procedures of the negotiation forum 
do not privilege certain EU member states over 
others. 
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Exclusive, 
strict, unequal 
Rules and procedures of the negotiation forum 
restrict the EU’s participation in comparison to 
other actors; 
Rules and procedures of the negotiation forum 
provide for privileged participation for certain 
EU member states over others. 
International 
constellation of 
interests 
EU external 
Polarized 
Negotiators take extreme positions in the 
negotiation process; 
The role and presence of moderate actors or 
groups is diminished; 
Negotiations are characterized by distributive 
and confrontational character. 
Consensual 
Negotiators occupy moderate positions in the 
negotiation process; 
The role and presence of cross-cutting groups of 
actors is increased; 
Negotiations are characterized by integrative and 
cooperative character. 
 
 
 Several propositions inform the explanatory choices in this study. First, the current 
analytical framework is based on the premise that the complex nature of EU effectiveness 
in multilateral negotiations cannot be sufficiently explained by a single factor or theory. 
Given the environment of multiple causalities, the current choice of factors draws upon 
several established theories and approaches (multi-level governance, institutionalism, 
intergovernmentalism, structural realism), crosscutting both EU internal (agent-related) 
and EU external (structure-related) explanations. Apart from the level of analysis, another 
principle for ordering selected factors can be related to the key explanatory building 
blocks in social sciences: power (internal policy, global distribution of power), interests 
(member states’ interests, international interest constellation) and institutions 
(institutional coordination, legal institutional setting). The bottom line is that a broad and 
somewhat eclectic choice of causal factors has been made in an attempt to develop a 
problem-specific composite explanatory framework that can account for different aspects 
of EU effectiveness (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010; Héritier, 2008). 
Second, while some scholars can characterize the outlined framework as 
analytical eclecticism, another way of expressing it is through the term integrative theory. 
According to Dessler (1991), the driving force for the development of an integrative 
theory is the need to resolve the double challenge of working with the heterogeneity of 
independent variables and differential framing of the dependent variable. These variations 
can be accommodated by incorporating an analysis of causal effects (cross-case level) 
and causal mechanisms (within-case level) simultaneously, something that the given 
study intends to perform. The joint focus on effects and mechanisms enables the 
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investigation of linkages and connections between EU internal and external causal 
factors. 
Third, the current analytical approach presupposes that the EU is a purposeful 
actor in multilateral negotiations. In other words, the EU is a negotiator with defined 
objectives, and their fulfillment depends on some material (member states’ interests, 
global distribution of power) and institutional (EU institutional coordination, rules and 
procedures of the negotiation forum) constraints and opportunities. In other words, the 
framework largely follows the rationalist ‘logic of position’ (Parsons, 2007), where an 
actor’s course of action is conditioned upon its relation to exogenously given obstacles. 
That being said, the opposite constructivist ‘logic of interpretation’ that is based on 
ideational driving forces cannot be ignored, and will likely inform the alternative 
explanation to be contrasted with the central analytical approach of this study. 
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CHAPTER 4. INTERNAL FACTORS OF EU EFFECTIVENESS IN 
MULTILATERAL ARMS NEGOTIATIONS 
 This chapter discusses the internal factors that hold a potential explanatory power 
over EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations. More specifically, it evaluates 
the levels of EU internal policy development, institutional coordination and EU member 
states’ interest convergence across the three case studies of the EU’s participation in 
multilateral ATT and NPT negotiations. The chapter shows that all three factors vary 
across the case studies, albeit to a different degree (see Table 4). While internal policy 
and institutional coordination show a limited degree of variation, scoring equally in two 
out of three cases, member states’ interest convergence demonstrates a full scope of 
variation across all cases, ranging from a low to a medium and to a high score. 
 
4.1 Internal policy 
4.1.1 ATT negotiations 
Since the inception of the European integration project, arms export policy was 
largely exempted from EC/EU rules and regulations. Various treaty provisions, from 
Rome to Lisbon, singled out ‘the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war 
material’ (Article 346 TFEU: European Union, 2010, p. 194) as a sovereignty-sensitive 
area at the core of national interests. It is thus not surprising that historically, EU member 
states used to rely on divergent and uncoordinated national arms export policies (Davis, 
2002). This tendency has been reversed since the end of the Cold War, when member 
states started to experience a growing pressure for greater coordination in their export 
control policies. Since the end of the 1980s, major arms exporters in Europe were exposed 
to a number of challenges related to a reduction in mіlіtary expendіture, an increasіng 
surplus of weapоns and shrіnking dоmestіc markets (Bauer and Remacle, 2004). In 
addition, globalization of international markets revealed potential economic benefits to 
consolidating European defense industries as a part of the single European market. The 
economic incentives unfolded in parallel with efforts to Europeanize member states’ 
foreign policies, which culminated in the creation of the CFSP in 1993. A dіrect trigger 
for a common approach to arms exports, though, emerged in the aftermath of the 1991 
Gulf War, during which Western allies found themselves in the ludicrous situation of 
fighting Iraqi troops equipped with Western weapon systems (Hartung, 2008). 
The foundation of the EU’s export control policy for conventional weapons was 
laid down at the start of 1990s, in the aftermath of the Gulf War. At that time, the Council 
Working Group on Conventional Arms (COARM) was established in Brussels to 
72 
 
deliberate on specific conditions for arms exports. They were later incorporated into the 
EU Code of Conduct on arms exports, which encouraged member states to assess their 
export authorizations to third countries against eight criteria: (1) respect for international 
commitments, especially concerning international sanctions; (2) respect for human rights 
in the country of destination; (3) the internal situation in the country of destination; (4) 
the preservation of regional peace and stability; (5) national security of the member states 
and their allies; (6) behavior of the destination country in the international arena; (7) risk 
of diversion; (8) sustainable development (Council of the EU, 1998). Thus, the principal 
objective of the EU Code was to set up ‘high common standards which should be regarded 
as the minimum for the management of, and restraint in, conventional arms transfers’ 
(Ibid., p. 2). The operative provisions of the EU Code required national capitals to 
establish a consultation mechanism whereby member states exchange information on 
denials to provide export licenses. Moreover, member states were also expected to 
exchange, and later to publish, annual reports on aggregate national arms exports in light 
of the implementation of the EU Code. It must be noted, however, that an actual decision 
on whether to grant an export license, as well as the accompanying steps of risk 
assessment, has been left entirely to the discretion of member states. 
Since the rationale behind the adoption of the EU Code was ‘to reinforce 
cooperation and to promote convergence in the field of conventional arms exports’ (Ibid.), 
it can bear significant implications for the EU’s posture at the ATT negotiations. An 
influential study has shown the effectiveness, albeit a subject for improvement, of this 
instrument in restricting arms sales to the states with a great risk of human rights 
violations, thus reinforcing the EU’s image of a value-based foreign policy actor 
(Bromley and Brzoska, 2008). Many experts consider the EU code to be an example of a 
progressive model of an arms export control regime, which is hardly replicated elsewhere 
by other regional actors. According to Bailes (2011), ‘it is far from certain that anyone 
else out in the world subjectively integrates [arms within wider foreign policy] when 
thinking about the importance or the “values” message of Europe’ (p. 83). The EU is the 
only regional organization that put in force a legally binding multilateral arms export 
control regime. 
In a similar manner, the European Parliament (EP) praises the EU’s arms export 
control framework as a model to be emulated by others. Although members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) are typically quite critical about member states’ 
implementation of the EU Code, they do recognize that ‘its principles and criteria have 
been officially endorsed by various third countries’ (European Parliament, 2012, p. 2; see 
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also European Parliament, 2013). The relevance of the EU Code was acknowledged by 
member states when in 2008 they agreed to transform it into the legally binding EU’s 
Common Position. This move was accompanied by the decision to expand the scope of 
activities covered by the eight criteria beyond mere exports and to include production, 
brokering, transit and transshipment of defense equipment and technology (Bromley, 
2012). Member states also have agreed upon a Common Military List of items covered 
by the EU Code, the Common Position on Arms Brokering and an EU Code User’s Guide 
to assist its implementation. A report prepared by multiple NGOs asserted that the ‘ability 
and willingness to update the regime is one of its main strengths, and one that bodes well 
for maintaining relevance in future’ (Saferworld, 2008, p. i). This assessment echoes the 
Council’s review of the Common Position claiming that its provisions continue ‘to 
provide a solid basis for the coordination of Member States’ arms export policies’ 
(Council of the EU, 2012a, p. 22). Hence, regardless the level of its domestic 
implementation, it can be concluded that the EU entered the ATT negotiations with a 
strong hand in a form of well-elaborated and undisputed internal policy norms and 
standards regarding arms transfers. 
 
4.1.2 NPT I and NPT II negotiations 
 In a broad sense, the origins of EU non-proliferation policy go as far back as to 
1957, when the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was established 
alongside the European Economic Community (EEC). The Euratom Treaty was designed 
to deal with civil nuclear energy cooperation in Western Europe, of which an important 
element was the establishment of regional nuclear safeguards. The latter implied a 
creation of a verification inspection system conducted by the European Commission, with 
a view to ensuring that nuclear facilities and materials of Community members were not 
diverted for unintended purposes (Müller, 2007). In a parallel process, member states 
started to discuss external aspects of non-proliferation issues in an intergovernmental 
working group created under the auspices of EPC in 1981. Yet, it was not until the early 
1990s that the EU emerged as a serious global player, destined to tackle the proliferation 
of WMD. Similar to the development of EU arms export control, a set of external and 
internal circumstances contributed to an environment permissive for deliberation of the 
nascent non-proliferation policy. Externally, the end of the Cold War and the US-Soviet 
rivalry opened up global arms affairs and provided an opportunity for new actors to step 
in. Internally, France’s accession to the NPT and institutionalization of CFSP provided 
an additional impetus for joint non-proliferation initiatives (Van Ham, 2011). 
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  The cornerstone of EU non-proliferation policy is the EU Strategy against 
proliferation of WMD, adopted by the European Council in December 2003. The starting 
point of the Strategy is the recognition of WMD proliferation as a serious threat to 
international peace and security. The document thus states that the EU’s principal 
objective in this area is ‘to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation 
programmes of concern worldwide’ (Council of the EU, 2003, p. 2). The Strategy outlines 
four main areas of EU activities: (1) rendering multilateralism more effective by acting 
resolutely against proliferators; (2) promoting stable international and regional 
environments; (3) cooperating closely with the US and other key partners; (4) developing 
necessary institutional structures within the EU. The most important of all has been the 
EU’s commitment to uphold multilateral non-proliferation institutions and treaties, as 
well as declared support of international mechanisms of verification and compliance with 
the existing non-proliferation norms (Ahlström, 2005). In other words, the EU’s WMD 
Strategy emphasizes the specific ‘European way’ of fighting proliferation, which 
prioritizes political and diplomatic measures and focuses on international cooperation and 
multilateralism and the root causes of international problems (Álvarez-Verdugo, 2006). 
 To what extent does the WMD Strategy strengthen the development of domestic 
policy in light of the EU’s participation in multilateral NPT negotiations? Sceptics claim 
that the Strategy does not enjoy a legally binding character and lacks an official status in 
comparison to traditional CFSP instruments, such as positions or actions, defined by 
Article 25 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). As Van Ham (2011) put it, the 
Strategy ‘is a misnomer and is, in fact, a hollow instrument with the authority of an 
informal political declaration’ (p. 5). The fact that member states prefer to maximize their 
room for maneuver when it comes to binding themselves to the Strategy’s provisions 
might signal a lack of trust in the EU or a lack of commitment to pool resources at the 
European level in fighting proliferation. Moreover, as Katsioulis and Mölling (2010) 
argue, the document’s main function is to serve as ‘a political symbol of European unity’ 
(p. 5) rather than a genuine attempt to develop a strong and united non-proliferation 
policy. The adoption of the Strategy, the argument goes, was just an attempt to remedy 
the deep divide among Europeans regarding how to respond to the US’s use of military 
force against Iraq, which was triggered by Saddam Hussein’s alleged WMD program. 
 On the contrary, optimists highlight the usefulness of the Strategy and its added 
value to building up the EU’s domestic non-proliferation acquis. While acknowledging 
the shortcomings of the Strategy when it comes to its non-legally binding nature, Portela 
(2004) highlights ‘one peculiarity normally absent from political declarations: it foresees 
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a constant revision and updating process as well as the regular production of progress 
reports’. The intense review process, based on the publication of biannual implementation 
reports by the Council, underscores the significance of the document as a cornerstone of 
EU non-proliferation policy. While revising and upgrading the Strategy for the first time 
in five years, member states explicitly endorsed its principles as ‘highly relevant’ 
(Council of the EU, 2008a, p. 4). Scholars also emphasize the Strategy’s positive 
streamlining and harmonizing effect on Europe’s non-proliferation activities ‘to a point 
that makes it possible to talk about a common non-proliferation policy worthy of its name’ 
(Portela and Kienzle, 2015, p. 63). As far as coherence is concerned, the non-proliferation 
policy largely lacked this asset prior to 2003. 
 Nevertheless, in terms of best practices or lessons learned that the EU can promote 
internationally, the policy, as it stands now, does not seem to offer a wide-ranging menu 
of choices. The core of the difficulties is related to the fact that, in contrast to the well-
elaborated EU non-proliferation acquis, the body of existing rules and norms – including 
the WMD Strategy – is strikingly dormant about the other side of the NPT bargain, 
nuclear disarmament (Cottey, 2014). The nuclear weapon states (NWS) status of the UK 
and France, and Europe’s general adherence to NATO’s doctrine of nuclear deterrence, 
preclude an EU common position on disarmament. Yet, establishing a WMD free zone 
in Europe or setting the precedent of withdrawing non-strategic nuclear weapons from 
EU members’ soil could have provided the EU with the strongest ground for leading by 
example in multilateral NPT negotiations (Interview 5, 2014). 
This is not to say that the EU has no rules and standards on non-proliferation 
matters that are worth being exported externally. For example, the EU set up a detailed 
and a legally binding system of export controls for dual-use goods with Regulation 
428/2009 serving as a centerpiece of this Community-wide regime (Micara, 2012). 
Similarly, far-reaching legislation exists regarding the transfer of nuclear technology and 
materials and the safety of nuclear installations, based on the functioning of the Euratom 
Treaty. However, even in these instances, limitations are obvious. The EU’s export 
control lists for dual-use goods are essentially based on inventories prepared by 
international control bodies, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and the EU’s 
system of regional nuclear safeguards is sometimes overshadowed or subsumed by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) rules and standards, which enjoy a greater 
outreach and higher legitimacy (Müller, 2014; Glavind, 2014). Hence, given this patchy 
and mixed record, the level of development of the EU’s internal non-proliferation policy 
is conceived as less than strong, but more than weak – moderate. This assessment is 
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shared by the two analyzed cases of NPT negotiations since there were no groundbreaking 
developments on the domestic level between 2010 and 2015. 
 
4.2 Institutional coordination 
4.2.1 ATT negotiations 
The central role in coordinating the EU’s negotiating position in the ATT 
deliberations belonged to the Council’s COARM working group. The COARM working 
party consists of the member states’ officials from national capitals and, at the time when 
the ATT process commenced, it was chaired by the rotating Presidency of the EU, with 
assistance from the Council Secretariat. The coordination process started in 2008 when 
the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) was created and EU officials started to engage 
in its work. Since 2009 a special group, the COARM-CODUN10, was set up, merging the 
expertise on conventional arms export control with disarmament processes at the UN 
level. The COARM-CODUN ATT group was given the task to develop strategic and 
tactical positions on different ATT provisions, and to elaborate on projects in the form of 
outreach seminars that were put in force by the Council Decision in 2009 (Interview 1, 
2013). Since 2011, the group has been meeting on a monthly basis to prepare for different 
stages of the negotiation process. In addition to these intense coordination meetings, the 
COARM-CODUN elaborated an EU non-paper on the ATT. The non-paper is a 
confidential document that contains the EU’s position on different aspects of the ATT. 
The document formed a basis for exchanges between member states in the run-up to the 
UN conference in July 2012, and proved to be a useful consensus-building exercise 
(Ibid.). The outcome of the coordination process was laid down in two Council 
Conclusions that outlined the EU’s position on the main ATT issues to the outside world 
(Council of the EU, 2010a; Council of the EU, 2012b). It should be noted, however, that 
both documents were of a very general character, and lacked the authority of a formal 
common position. 
 What is important to highlight in this context is the impact of the Lisbon Treaty 
on the process of internal coordination. The role of the rotating Presidency in the area of 
CFSP was largely replaced by the EEAS, which was formally established in December 
2010. Both the COARM and CODUN working parties were integrated into the Security 
Policy and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) Structures, which now form 
one part of the EEAS. Thus, both CODUN and COARM are no longer chaired by the 
                                                          
10 CODUN stands for Global Disarmament and Arms Control working group. 
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rotating Presidency’s representative, but by an EEAS official. A permanent chair helped 
to ensure not only consistency and better expertise, but also an enhanced sense of 
impartiality. According to one official, the new status of the working groups reinforced 
their agenda-setting power and also allowed them to gain a certain level of trust from 
member states (Ibid.). This, in the end, also positively affected the internal coordination 
on the ATT. 
 The European Commission’s role in ATT coordination was also significant, albeit 
overshadowed by its competence dispute with the member states. The Commission’s 
presence was needed to guarantee that the ATT was compatible with the EU acquis. In 
other words, it was important to ensure that new controls imposed by the ATT do not 
disrupt the functioning of the EU’s internal trade in defense related products facilitated 
by the 2009 Directive on intra-Community trade (Interview 2, 2013). Although the 
Commission normally participates in the deliberations of the Council working groups, it 
signaled its wish to be part of multilateral negotiations only months before the 2012 UN 
conference. Consequently, the Commission fell short of time needed for proper 
preparations, and exceptionally asked the Council to authorize the member states to 
negotiate certain parts of the Treaty covered by the Union’s exclusive competence. Yet, 
for the March 2013 UN conference, the Commission sought a different mandate, which 
authorized it to negotiate the relevant aspects of the ATT itself. This naturally created 
confusion and caused frustration with some of the Council members. Nevertheless, the 
inter-institutional debate did not affect the EU’s external representation, as the EEAS 
diplomats continued to speak on behalf of the EU (Interview 3, 2013). 
 Finally, despite its limited role in the area of arms affairs, the European Parliament 
also raised its voice concerning the ATT. In its Resolution of 13 June 2012, MEPs 
reiterated its support for a global, legally binding treaty and backed the Council 
Conclusions on this topic. Moreover, the EP recognized ‘the coherent and consistent role 
played by the EU and its Member States in support of the international process to establish 
an arms trade treaty’ (European Parliament, 2012, p. 5). However, taking into account the 
dispute on the legal competences between the Commission and the Council, the level of 
the EU’s internal coordination on the ATT is evaluated as medium. 
 
4.2.2 NPT I negotiations 
In the run-up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference (RevCon), the EU coordination 
process was almost exclusively governed by the pre-Lisbon Treaty arrangements. It 
means that the primary responsibility for coordinating the EU’s negotiation positions was 
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in the hands of the EU rotating Presidency, whose representative chaired the specialized 
working group on non-proliferation (CONOP). Assisted by CODUN, the CONOP 
working party consists of member states’ officials from national capitals that meet once 
a month in Brussels to discuss WMD-related matters. It is important to note, however, 
that the coordination process in the context of NPT review cycles is not entirely Brussels-
based, as it must be geared towards a set of Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings 
that take place in each of the three years preceding the RevCon in Vienna, Geneva and 
New York. In 2007-2009, the EU participated and issued statements in each of the three 
PrepComs that were crafted and delivered by German, Slovenian and Czech Presidencies, 
respectively. The EU Presidencies’ ‘shuttle diplomacy’ between the three NPT venues 
and Brussels required a great amount of time and effort, even though the PrepComs have 
no decision-making authority, and the NPT parties are not under pressure to agree on 
anything within these arenas (Interview 6, 2014). 
As the actual negotiations usually take place only at the RevCons, the months 
before the 2010 RevCon commenced in May promised to become a real litmus test for 
the EU’s internal coordination process. The lion’s share of the task of preparing and 
crafting the EU’s negotiation position was carried out by Spain, which held the EU 
Presidency in the first half of 2010. Several issues are important to mention in this context, 
as they arguably have contributed to the quality of internal coordination. First, to perform 
the job of the Council rotating Presidency, including the preparation for a major 
multilateral conference, is a traditionally challenging task for small or new and less 
experienced member states (Müller, 2005b, p. 11). In contrast, Spain already had held 
Council Presidencies in the past, and possessed the required level of institutional and 
administrative capacity to perform the job. Second, in the conversation with their 
American counterparts, Spanish diplomats signaled their willingness to assume 
leadership roles and to be ‘a bit ambitious’ in working out the EU’s negotiation stance in 
the run-up to the Conference (Wikileaks, 2009a). Third, in light of the Lisbon Treaty 
provisions entering into force, the Spanish Presidency has demonstrated flexibility and 
agreed to incorporate the EEAS representatives, including the Special Representative on 
WMD non-proliferation Annalisa Giannella, to jointly co-chair the EU delegation to the 
RevCon. 
As a result of a series of coordination meetings, a legally binding Common 
Position was produced, which has directly informed the EU’s negotiation stance in the 
RevCon (Council of the EU, 2010b). The document was adopted at the end of March 
2010, or, in other words, more than one month before the start of the RevCon. This is 
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important, as it arguably demonstrates good time-management skills and ownership of 
the coordination process, with an understanding that early adoption of EU Common 
Position might increase the chances that the other parties will consult it before 
negotiations. Moreover, in comparison to the EU’s previous positions in 2000 and 2005, 
the current Common Position stood out as a strong and well-elaborated document, with 
substantial political content and a less declaratory character (Interview 7, 2014; 
Cenevska, 2016, p. 269). Several interview sources from EU member states confirmed 
that despite the traditional time-consuming character, the internal coordination process 
was well-organized and, for what it matters, has not been overshadowed by major 
procedural conflicts (Interviews 8 and 9, 2014). Apart from the above-mentioned 
characteristics of the Spanish Presidency, what also seemed to contribute to a successful 
coordination process was a certain political and legal path dependency: earlier common 
positions (2000 and 2005) that provided a good working basis to start with, as well as the 
established legal procedures and practices of member states exercising their foreign 
policy competence with the help of the Council Presidency (Interview 6, 2014). The 
evidence at hand therefore allows to suggest that the level of EU institutional coordination 
in the run-up to the 2010 NPT RevCon was high. 
 
4.2.3 NPT II negotiations 
The institutional coordination for the 2015 RevCon started in November 2014 
with the meetings in Brussels. As it was the case with the previous RevCon, the 
preparation work was concentrated around the CONOP working group that now had been 
integrated into the structures of the EEAS since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. The 
CONOP coordination meetings were also informed by earlier expert level meetings in 
Geneva (on disarmament) and Vienna (on non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy) that drafted common language related to various NPT pillars (Interview 10, 
2015). If the coordination work on Vienna issues was reportedly conducted in a good 
spirit, the disarmament part appeared to be the backbone of contention. According to an 
EEAS diplomat present in the meetings, EU member states spent three months before 
finding acceptable language just on the one paragraph related to the assessment of 
humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons (Interview 11, 2015). Hence, the coordination 
process was generally perceived by some participants as ‘very cumbersome’ and 
‘extremely difficult’ (Interviews 12 and 13, 2015). 
One complicating factor in this context turned out to be the upcoming 
parliamentary elections in the UK, scheduled to take place in May. In line with internal 
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parliamentary procedures of scrutinizing the CFSP, the British Parliament asked the 
Council to submit its common position on the upcoming RevCon by the end of February 
2015, to be able to review it in time. This deadline proved to be unrealistic for the Council 
in light of the difficulties with the internal negotiation process. Although the initial aim 
was to adopt a Council Decision, unable to reach an agreement by the end of February, 
member states were forced to pursue the common position in the form of Council 
Conclusions, which were eventually adopted on 20 April 2015, two weeks before the start 
of the RevCon (Interviews 14 and 15, 2015). This move represented a divergence from 
the established practice of agreeing on legally binding instruments in the NPT context 
since the 1990s, and has been viewed as a failure, not least because Council Conclusions 
is a document that binds EU member states only politically (Meier, 2015, p. 5). Moreover, 
some member states perceived the agreed outcome of the coordination process as 
suboptimal, criticizing it for its vague language and a lack of forward-looking elements 
(Interviews 12 and 16, 2015). As one diplomat put it, the Council Conclusions was 
something that ‘everyone was equally unhappy with’ (Interview 17, 2015). It should be 
noted, however, that, given the high risk of a total breakdown of internal negotiations 
between member states with no EU common position as a result, some interviewees 
indicated that the agreed upon Council Conclusions, even in a weakened form and with 
diluted content, represented success in the coordination process (Interviews 13 and 18, 
2015). 
As the 2015 RevCon was the first instance of high-level multilateral negotiations 
in the NPT context after the Lisbon Treaty reformed the EU’s foreign policy-making, it 
is important to briefly outline the implications of this change for EU coordination in the 
run-up to the RevCon. Just as COARM, the CONOP working group has been moved from 
the Council structures to the EEAS, and has been chaired by a permanent EU official 
instead of representatives of the rotating Presidency since then. Further, the EU’s new 
Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Jacek Bylica, replaced the 
rotating Presidency in representing and speaking on the EU’s behalf in the NPT 
PrepComs and the relevant UN bodies. This change has been perceived as a positive 
development, as it promised to add more coherence and continuity to the EU’s internal 
deliberations on non-proliferation and disarmament (Ibid.). 
On the other hand, the Lisbon Treaty, which created the EEAS and significantly 
reinforced the role of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
also brought an unexpected procedural complication for EU coordination on the eve of 
the RevCon. In contrast to the 2010 RevCon, when the EU’s general statement was 
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negotiated among member states (although delivered by then High Representative 
Catherine Ashton), the new rules stipulated that in 2015 the High Representative Federica 
Mogherini acts on her own authority, reflecting the EU’s view on the subject. In practical 
terms, this implied drafting the general statement independently which – given the shaky 
ground of internal consensus – generated tensions with some member states, which 
refrained from drafting statements for NPT main committees before seeing Mogherini’s 
statement (Interviews 19 and 20, 2015). The delicate situation exhausted itself once the 
text of the general statement became available, being largely drawn on the consensual 
language of the Council Conclusions. However, as it was released just days before the 
RevCon’s start, this significantly delayed the preparation of EU statements for the NPT 
main committees (Interview 14, 2015). Given the mixed record of EU institutional 
coordination for the second case study of the NPT negotiations, it is coded as medium. 
 
4.3 Member states’ interest convergence 
4.3.1 ATT negotiations 
On the level of the 27 EU member states, there was a high degree of convergence 
of national preferences concerning the ATT. Member states reiterated the EU’s view on 
the need for a strong and universal agreement regulating arms sales. There was also a 
consensus on how the key parameters of the future Treaty should look. In their response 
to the UN Secretary-General’s call on expressing preliminary views on the ATT, EU 
member states shared a common vision for the necessity to include strict criteria for 
export risk assessment (United Nations, 2007). Most of them referred to the norms that 
were already in place at the European and domestic levels, such as those related to the 
humanitarian agenda. Furthermore, member states maintained similar views on the scope 
of the Treaty, implementation mechanisms and transparency provisions. 
 One reason why the new agreement was relatively uncontroversial among EU 
member states is the fact that the ATT leaves the implementation and enforcement of the 
export control policy fully to the member states. As long as the protection of national 
sovereignty was ensured, governments were ready to compromise on the rest of the issues. 
Moreover, the ATT could create a level playing field for national defense industries on a 
global scale. As stated by German officials, ‘export control can only achieve maximum 
effectiveness if as many countries as possible apply similar rules and procedures’ 
(German Government, 2010, p. 16). Since the start of the UN negotiations, the business 
community indeed closely followed the process and cooperated with governments in 
order to bring the ATT forward. ‘For industry, the unevenness [of regulations] presents 
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enormous challenges in achieving concurrent compliance in all the jurisdictions in which 
it operates’ (Wood, 2012, p. 25; see also ASD, 2013). Finally, the ATT provisions 
endorsed the creation of structures and practices, which to a great extent, were already 
institutionalized at the domestic level in European countries. Apart from export criteria, 
this concerned the establishment of appropriate national authorization bodies, end-use 
control and lists of controlled military items. 
 Certainly, there were some differences among EU member states. One group of 
states (France, Italy) kept a somewhat conservative attitude towards the ATT, a second 
group (Germany, the UK, Sweden) pushed for a more progressive position, while the rest 
(mainly non-producers of arms) showed no active stance (Interview 4, 2014). Italy, for 
instance, wanted to keep civilian arms out of the scope of the Treaty (Depauw, 2012, p. 
5). Germany was targeting more ambitious export control risk assessments than the one 
suggested by EU diplomats (German Government, 2010). Yet, these differences were of 
minor significance in comparison to the common objective of a strong and effective 
global agreement. Member states’ consensus around the ATT was further reinforced by 
a joint declaration of the EU’s top arms exporting countries. In their joint statement, the 
Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK explained their 
view on different points of the Treaty, and declared their wish ‘to conclude a strong, 
robust, effective and legally binding Arms Trade Treaty in order to make the world a safer 
place and reduce the number of innocent victims of armed violence’ (Fabius et al., 2012). 
To sum up in the words of one of the interviewees, arms export control in Europe ‘is an 
issue, where comparing to other areas of non-proliferation and disarmament there has 
been considerable level of cohesion among member states in terms of policy objectives’ 
(Interview 1, 2013). Hence, the level of member states’ interest convergence in the case 
of ATT negotiations is coded as high. 
 
4.3.2 NPT I negotiations 
In the context of nuclear security politics, strategic interests of EU member states 
diverge. One line of division stems directly from the distinction between members that 
hold of nuclear weapons as opposed to those that renounce them. As NWS, France and 
the UK are committed to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence that is based on the perception 
of nuclear weapons as instruments to guarantee global and, primarily, national security. 
Both states are permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5) and, at the same 
time, belong to a NWS club, which effectively limits their policies to an almost exclusive 
focus on non-proliferation and, at best, a lukewarm attitude towards nuclear disarmament. 
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France was the last EC/EU member state to join the NPT regime in 1992, thus removing 
the last barrier for the EU’s participation in this multilateral forum. Prior to the 2010 
RevCon, Müller (2007) made an observation that France has become ‘the most 
intransigent member of the nuclear club and has stonewalled during the last [2005] NPT 
Review Conference on further progress in nuclear disarmament’ (p. 193). The UK 
traditionally shows a more flexible attitude and willingness to negotiate nuclear 
reductions, although it would prioritize solidarity with other P5 members when it comes 
to disarmament issues. 
The absolute majority of EU member states are non-nuclear weapon states 
(NNWS), but despite this shared status, the group lacks homogeneity. The core of EU 
NNWS constitute NATO member states that benefit from the Alliance’s nuclear umbrella 
and, by extension, acknowledge, at least to some extent, security benefits generated by 
nuclear weapons. Four states – Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy – are in a 
particular ambivalent position as they, while being official NNWS, host US nuclear 
warheads in the framework of NATO nuclear posture. This has led to a situation, in 
which, as described by Katsioulis and Mölling (2010), Germany’s ‘Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs calls for a nuclear disarmament, while the Ministry of Defence has to maintain 
“allied discipline”’ (p. 6) due to obligations within NATO. Hence, EU NATO states hold 
cautious attitudes towards nuclear disarmament, which contrasts with EU non-NATO 
states, such as Austria, Ireland and Sweden. While sharing the non-proliferation agenda 
with the rest of the EU, the non-aligned trio has been traditionally more interested in 
disarmament, emphasizing the need for concrete progress in this field (Meier and Quille, 
2005). Finally, another line of division within the EU cuts across economic interests and 
strength of industry or between proponents and opponents of nuclear energy, with France 
and Austria finding themselves on far opposite sides of the interest spectrum (Rosa, 2001, 
p. 43). 
Although the general constellation of interests among EU member states on 
nuclear matters suggests a heterogeneous and diverse picture, the situation in the years 
preceding the 2010 NPT RevCon had been a bit more nuanced. The willingness to bridge 
the internal divide among member states in foreign affairs and the transatlantic rift with 
the US after the Iraqi debacle in 2003, which culminated in the adoption of the WMD 
Non-Proliferation Strategy, was strong enough to set the dynamics of interest 
convergence for years ahead. Member states’ deliberate and almost exclusive focus on 
non-proliferation was also reinforced by the international agenda, with growing threats 
of evolving Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs. Observing the increasing 
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convergence of interests among EU member states on non-proliferation issues, Ahlström 
(2005) importantly notes that it ‘has come about partly as a result of some member states 
being prepared to suppress their interest in disarmament – at least when working in an 
EU context’ (p. 46). In other words, member states’ unity of purpose and determination 
in dealing with non-proliferation crises came at the price of deliberately sidelining the 
disarmament agenda (Portela and Kienzle, 2015). Due to this mixed record, the 
convergence of EU member states’ interests on the eve of the 2010 NPT RevCon is 
considered as medium. 
 
4.3.3 NPT II negotiations 
 Reinforced by the EU WMD Strategy, the evolving pattern of member states’ 
interest convergence in the nuclear security field is not meant to be inevitable or 
irreversible. The unequal balance of strategic interests in favor of non-proliferation 
matters over disarmament issues that characterized the intra-European consensus in the 
2000s has since been increasingly challenged by pro-disarmament EU member states. 
Driven by a lack of implementation of disarmament measures in the aftermath of the 2010 
NPT RevCon, as well as by the long-standing national view that rejects the value and 
relevance of nuclear weapons in the current security environment, Ireland and Austria 
started to actively advocate the need to re-prioritize the disarmament agenda in 
international politics, thereby placing it on an equal footing with the commitment to the 
non-proliferation norm, including on the level of the EU (Nielsen and Hanson, 2014). The 
Irish Ambassador to the CD has been clear about shifting accents of the country’s 
preferences: ‘The continuing lack of progress on [disarmament] pillar of the NPT will 
[…] undermine the Treaty’s non-proliferation objectives unless action is taken now. For 
this reason, my delegation will be joining those pressing for a greater focus on 
disarmament as this review cycle progresses’ (Corr, 2013, p. 3). Austria appeared even 
more strong-headed in justifying its pro-disarmament pivot, which goes as far as 
questioning the legitimacy and legality of nuclear weapons: ‘We are convinced of […] 
the need to fundamentally change the discourse on nuclear weapons. We need […] to 
foster the understanding that any use of nuclear weapons would be morally repugnant, 
incompatible with […] fundamental principles of international humanitarian law’ 
(Kmentt, 2012, p. 1). The EU’s NWS, in turn, vehemently reject any bids to outlaw 
nuclear weapons, and criticize calls for a rapid reduction of arsenals. In other words, both 
the UK and France continue to insist on the status quo, and demonstrate little appetite for 
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disarmament, arguing that the NPT regime is primarily about rules and norms of non-
proliferation (Interview 21, 2014). 
 The informal arrangement among EU member states of setting aside 
disagreements for the sake of moving forward in the areas of shared interest was 
effectively undermined by pro-disarmament and anti-disarmament camps clearly pulling 
the EU in different directions. That the Union has become more polarized on NPT issues 
was crystallized in the preparatory talks preceding the 2015 RevCon. As one diplomat 
mentioned, in drafting the statements for the 2014 PrepCom, member states were relying 
on the language of 2010 – a clear sign of an internal stalemate (Interview 8, 2014). 
Moreover, not only has the unifying effect of EU consensus on non-proliferation slowly 
evaporated, but further progress on the NPT’s second pillar has been seemingly hijacked 
by the increasing divisions on pillar one. Some member states appeared to be deliberately 
reluctant about crafting a stronger EU position on non-proliferation before the RevCon, 
asking for an equally ambitious stance on disarmament. In particular, Austria reportedly 
made an agreement on the statements for the Main Committees II and III conditional upon 
an agreement on the disarmament statement – a move that has been characterized by one 
interviewee as ‘hostage taking’ (Interview 19, 2015). On the other hand, the EU’s NWS 
did not win over many friends either. France, in particular, was criticized by moderate 
EU member states for its intransigent position on disarmament and the refusal to even 
mention the reference to the humanitarian approach to nuclear politics (Interview 20, 
2015). France was also the only EU member state that did not attend the international 
conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons organized by Austria in 
December 2014. In sum, and in the words of a non-EU diplomat closely following intra-
EU debates on the NPT, since 2010, the EU has witnessed increasingly divergent 
positions among its member states, ‘to the point that it can be called dysfunctional’ 
(Interview 22, 2015). Hence, the level of EU member states’ interest convergence in the 
second case study of the NPT negotiations was indisputably low. 
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Table 4. The overview of internal factors of EU effectiveness. 
Factors | Cases ATT NPT I NPT II 
Internal policy Strong Moderate Moderate 
Institutional 
coordination 
Medium High Medium 
Member states’ 
interest convergence 
High Medium Low 
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CHAPTER 5. EXTERNAL FACTORS OF EU EFFECTIVENESS IN 
MULTILATERAL ARMS NEGOTIATIONS 
 This chapter presents and discusses the external factors of EU effectiveness in 
multilateral ATT and NPT negotiations. First, it examines the distribution of power 
resources among negotiators, and determines the EU’s place in relevant power structures. 
Second, it explores the rules and procedures of the diplomatic forums under which the 
EU negotiates. Third, it scrutinizes the international constellation of interests and the 
spectrum of negotiation items that dominated the ATT and NPT processes. It shows that 
out of the three external factors, only the rules and procedures of the negotiation forums 
appear invariant, while the global distribution of power and international constellation of 
interests display different values in two out of three selected case studies (see Table 6). 
 
5.1 Global distribution of power 
5.1.1 ATT negotiations 
The EU’s weight in the area of arms trade is considerably high. Although the EU 
does not export arms, EU member states collectively accounted for one third (31 per cent) 
of global arms exports between 2007 and 2011, the period in which the preparatory 
process for the ATT negotiations was unfolding (see Table 4). This places the EU ahead 
of the two biggest arms exporters – the US and Russia – with their market shares of 30 
and 24 per cent, respectively (Holtom et al., 2012). Out of the 18 EU member states that 
were trading arms in the indicated period, three EU member states – Germany, France 
and the UK – accounted for more than two thirds (68 per cent) of total EU exports, thus 
joining the US and Russia on the list of the top-five global arms suppliers. Moreover, 42 
EU-based companies were listed among the world’s top-100 arms-producers in 2007, 
while in 2012 the number fell marginally to 38 firms (Perlo-Freeman, 2009, p. 288; Perlo-
Freeman and Wezeman, 2014). 
When it comes to a specific category of conventional arms – SALW11 – the 
inclusion of which into the scope of the ATT has become a subject of intense debate, the 
EU also demonstrates high significance in this dimension. Between 2007 and 2011, 
between five and six EU member states were regularly reported to be in the top ten SALW 
exporters, with Italy and Germany occupying the second and the third rank, respectively, 
                                                          
11 The UN defines ‘small arms’ as items designed to be carried and used by one person, such as revolvers 
and pistols, rifles and carbines, and light machine guns. ‘Light weapons’ are designed for use by several 
people, and might be transported by a crew of people, a pack animal or a light vehicle. Examples of light 
weapons include portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, mounted grenade launchers, etc. (Parker and 
Wilson, 2016). 
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just below the US (Herron, et al., 2010; Holtom et al., 2014). Hence, in terms of material 
powerbase, the EU as a collective actor carried more weight than any other participant of 
the ATT negotiations with an exception of, perhaps, the US. The strong position of EU 
member states in the global arms market, manifested through an aggregate size of their 
exports, promised to put the EU in a particularly favorable position of asymmetrical 
dependence in the negotiations as ‘the third countries would not have an interest to have 
the ATT without the EU’ (Interview 2, 2013). 
 
Table 5. Largest arms exporters in 2007-2011, in % of global market share.12 
Exporter 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2007-
2011 
United 
States 
29,6 28,3 28,5 31,3 30,2 29,6 
Russia 20,9 25,9 20,7 23,9 28,7 24,2 
Germany 12,4 9,8 10,4 10,6 4,5 9,4 
France 9,0 8,3 7,9 3,5 5,9 6,9 
United 
Kingdom 
3,6 4,0 4,3 4,5 3,4 3,9 
European 
Union13 
37,7 32,5 34,6 26,4 26,5 31,4 
 
Arms producing and exporting capabilities were not the only power resources that 
mattered in the ATT negotiations. As the idea behind the ATT was to craft binding rules 
and standards in an area that has not been governed by globally accepted norms and 
practices before, non-material power resources, such as ideas, beliefs and knowledge, also 
appeared to be relevant for the purpose of influencing the negotiations. In many respects, 
the ATT initiative emerged on the verge of the international community’s growing 
concern with human security – a trend that was set in the 1990s, and fostered by the UN 
                                                          
12 My own calculations based on the data provided by the SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Database. The Database 
covers major types of conventional weapons (aircraft, artillery, armored vehicles, ships, etc.) with an 
exception of majority of SALW. 
13 The numbers are based on a sum of exports by 18 EU member states that were supplying arms in 2007-
2011. 
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leadership’s personal commitment and interest in human security activism (Hampson, 
2008; Krause, 2007). The notion of human security was meant to change the point of 
reference in security discourse from an exclusive focus on the territorial security of states 
to the safety and well-being of individuals and their communities. After the end of the 
Cold War, several Nobel Peace Prize laureates elaborated the International Code of 
Conduct on Arms Transfers, which called upon the states ‘to adhere to their commitments 
on international human rights and humanitarian law when considering application for 
export licenses’ (Holtom and Wezeman, 2007, p. 433). After this initiative was put on the 
table at the UN in the late 1990s, international civil society organizations started an 
intense lobbying campaign pushing for a legally binding treaty on conventional arms 
transfers based on their successful experience of campaigning against landmines, SALW 
and cluster munitions (Wisotzki, 2013). 
The EU was a well-placed actor to capitalize on the normative discourse of human 
security underpinning the ATT initiative. First and foremost, the EU has been long 
practicing the application of humanitarian criteria in the arms export decision-making 
process since the adoption of the EU Code of Conduct in 1998. Further, the EU’s self-
perception and identity as a human rights champion and normative power is well-known 
(Whitman, 2011), not least because of its willingness to act as a norms entrepreneur in 
various multilateral contexts and bilateral dialogues with its partners. By articulating and 
exemplifying human security norms and ideas in the ATT context, the EU received an 
opportunity to match its own ideological agenda with global policy-making. In addition, 
it became a natural ally of many NGOs from Control Arms coalition and progressive 
states in Latin America, the Caribbean and the Pacific that were eager to further extend 
the human security agenda to multilateral arms control processes against the will of actors 
like China, Russia and India, whose view on international security is predominantly state-
centric (Bromley et al., 2012). 
Moreover, since the 1990s, the EU has been developing its own arms export 
control policy based on the strict criteria for arms transfers, common lists of military 
equipment and information exchange mechanisms. Given that the international 
community was searching for solutions in the form of mechanisms, practices and models 
to be possibly replicated in the emerging ATT regime, the EU’s experience of operating 
multilateral export control system on a regional scale appeared to be a considerable asset. 
Without a doubt, the EU was not the only actor capable of suggesting ideas and providing 
best practices. Alternative sources of ideas have included, among others, the Wassenaar 
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 
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Technologies, the OSCE’s Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers, and the 
Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms 
and Light Weapons (Kytömäki, 2010). Yet, in contrast to the EU’s policy, these 
instruments lacked either a sufficient scope (ECOWAS), or legally binding nature 
(OSCE) or an adequate level of diplomatic representation (Wasssenaar). In short, across 
both dimensions of material and non-material power resources, the EU had a strong 
position in comparison to other players in the ATT negotiations. 
 
 5.1.2 NPT I and NPT II negotiations 
 At first glance, the EU’s weight in nuclear arms politics is not insignificant. The 
two EU NWS, France and the UK, collectively possess 515 nuclear warheads, which 
places them ahead of China and those NWS – India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea – 
that are not parties to the NPT (Kristensen and Norris, 2017). On the global scale, this 
number is relatively marginal though, as the two former Cold War foes, the US and 
Russia, account for 93 percent of the world’s total nuclear stockpile, which estimated to 
be around 14900 nuclear warheads (Ibid.). Nonetheless, having the third biggest nuclear 
force and being partially linked to the US through NATO’s doctrine of nuclear sharing 
and nuclear deterrence makes the EU – through its member states – a powerful military 
actor. 
 However, when it comes to the context of NPT negotiations, the role and 
significance of material power resources need to be re-examined. Under regular 
circumstances in the area of international security and international affairs more broadly, 
nuclear forces are an important element of an actor’s military strength that helps to create 
leverage over others, but in the context of the NPT, the potential benefits of material 
power are largely offset by the structure of the negotiations. The foundation of the NPT 
rests upon a ‘grand bargain’ between NWS and NNWS, wherein the first committed to 
disarm and not to assist in spreading nuclear weapons, and the second pledged not to 
manufacture, transfer or receive them (Lewis, 2010; Ruzicka and Wheeler, 2010). In 
addition to the disarmament promise, two other concessions were offered by the NWS in 
exchange for the NNWS’ commitment not to proliferate. In the framework of NPT, the 
NWS recognized the right of their counterparts to develop nuclear technology for 
peaceful purposes and pledged to assist them. In order to close the bargain, the NWS also 
offered various kinds of security assurances to prevent the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons against NNWS (Knopf, 2012a). Thus, by entering into the NPT’s bargain, all of 
its parties accepted a significant degree of vulnerability and mutual restraint. As 
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Avenhaus et al. (2002) argued, the NPT negotiations exemplify a ground where the effect 
of equal and opposite force is likely to occur: ‘attempts by nuclear weapon states to “lean 
on” nonnuclear weapon states merely increases the desire of nonnuclear weapon states to 
achieve equal means of pressure’ (p. 25). The means of pressure exercised by the NNWS 
vary, potentially going as far as a withdrawal from the NPT or the creation of alternative 
negotiation forums (Kulesa, 2014; Johnson, 2010), although not all scholars are 
convinced about the willingness of the NNWS to jeopardize the NPT to such extent 
(Horovitz, 2015). In practical terms, the grand bargain implies that the NPT’s three pillars 
– disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy – are closely 
interdependent, and that significant change in each of the pillars will inevitably push for 
equal measures in one or two others, if a negotiated agreement should be reached. As the 
underlying interdependent structure of the NPT negotiations diffuses material power of 
the NWS, it is hard to argue that the EU, through its nuclear armed member states, is in 
any advantageous or asymmetric power position in relation to other participants. 
 The EU’s non-material power resources in the NPT negotiations are rather scant. 
Certainly, the EU appears to be a strong promoter of the non-proliferation norm. In the 
context of the last NPT review cycles, the EU regularly condemned violation and non-
compliance with the non-proliferation obligations, although sceptics can point out that 
the EU’s criticism of some norm-breakers (Israel, India and Pakistan) has not been as 
equally forceful as towards others (Iran, North Korea) (Müller et al., 2013; Quille, 2013). 
The EU’s commitment to the non-proliferation norm is also manifested through the 
practice of inclusion of non-proliferation clauses into its agreements with third countries 
and the extensive financial contributions to international non-proliferation organizations, 
such as the IAEA (Grip, 2009; Kienzle and Vestergaard, 2013). However, in the context 
of the NPT negotiations, the non-proliferation norm has a somewhat muted resonance, as 
in the eyes of the majority of its members, particularly NAM countries, it is widely 
associated with injustice to the NPT’s grand bargain. 
In contrast, the disarmament norm reverberates greatly with the majority of NPT 
participants. During the last ten years, this also has been an almost exclusive focus by 
most grass-roots and advocacy NGOs that joined forces to form the International 
Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and the Global Zero coalition, both 
created in the run-up to the 2010 NPT RevCon (Knopf, 2012b). Yet, it is disarmament, 
where the EU as a norm entrepreneur, scores quite poorly. To play this role, it would 
require the EU’s NWS to renounce their nuclear weapons, accompanied with the 
establishment of a WMD-free zone in Europe. However unrealistic, this scenario would 
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allow the EU to lead by example and claim the moral high ground in the NPT process, 
similarly to how Brazil and South Africa capitalize on their past decisions to stop nuclear 
programs to build leverage in various disarmament forums. As far as knowledge counts 
as an important power resource, one can argue that nuclear technologies for peaceful 
purposes developed by many EU member states can contribute to the EU’s powerbase in 
the NPT negotiations. The problem here is that the rules and decisions on the nuclear 
technology transfer are elaborated in a different international setting – the NSG – which 
is independent from the NPT (Joyner, 2006). In sum, the evidence at hand does not allow 
to conclude that the distribution of power in the last two NPT review cycles placed the 
EU in any advantageous position in comparison to other players. 
 
5.2 Legal institutional setting 
5.2.1 ATT negotiations 
The ATT was elaborated under the premises of the First Committee of the UNGA, 
which deals with the issues of disarmament and international security, and subsequently 
adopted by vote in the General Assembly. At the moment the ATT initiative was put on 
the table in the middle of the 2000s, the EU enjoyed a formal observer status at the UN. 
Due to a lack of legal personality, it was recognized in the UN as the European 
Community represented by the European Commission in cases of exclusive competence, 
and by the rotating Presidency in events of shared competences and CFSP (Farrell, 2006, 
p. 31). The observer status allowed the EU representatives to participate only in formal 
meetings without the right to propose amendments, chair meetings or, most importantly, 
to vote (Hoffmeister and Kuijper, 2006, p. 14). Rights and privileges of an observer 
therefore fall significantly short of those of members of the UN. The EU’s membership 
at the UN is, however, unlikely, as it is only open to states, and any modification of this 
rule would require a change to the UN Charter by large qualified majorities of votes. 
 By the time the ATT preparatory process was over and the actual negotiations on 
the content of the Treaty began, the situation with the EU’s official status in the UN 
changed. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the EU 
acquired a legal personality and pushed to upgrade its formal status in the UNGA and 
related multilateral forums. As a result, UN Resolution 65/276 of 3 May 2011 granted the 
EU an ‘enhanced observer’ status. According to the latter, the EU received the right to 
attend informal meetings, the right to speak and to make interventions, as well as the 
ability to propose amendments and to distribute its documents (Wessel, 2011). In the 
words of an EU diplomat attending the ATT negotiations, the EU relied on ‘basically the 
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same instruments as UN member states with the exception that we don’t vote’ (Interview 
1, 2013). This, however, is a slight overstatement. In addition to no voting rights, UN 
Resolution 65/276 also stipulates that the EU ‘shall not have the right […] to co-sponsor 
draft resolutions or decisions, or to put forward candidates’ (United Nations, 2011, p. 3). 
Moreover, its amendments may be put to a vote only at the initiative of an EU member 
state. Some scholars thus claim that even though the EU’s status and visibility in the UN 
has been upgraded, it will most likely remain ‘procedurally handicapped’, as it ‘still has 
to rely on its member states to promote its agenda in the UN GA’ (Wouters et al., 2011, 
p. 4). 
 In the UN Security Council (UNSC), in which informal exchanges on the ATT 
took place, the EU is virtually absent, and the primary actors in this forum are EU member 
states. The Lisbon Treaty, however, has made an attempt to enhance the EU’s presence 
in the UNSC. Article 34 TEU calls upon those EU member states that hold a seat in the 
UNSC to ‘concert and keep the other Member States and the High Representative fully 
informed [and] defend the positions and the interests of the Union’ (European Union, 
2010, p. 35). Member states can even request the UNSC to give permission to the EU 
High Representative to speak at the forum on behalf of the EU, once the Union has 
defined its position on the subject that is on the UN SC agenda. In practice, however, 
member states, in particular France and the UK, show little willingness to act as ‘agents 
of Europe’ in the SC, prioritizing their national positions over collective EU action 
(Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2011b). The sort of solidarity stipulated by the Lisbon 
Treaty turned into an irony given that one of the permanent members of the SC – the UK 
– regularly questioned the competence and legitimacy of the EEAS to speak on behalf of 
the EU in international forums. 
 
 5.2.2 NPT I and NPT II negotiations 
 Formally, the NPT is not a UN treaty, as it was negotiated by the Eighteen-Nation 
Committee on Disarmament, a predecessor to the Geneva-based Conference of 
Disarmament. Yet, the NPT is connected to the UN system, as it was put to a vote and 
adopted by the UNGA in 1968, and each of its Review Conferences are convened under 
the premises of the UNGA. This implies that the EU’s status in the NPT negotiations is 
closely linked to its formal standing in the UNGA. As a non-state actor, the EU is not a 
party, but an observer to the NPT. Despite its observer status, the EU enjoys a wide range 
of participatory rights as a result of an informal arrangement with NPT parties (Interview 
25, 2013; Interview 43, 2014). In the context of the 2010 and 2015 RevCons, the EU was 
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able to deliver statements in the plenary debates and during the meetings of the three Main 
Committees. In addition, the EU could submit proposals, make amendments, intervene 
and participate in NPT formal and informal meetings. 
It thus appears that the EU enjoyed enhanced participatory rights in the NPT 
process even before UN Resolution 65/276, which officially granted it with enhanced 
observer status in the UN. However, it would be incorrect to claim that the Resolution 
has not had any impact on the EU’s participation in NPT negotiations. For example, the 
EU is now allowed to speak early in the debates, which contributes to the better EU 
visibility among the NPT crowd. Yet, other than this aspect, the Resolution has brought 
few other concrete changes regarding the NPT participation (Interview 26, 2017). The 
EU’s observer status in the NPT also implies a range of limitations, similar to those it 
encountered in the ATT negotiations. Clearly, the EU cannot vote during the NPT 
proceedings. Further, it cannot attend the meetings of Subsidiary Bodies, which are 
created by the NPT Main Committees to advance the discussion on specific topics and 
the forward-looking elements of the RevCons outcome. For instance, during the 2015 
NPT RevCon, the EU prepared a statement on the WMD-free zone in the Middle East, 
discussed by the Subsidiary Body II, but it had to ask Latvia to deliver its contribution in 
its capacity of EU rotating Presidency (Interview 10, 2015). The proceedings of 
Subsidiary Bodies are only open to NPT members and are closed to the public. In sum, 
the overview of the institutional rules and procedures in the three cases of multilateral 
arms negotiations reveals that the EU has enjoyed an equally wide range of participatory 
rights across all three cases, which nevertheless falls short of all opportunities and 
possibilities exercised by UN members and full parties to the treaties. 
 
5.3 International constellation of interests 
5.3.1 ATT negotiations 
 Until recently, conventional arms have been the only type of arms not covered by 
global multilateral treaties, as has been the case with chemical, biological, radiological 
and nuclear weapons for quite some time. Several international mechanisms, among 
which the most renowned are the 1995 Wassenaar Arrangement and the 2001 UN 
Program of Action on SALW, have already been in place to address the issue of arms 
export control. Yet, in contrast to the ATT, these regimes lack a legally binding nature 
and are not universal in their membership or scope of application. As then UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon argued in the opening of the UN negotiating conference in March 
2013, ‘there are common standards for the global trade in armchairs but not the global 
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trade in arms’ (Ki-moon, 2013). A growing understanding that an agreement on rules 
regarding the global arms trade is long overdue and that the international community, 
spearheaded by the UN, is expected to close the major regulatory loophole, has 
contributed to a growing sense of urgency and a common purpose behind the ATT 
initiative. 
Several pieces of evidence speak in favor of a consensual nature of the ATT 
negotiations. First, there has been a high level of support for the ATT process just in the 
initial stage. Transnational pressure to adopt an ATT dates back to as early as the 1990s, 
but the process reached its momentum when one of the permanent members of the UNSC, 
the United Kingdom, declared its support for the new initiative. In summer 2006, a cross-
regional group of states, consisting of Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, 
Kenya and the UK, circulated the draft resolution ‘Towards an Arms Trade Treaty’, which 
called for ‘a comprehensive, legally binding instrument establishing common 
international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms’ (United 
Nations, 2006, p. 2). The draft later was co-sponsored by a total of 77 states and adopted 
by the UNGA in December 2006 as Resolution 61/89, with 153 votes in favor. 
Second, apart from declaring its support of the initiative in principle, many states 
also considered the emerging Treaty as feasible in light of its prospective effectiveness. 
In response to the Secretary-General’s call to share their views on the future of the ATT, 
around 100 states and the EU formally handed in written replies, which ‘was the highest 
number ever submitted on a disarmament-related issue’ (Kytömäki, 2010, p. 39). An 
overwhelming majority of actors – more than 90 – confirmed that a global legally-binding 
instrument regulating arms transfers is indeed desirable and achievable. This consensus 
on the ATT’s feasibility was later confirmed in the findings of the Group of Governmental 
Experts and Open-Ended Working Group established by the UNGA to advance the 
consultation process (United Nations, 2008; United Nations, 2009). As one researcher 
commented on the views of participating actors, ‘there is a distinct lack of international 
regulation of arms transfers, and many states feel that international standards are 
becoming imperative in light of the globalization of the arms trade’ (Parker, 2008, p. 2). 
Finally, one of the particular features of the ATT process was the absence of block 
negotiations, which is the fragmentation of participants into a set of informal issue-based 
coalitions or groupings of actors. Disaggregation of the negotiation space into coalitions 
of interests is not a problem in itself, and is typical for many multilateral talks (Crump 
and Glendon, 2003). However, in the field of arms affairs, in which negotiators are 
usually exposed to high security stakes and zero-sum logic of bargaining, an extensive 
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number of coalitions is a function of a diverse collection of views that sometimes can 
propel polarization of interests, paving the way to a negotiation stalemate. As one 
diplomat stressed about the context of the ATT talks, ‘normally in the field of 
disarmament you have deep cleavages, but in the ATT case – a strong coalition of 
European, American and some Asian countries’ prepared to drive the negotiations 
forward (Interview 23, 2014). Broad acceptance of the need of a treaty to regulate the 
conventional arms trade and thereby reduce risks to international security posed by illicit 
arms flows manifested itself in an integrative and cooperative character of the ATT 
negotiations. 
A wide-ranging consensus on the future of the emerging ATT certainly did not 
imply that there was nothing left to negotiate about or to compromise on. Although 
negotiating parties largely shared the view on the feasibility of the Treaty, their positions 
on its parameters and scope – the two most contentious issues during the ATT 
negotiations – appeared to be quite divergent (United Nations, 2007). Broadly speaking, 
two camps of opinions can be identified. The group of progressive states – maximalists – 
consisted of European, Caribbean, Pacific, and African and Latin American countries that 
insisted on strict criteria for authorizing arms transfer (considerations on possible 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, on the risk of diversion, 
impact on existing conflict or sustainable development), as well as the broadest possible 
scope of activities (export, import, transit, brokering, loan, lease, etc.) and types of 
weapons (all types of conventional weapons including ammunition, SALW, dual-use and 
technology) to be covered. 
These demands were resisted by sceptics, or minimalists, such as China, India and 
Russia, who were concerned about the impact of the ATT on their arms manufacturing 
capabilities and the right of self-defense. The trio appeared to be at the helm of a wider 
group of mostly non-democratic countries in Asia, the Middle East and the Americas, 
interested in pushing back the human security agenda and overall watering down 
ambitious regulatory provisions (Parker, 2007; Bromley et al., 2012). Interestingly, the 
US belonged to this second group of actors until 2009, when the new President, Barack 
Obama, reversed the American attitude towards the ATT and declared his 
administration’s support for the initiative. The disagreements between maximalists and 
minimalists were addressed and reconciled for the most part during the two multilateral 
conferences in July 2012 and March 2013. 
 
5.3.2 NPT I negotiations 
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As a rationale behind convening NPT RevCons is to assess the progress in the 
implementation of the Treaty’s main objectives, the subject of each quinquennial talk is, 
in a way, pre-determined by the Treaty’s content and the grand bargain between NWS 
and NNWS that it manifests. This implies that the broad constellation of interests is quite 
similar from one RevCon to another, and it revolves around a fundamental concern about 
means and ways to prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons and to further 
strengthen the non-proliferation norm. In other words, all NPT RevCons are essentially 
the negotiations between NWS and NNWS, whereby the first focus on the topics of 
international safeguards and regional nuclear proliferation, whereas the second prioritize 
the issues related to their access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, security 
assurances from NWS and nuclear disarmament measures. While these substantive areas 
have been at the center of nearly all NPT talks, their particular mix and relative salience 
– frequently determined by the international agenda and the previous NPT decisions – is 
distinct in every new RevCon. 
The 2010 NPT RevCon was convened in the shadow of a decade-long impasse of 
the NPT process, of which a lack of progress on disarmament was the most critical. The 
previous 2005 RevCon failed to agree on the final outcome document, mainly due to the 
resistance of the NWS to recognize their commitment to the previously agreed upon 
disarmament measures in the form of the so-called ‘13 steps’ (Müller, 2005c). Moreover, 
the NPT regime has been challenged by the unresolved problem of North Korea’s 
withdrawal from the Treaty and its subsequent nuclear missile tests in 2006 and 2009, by 
Iran’s continuous non-compliance with its safeguard obligations and the alleged pursuit 
of a military nuclear program and by the 2008 US deal on the transfer of nuclear 
technology to India, a non-party to the NPT. Against this background, a widespread 
understanding among participants emerged that the upcoming RevCon almost certainly 
needed to produce a substantial agreement in order to prevent the NPT regime from 
falling into irrelevance (Interviews 7 and 9, 2014; Rees, 2011, p. 139). As Bourantonis 
(2015) observed, ‘in that context, fears of a full NPT collapse inspired most of the NPT 
parties to show moderation to restore confidence in the Treaty’ (p. 43). 
The positive tone of the negotiations was set by several events in the lead-up to 
the RevCon, primarily by Obama’s Prague speech in April 2009, where the US President 
outlined his vision and commitment to a world without nuclear weapons, and the new 
US-Russia Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), concluded in April 2010. The key 
to the improved climate of the negotiations was the position of the US delegation, which 
foremost sought to repair the damage to its posture in the NPT regime inherited from the 
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Bush administration, and to avoid another failed outcome of the RevCon (Miller, 2010). 
Political will and commitment to improve the NPT, shown by the majority of its 
membership, including the NWS, materialized in ‘the unique constructive exchange that 
developed between the governments and diplomats before and during the conference’ 
(Aboul-Enein, 2010). As another failed NPT RevCon would risk undermining the NPT 
regime and the provision of security benefits that it entails, leaving both sides of the grand 
bargain worse-off, the parties showed a willingness to adopt compromising strategies and 
seek common ground, which is rather unusual in the NPT context. As one participating 
observer commented, ‘the international environment in 2010 was more conducive to 
addressing nuclear issues than ever before’ (Johnson, 2010, p. 8). 
One of the driving forces in the 2010 NPT RevCon negotiations was the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM), a grouping that comprises 116 non-Western NNWS 
(excluding India and Pakistan, which are not NPT parties) and constitutes more than 60 
percent of NPT membership. Traditionally more committed to the disarmament pillar 
than the non-proliferation norm, the NAM suggested an ambitious disarmament action 
plan with a timeline of complete elimination of nuclear weapons by 2025, accompanied 
by a convention banning nuclear weapons (Aboul-Enein, 2010; Potter and 
Mukhatzhanova, 2012). The timeframe and nuclear weapons convention were proposed 
as new disarmament measures in addition to the 13 steps action plan agreed upon by NPT 
parties in 2010. To reaffirm the importance of the 13 practical steps, including the NWS’ 
‘unequivocal undertaking’ to eliminate nuclear weapons, an agreed disarmament 
benchmark for the NWS was also the main priority of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) 
– Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden – that 
effectively lobbied them in the 2000 NPT RevCon (Rauf, 2000). 
In contrast, the P5 or NWS set their priorities around strengthening the non-
proliferation pillar, in particular in the parts related to non-compliance with the NPT 
obligations and the response to withdrawal from the Treaty, torpedoing Iran and North 
Korea, respectively. The NWS were also eager to promote the Additional Protocol to the 
IAEA’s comprehensive safeguards agreements as a compulsory verification standard for 
the NPT parties (Dhanapala, 2010). In this respect, their views closely aligned with the 
position of the ‘Vienna Group of Ten’, another NPT grouping that is comprised of some 
EU member states (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands and Sweden) 
in addition to Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Norway, and is pre-occupied with 
issues of safety and security of nuclear supplies. The elephant in the room, though, during 
the 2010 RevCon negotiations was a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, a goal that has 
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been pursued by the NPT community since 1995, yet with little outcome to date. Progress 
on this issue appeared to be of top priority for Egypt, the chair of the NAM in 2010, and 
required an active engagement on behalf of the NWS, especially Russia, the US and the 
UK as NPT depository states (Kelly, 2010). As many insiders indicated, success of the 
whole outcome of the 2010 RevCon depended on the progress on the Middle East issue 
(Interview 24, 2016; Dhanapala, 2010). 
 
5.3.3 NPT II negotiations 
If the 2010 NPT RevCon was regarded as a forward-looking conference with its 
consensual 64-point Action Plan outcome spanning across all three NPT pillars, the 
following RevCon was predictably perceived as an implementation conference. Indeed, 
the ninth NPT review cycle featured intense discussions within the NPT community over 
what has been or should be achieved before the 2015 RevCon is convened. One source 
of contention among NPT parties stemmed from the fact that the Action Plan did not 
actually set concrete deadlines or provide specific indication for the necessary pace of its 
implementation. This tension was especially acute in the area of disarmament, where, as 
Mukhatzhanova (2014) observed, the NWS and NNWS hold ‘divergent views on the 
acceptable pace of implementing [relevant] action items, and the gap has only been 
growing’. While the P5 view the Action Plan as a long-term roadmap that can be ‘rolled 
out’ for the next review cycles, their counterparts insisted on its implementation in the 
short-run and without delays. Naturally, this discrepancy in interpretation resulted in what 
many in the non-nuclear camp viewed as unsatisfactory progress on disarmament 
measures. According to a study that monitored the implementation of the Action Plan, 50 
percent of the disarmament action points showed no or minimal progress, mainly due to 
the ongoing modernization plans, continuing role of nuclear weapons in states’ security 
doctrines and a lack of major reductions of nuclear stockpiles (Evans et al., 2015). These 
findings stood in contrast to the monitoring results of the non-proliferation pillar, where 
around 90 percent of the action points reportedly were met with some or significant 
progress (Ibid.). 
Apart from disarmament, another issue that promised to be highly contentious 
during the 2015 RevCon was the issue of the WMD-free zone in the Middle East. The 
crucial outcome of the 2010 RevCon was a decision to convene a conference in 2012 with 
all regional players, which would serve as a starting point for the creation of the WMD-
free zone. Although the first incremental steps were successfully taken, including the 
appointment of the Finnish diplomat, Jaakko Laajava, as a facilitator, designation of 
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Finland as a host country and organization of a seminar on the topic by the EU in 2011, 
the conference itself did not take place. One reason for the debacle is the position of Israel, 
that seeks to expand the agenda of the conference and link it to the broader security 
situation in the region (Dhanapala, 2015). As the key promise of the 2010 RevCon 
remained unfulfilled and a new date for the conference was not proposed, many Arab 
states expressed frustration with the inability of the NPT to deliver, with Egypt walking 
away from the 2013 PrepCom meeting (Mukhatzhanova, 2014). Hence, the two issues of 
disarmament and the Middle East appeared to be central for the 2015 RevCon, generating 
tension and increasing rifts among NPT members. 
Failure to implement previous commitments on disarmament or other pillars is not 
an unusual situation in the NPT process, and its practitioners have been exposed to the 
problem in the past. In themselves, unfulfilled promises are not necessarily a guarantee 
of dysfunctional or disruptive negotiation dynamics, especially when they could be 
counterbalanced by positive achievements, as the interim agreement on the Iranian 
nuclear program reached in 2013 (Meier, 2014). What, however, did make a difference 
at the 2015 RevCon was the increased focus on the humanitarian impact of nuclear 
weapons (HINW). The reference to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of 
nuclear weapon detonation has already been included in the final outcome of the 2010 
NPT RevCon. Yet, in 2010, the idea of the HINW was at the margins, whereas in the 
ninth NPT review cycle, the humanitarian discourse moved to the forefront, with potential 
to reframe the entire debate on nuclear disarmament. If the 2012 NPT PrepCom statement 
stressing the humanitarian dimension was backed by 16 states, during the 2015 RevCon 
the number of states supporting the humanitarian focus on nuclear weapons grew to 159, 
as exemplified by the statement delivered by Austria during the RevCon (Laggner, 2012; 
Kurz, 2015). According to Nielsen and Hanson (2014), there have been several reasons 
for the rise of the humanitarian focus in nuclear debates, the most important of which are 
the growing importance of human security in international politics more generally, as well 
as new scientific evidence about the likely environmental, agricultural and health impacts 
of nuclear weapon detonation. 
The rise of the HINW had a significant impact on the NPT negotiation process, 
not only because it shifted the focus of the debate, but also in terms of altering the 
fundamental constellation of interests at the RevCon. By highlighting the HINW, its 
supporters aimed at re-energizing the disarmament process and channeling it towards 
more effective measures on the way to ‘the global zero’. As the Austrian ambassador 
stated, ‘the more the world understands about the global humanitarian consequences of 
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nuclear weapons, the stronger the case against them becomes’ (Kmentt, 2013). Many 
NNWS, particularly those frustrated with the slow path of disarmament and the perceived 
injustice of the grand bargain, took it even further, linking the humanitarian dimension 
with the need to establish a legal ban on nuclear weapons. They argued that in light of the 
humanitarian consequences of any nuclear weapon use, the abolition of nuclear weapons 
is a political and moral imperative (Fihn, 2015). In contrast, the P5 rejected any such 
radical moves, arguing that disarmament needs to be pursued in a step-by-step, 
incremental manner with a proper consideration of the existing global security 
environment (P5, 2015). Moreover, the NWS also criticized the humanitarian initiative 
as counter-productive and one that distracts the NPT community from realistic nuclear 
reductions. France, for example, asked to delete altogether the reference to the HINW in 
the RevCon draft documents on the grounds of its perceived little added value (Acheson, 
2015). The unwillingness of both camps to compromise and to engage with each other’s 
views contributed to ‘a particularly difficult atmosphere, which [was] very prone to erratic 
behavior […] There [were] clear fears that raising the temperature of the regime in this 
way will only highlight divisions and force states to pick sides’ (Sliwon, 2015). This 
polarization of the negotiation process became symptomatic of a growing mistrust 
between the NWS and the NNWS with regards to their intentions behind promoting or 
rejecting the humanitarian debate. As Meier (2015) concluded, ‘most nuclear weapon 
states and many states supporting the humanitarian initiative appear to have moved so far 
apart that both camps dispute the legitimacy of the other’s perspective’ (p. 5). The 
humanitarian initiative has therefore spotlighted a disagreement over the value and utility 
of nuclear weapons, a divide that due to its fundamentally normative nature is difficult, if 
not impossible, to bridge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
102 
 
Table 6. The overview of external factors of EU effectiveness. 
Factors | Cases ATT NPT I NPT II 
Global distribution 
of power 
Asymmetrical Symmetrical Symmetrical 
Legal institutional 
setting 
Exclusive, strict, 
unequal 
Exclusive, strict, 
unequal 
Exclusive, strict, 
unequal 
International 
constellation of 
interests 
Consensual Consensual Polarized 
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CHAPTER 6. ASSESSING EU EFFECTIVENESS IN MULTILATERAL ARMS 
NEGOTIATIONS 
 The main purpose of this chapter is an empirical analysis of the EU’s effectiveness 
in multilateral ATT and NPT negotiations. The chapter will evaluate the EU’s diplomatic 
performance in line with the three main attributes of EU effectiveness conceptualized in 
chapter 3: goal achievement, relevance and external cohesion. An empirical analysis 
along these three dimensions provides for a richer and more nuanced understanding of 
EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations. It is shown that the different 
combination of values attached to goal achievement, relevance and external cohesion 
define a particular degree of EU effectiveness, which varies across the three case studies 
(see Table 10). An in-depth explanation with regards to why a particular level of EU 
effectiveness occurred in the selected cases is discussed in the following chapter. 
 
6.1 ATT negotiations 
6.1.1 Goal achievement 
The EU was convinced that in order to have added value for and a positive impact 
on global security, the ATT had to be ‘as strong as possible’ (Interview 1, 2013). By 
adopting a maximalist approach to the emerging arms trade regime, the EU took a 
progressive stance on each of the contentious negotiation items. For example, with regard 
to the export control criteria, the EU wanted to make sure that decisions on arms transfers 
would be weighed against the risk of human rights abuses, gender-based violence and 
violation of international humanitarian law in the country of destination. Mirroring its 
own criteria in the EU Code of Conduct, the EU further maintained that the criteria for 
arms transfer authorization should reflect the risk to regional security and stability, the 
risk of diversion to unintended users, and the impact on sustainable development. 
Moreover, the EU has also suggested to include a reference to the risk of corruption in 
the ATT (Zimonyi, 2011). 
Concerning the scope of the Treaty, the EU maintained that, in addition to existing 
types of arms enlisted in the UN Register of Conventional Arms14, it should incorporate 
small arms and light weapons, ammunition, and technology transfers. According to 
Brussels, in terms of activities the Treaty should not be limited to exports and imports 
only, but needed to include a broader set of matters, such as transit, transshipment and 
                                                          
14 The UN Register of Conventional Arms contains seven categories of weapons: battle tanks, armored 
combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and 
missile launchers. 
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brokering (Bauwens, 2010). Further, the EU suggested an implementation mechanism 
with the creation of an international secretariat and regular review conferences and a 
transparency scheme with public reporting on arms sales and information exchange 
between states (Giannella, 2011). Finally, the EU pledged to pursue the inclusion of a 
regional integration organization (RIO) clause, which would allow the EU and other 
regional organizations to become formal parties to the Treaty. The EU insisted on the 
clause due to its legal competences in the areas related to arms trade, and an eagerness to 
raise its profile within multilateral institutions. 
With these goals in mind, the EU clearly belonged to the maximalists’ camp – a 
group of negotiators that advocated ambitious criteria, scope and other parameters to 
ensure a meaningful ATT and its highest possible contribution to reducing global armed 
conflicts and violence. As one non-EU diplomat revealed, ‘the EU as a whole was on a 
very progressive side, strongly defending the ATT with a complete scope and strong 
provisions’ (Interview 27, 2014). However, one can claim that against a background of 
non-existing rules, it is relatively easy to appear on a progressive or ambitious side given 
such a low departure point. Yet there were states, such as China, India, Israel and Russia, 
that defended the status quo, questioning the rationale and feasibility of the ATT in the 
first place (Parker, 2007, p. 4). Moreover, initially many actors argued that the scope of 
the ATT should be restricted to the UN Register of Conventional Arms only, while the 
EU advocated for a broader scope, including SALW and ammunition (Interview 23, 
2014). In terms of criteria for export, a majority of states, just as the EU, also shared the 
need to include human security parameters, but other EU suggestions – diversion, respect 
for UNSC Resolutions, gender-based violence – appeared to be much less popular 
(Parker, 2007, pp. 10–11). Thus, the EU clearly put forward ambitious negotiation goals 
in the ATT process. 
The EU was largely successful in pursuing its negotiation objectives (see Table 
7). First and foremost, it has managed to push for full incorporation of the principles 
related to the human security agenda. Article 7 of the ATT maintains that states should 
weigh their decisions on authorizing arms export to a certain country against the risks of 
human rights abuses, gender-based violence and violation of international humanitarian 
law. Moreover, Article 6 prohibits any arms sales if there is a risk of their being used for 
committing genocide or crimes against humanity. Other criteria, such as respect for 
international obligations, regional peace, stability and the fight against corruption, were 
also included in the Treaty text. The only export criterion that did not find a place in 
Article 6 or 7, but that is reflected in the Preamble of the document, is the principle of 
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sustainable development (United Nations, 2013a). The EU has thus managed to 
successfully ‘upload’ virtually all normative principles of its Code of Conduct to the ATT. 
 
Table 7. The EU’s goal achievement on the key dimensions of the ATT. 
Objective Outcome Reference in the ATT 
text 
Export criteria Achieved Articles 6 and 7 
Scope (weapons) Partially achieved Articles 2, 3 and 4 
Scope (activities) Achieved Articles 7, 8, 9 and 10 
Implementation Achieved Article 5 
Transparency Achieved Article 13 
RIO clause Not achieved - 
 
The EU also has accomplished its objective regarding the scope of the Treaty, 
albeit less successfully. Small arms, ammunition and weapon components, apart from 
technology, were included in the ATT. Yet ammunition was not considered with regard 
to import, transit and brokering activities, something that the US strongly opposed 
(Interview 1, 2013). Further, provisions on implementation and transparency reflect EU 
demands. The ATT obliges states to put in force appropriate national control systems and 
report annually to the ATT Secretariat. States are also obliged to publish reports on the 
application of the Treaty and maintain an information exchange among themselves. To a 
great extent, these provisions also reflect the EU’s domestic export control mechanisms. 
The only point that was not achieved during the negotiations was the possibility for 
regional integration organizations (RIO) to become official parties to the Treaty. The RIO 
clause became ‘the biggest disappointment for the EU’, as it was blocked by China on the 
grounds of the EU’s active arms embargo against it (Interview 27, 2014). Chinese 
diplomats were not against the clause as such; they seemed to pick it up as a pretext for 
diplomatic bargaining in an attempt to pressure the EU to remove the 24-years-old ban 
(Interview 1, 2013). Nevertheless, as one diplomat claimed, ‘the ATT was a case where 
the EU got the most compared to other UN treaties […] It is not that the glass is half full, 
half empty – its 90 percent full’ (Interview 21, 2014). Given the outcomes outlined above 
and the progressive character of EU objectives, the level of the EU’s goal attainment is 
assessed as high. 
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6.1.2 Relevance 
Apart from successfully shaping the outcome of the ATT negotiations, the EU 
also had an effect on the way the negotiated agreement was achieved. The EU’s relevance 
in the ATT negotiation process has been demonstrated through the implementation of the 
two Council Decisions adopted in support of the emerging ATT. In the run-up to the UN 
conferences in 2012 and 2013, the EU dispatched 2.3 million euros of financial assistance 
to organize a series of outreach activities to promote and foster the ongoing debate on the 
ATT (Council of the EU, 2009; Council of the EU, 2010c). In a partnership with the 
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the EU organized 13 
regional seminars in Africa, the Americas, Asia, the Middle East and Europe, inviting 
local policy makers, civil society, industry and the public. The seminars aimed at raising 
awareness about ongoing ATT negotiations, promoting the exchange of views among the 
interested actors and sharing expertise on arms export control mechanisms. During the 
project launching event in Geneva, the EU’s Special Representative for WMD non-
proliferation, Annalisa Giannella, explained the EU’s motivation to promote the idea of 
an ATT among a wide set of stakeholders, with a conviction that it was necessary for the 
ATT process to be as inclusive as possible (UNIDIR, 2009a). 
 Aimed at advancing the intensity and inclusiveness of the negotiation process, the 
EU’s initiative appeared to hit fertile ground. There has been a degree of uncertainty and 
incomplete knowledge about the changing nature of arms trade in times of globalization 
and the (in)adequacy of existing instruments of arms transfer control (Cooper, 2006; 
Parker, 2008, p. 9). The need for continuous awareness-raising and information-sharing 
about the Treaty and its implications also has been acknowledged as an important 
outcome of the first regional seminar, which took place in Dakar (UNIDIR, 2009b). In 
the end, the seminars helped to raise the level of participation in the negotiations, 
especially among the vast majority of countries that are neither major exporters, nor major 
importers, and which ‘otherwise would have felt that [the ATT] is not about them’ 
(Interview 1, 2013). The seminars also occasionally offered a forum for pre-negotiation 
that, coupled with their awareness-raising function, helped to drive the ATT process 
forward (Interview 28, 2014). One diplomat claimed that the EU’s initiative was useful 
in terms of focusing and streamlining the negotiation process, arguing that ‘without the 
EU it would have been difficult to prepare [its] agenda’ (Interview 23, 2014). By 
supporting the ATT process through a series of outreach activities, the EU acted to 
advance the collective interest in moving the negotiation process forward. 
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 While the EU’s initiative has been welcomed by many and even praised by 
Roberto García Moritán, the chairperson of the diplomatic forum (UNIDIR, 2010, p. 1), 
some questioned the EU’s altruism and motives behind the outreach project. Depauw 
(2012), for example, assumed that the EU was attempting to purposefully impose its 
individual agenda on participants: ‘[T]he EU Common Position on arms exports was often 
used in seminars, which may feed the idea that the EU is promoting its own Common 
Position rather than an ATT’ (p. 10). This assumption is linked to a bigger concern raised 
by some parties that the ATT negotiations have been excessively dominated by the 
interests, concerns and practices promoted by arms exporters, allegedly transforming the 
emerging ATT into an agreement of the exporters’ club. Holtom and Bromley (2011), for 
instance, warned about ‘a danger that the Southern states that have played a key role in 
pushing the ATT forward could lose interest in the drafting process as well as in 
implementing any treaty that is eventually adopted’. Indeed, countries like India, Pakistan 
and Indonesia have repeatedly complained about the discriminatory nature of the 
negotiations, criticizing the ATT as a Western product that primarily favors arms 
exporters (United Nations, 2013b). As one NGO interviewee commented, ‘the weakest 
point of the Treaty – and probably of the negotiations – has been that it hasn’t really made 
it clear what are the advantages for importers to enter it’ (Interview 4, 2014). From this 
perspective, the EU and its member states have not made enough efforts to accommodate 
the voices of dissent and bring the major importers on board, opting instead for sidelining 
their concerns. Given this mixed record of both promoting the common interest in 
establishing the ATT and hindering the collective ownership of the Treaty by alienating 
specific groups of actors, the EU’s relevance in the negotiation process is conceived as 
medium. 
 
6.1.3 External cohesion 
 There was a considerable level of external cohesion among EU actors during the 
final UN conferences in July 2012 and March 2013. Seven EU member states took the 
floor during the opening session of the ATT conference on 18 March 2013 (United 
Nations, 2013c). In their statements, all seven countries mentioned as their priority the 
inclusion of provisions related to humanitarian parameters, SALW, ammunition, 
implementation and transparency mechanisms, and the RIO clause. The content of the 
member states’ messages largely resembled the one delivered by the EU (Mayr-Harting, 
2012). Similarly, on the first plenary day of the 2012 UN conference, nine EU member 
states practically ‘sang the same tune’ while delivering their statements (United Nations, 
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2012a). Even earlier, responding to the Secretary-General’s call to participants to share 
views in the lead-up to the July conference, twelve member states sent their contributions, 
and all but three explicitly endorsed the EU’s submission (United Nations, 2012b). 
Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom did not refer to the EU directly, but content-
wise pushed for the same language and messages as expressed in the EU’s contribution. 
One diplomat from a non-EU country thus pointed out that ‘as a group, the EU was the 
most influential with a common position and one voice’ (Interview 27, 2014). 
 In terms of diplomatic activities, the EU relied extensively on delivering 
statements, reacting to proposals and suggesting amendments. During the 2012 UN 
conference, the EU delivered statements during the plenary debate and the committee 
discussions and proposed amendments to the Chair’s draft Treaty, intervening on average 
almost every second day. The EU also has been very active and extremely vocal during 
the 2013 conference (Interview 21, 2014). As a matter of fact, this pattern of high 
visibility was inherited from the EU’s earlier participation in the four sessions of the 
PrepComs in 2010-2012, in which at least 18 interventions in total were made on behalf 
of the EU. Hence, the EU appeared as the primary collective channel of influence for its 
member states, in addition to their national means. What is more, some EU member 
states’ delegations deliberately refrained from ‘taking a national stance for the sake of 
investing into European one’ (Interview 1, 2013). Especially for small EU member states 
with limited diplomatic resources, endorsing the EU’s collective action in multilateral 
institutions can bring added value for their national foreign policies. 
 Yet several reservations about the degree of external cohesion shall be revealed. 
First, despite widespread backing of the EU-oriented RIO clause in the text of the ATT, 
there was one country – the UK – which in March 2013, neither endorsed the RIO clause, 
nor aligned its statement with that of the EU.15 The UK holds a particular view on the 
CFSP, questioning the legitimacy of EEAS diplomats to represent the EU externally. 
Second, one specific difference in the positions of the member states was found in the 
statements of Germany and France. While the former explicitly rejected introducing 
exceptions to the Treaty’s scope, like the one related to bilateral defense cooperation 
agreements acutely promoted by India, the latter backed this provision on the basis of the 
right to self-defense. Paris’ support of the major loophole in the ATT was perceived as a 
surprising about-face in light of the agreed collective position on the Treaty’s scope and 
                                                          
15 An overview of the EU member states’ statements, as well as positions of other negotiators, can be found 
at the web-page of the UN, www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/att/2013-conference/2013-att-statements/; 
or, alternatively, at the web-page of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/att. 
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implementation (Interview 23, 2014). The UK’s and France’s deviations, however, did 
not spoil the overall picture of the EU’s moderately high external cohesion, as both states 
remained consistent with other EU actors on the remaining issues. 
 
6.2 NPT I negotiations 
6.2.1 Goal achievement 
 The EU revealed its negotiation objectives for the 2010 NPT Review Conference 
in its detailed and comprehensive common position adopted one month before the start 
of the RevCon in the form of Council Decision (Council of the EU, 2010b). While 
outlining its general interest in strengthening the international non-proliferation regime 
along with the commitment to promote a successful outcome of the RevCon, the EU 
singled out seven priority areas for its diplomatic conduct: 
(1) a reaffirmation by all States Parties of their commitment to the NPT; 
(2) strengthening the implementation of the NPT through the adoption of concrete, 
pragmatic and consensual measures on all three pillars; 
(3) reaffirming the commitment to nuclear arms control and disarmament, 
particularly through an overall reduction of nuclear arms, ratification of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and starting negotiations on a 
treaty banning fissile material for nuclear weapons (FMCT); 
(4) strengthening the IAEA’s comprehensive safeguard arrangements with the 
Additional Protocol as a verification standard; 
(5) strengthening the NPT through a common understanding of how to respond to 
withdrawal; 
(6) upholding the NPT with a common understanding of how to respond resolutely 
and effectively to cases of non-compliance, such as those of Iran and North Korea; 
(7) broadening acceptance and support for responsible and peaceful use of nuclear 
energy through the multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle. 
These priorities were embedded into a broader set of 56 specific aims covering all 
three NPT pillars, the WMD-free zone in the Middle East and other issues related to the 
functioning of the NPT. On disarmament, in addition to the abovementioned proposals 
on the CTBT and FMCT, the EU sought to include non-strategic nuclear weapons into 
the disarmament action plan, and suggested to close the facilities that produce fissile 
material for nuclear weapons. On non-proliferation, proposals on withdrawal, non-
compliance and the Additional Protocol were characterized as the EU’s most important 
preferences in the RevCon (Interview 25, 2013). Furthermore, the EU also put forward 
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specific ideas on measures to prevent nuclear terrorism, to strengthen export controls and 
to enforce compliance with the NPT obligations. Regarding peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy and elaborating further its central idea of promoting multilateral nuclear fuel cycle, 
the EU highlighted the initiative of a Low Enriched Uranium Bank under the control of 
the IAEA. Finally, the EU called for concrete practical steps in establishing the WMD-
free zone in the Middle East, acknowledging special responsibility of the NWS in this 
task. 
Taken as a whole, the EU’s negotiation objectives hardly share a high level of 
ambition. Within the disarmament basket, many of the action points were either 
backward-looking (e.g., ‘reaffirming’ existing security assurances, the commitment to the 
Conference on Disarmament, seeking conditions for a world without nuclear weapons) 
or uncontroversial (e.g., CTBT). With the exception of the proposal to ban production 
facilities of fissile material, the EU did not put forward any bold steps for disarmament 
that would allow to speak of a significant departure from the status quo. As Müller (2010) 
put it, ‘with its minimalist stance on disarmament, the EU had difficulty in impressing 
anyone’ (p. 11). Regarding peaceful uses, only the part related to the multilateral fuel 
arrangements contained ambitious language, while the rest of the section merely 
reiterated the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. By the same token, the 
EU’s Middle East objectives were condensed to just two action points, without any 
specific details beyond a general commitment to the WMD-free zone. The only part of 
the EU’s common position that did include more far-reaching elements than others was 
the non-proliferation pillar. In this area, the EU provided the most visible, elaborated and 
concrete input that promised to considerably strengthen the international non-
proliferation toolbox (Interview 29, 2014). Overall, however, the EU’s negotiation 
objectives were characterized by a conservative flavor. 
 
Table 8. The EU’s goal achievement in the 2010 NPT Review Conference. 
 
NPT pillar Outcome Reference in the 
outcome 
document 
Goal achievement 
Disarmament  
(19 action points) 
11 achieved 
2 partially achieved 
6 not achieved  
Actions 1-22 Medium 
Non-proliferation 
(21 action points) 
6 achieved 
1 partially achieved 
14 not achieved 
Actions 23-46 Low 
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Peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy  
(8 action points) 
3 achieved 
2 partially achieved 
3 not achieved 
Actions 47-64 Medium 
The Middle East 
(2 action points) 
2 achieved Part IV of the 
Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
High 
 
A comparison between the EU’s Council Decision and the final outcome 
document reveals a moderate level of congruence between them. On one hand, the EU 
has clearly achieved the first three priorities of its common position: first, state parties 
reaffirmed their commitments to the NPT through reaching consensus on the RevCon’s 
outcome; second, the NPT was strengthened by a consensus Action Plan consisting of 64 
points that covered all NPT pillars and the issue of the WMD-free zone in the Middle 
East; third, the CTBT and FMCT were covered by sections D and E of the Conclusions 
and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions (Final Document, 2010, pp. 22–23). On the 
other hand, the other four priorities, much more ambitious in character, largely fell by the 
wayside. The Additional Protocol to the IAEA’s comprehensive safeguard agreements 
was recognized as a voluntary instrument only. Moreover, the RevCon’s Action Plan has 
no reference to the problem of withdrawal from the NPT, not even mentioning any 
concrete follow-on actions with this regard (Ibid., pp. 25-27). The EU’s proposals to 
strengthen compliance with the NPT obligations by empowering the IAEA’s oversight 
and to endorse the multilateral fuel cycle arrangements also did not find their way to the 
consensus final document. 
This mixed picture of the EU’s goal attainment does not change significantly when 
one looks into the approximation between the EU’s detailed action points and the 
RevCon’s Action Plan. As Table 8 demonstrates, the EU appeared to be moderately 
successful in promoting its disarmament language and proposals regarding peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy: 13 and 5 action points from the respective sections of the EU’s 
common position partially or fully landed in the outcome document. In contrast, the EU 
was less successful on the non-proliferation side, with only 7 out of 21 specific aims 
somehow reflected in the RevCon’s Action Plan. It is important to point out that most of 
the EU’s achievements related to disarmament, peaceful uses and the WMD-free zone in 
the Middle East were drawn on the lowest common denominator language, and the 
respective sections of outcome document have advanced beyond them (Interview 7, 
2014). In the non-proliferation area, on the contrary, the EU did not manage to push 
through its more ambitious proposals and initiatives. Therefore, the medium congruence 
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between the EU’s negotiation goals and the outcome agreement is discounted against the 
overall conservative character of its goals, resulting in a low score of the EU’s goal 
achievement. 
 
 6.2.2 Relevance 
 The EU’s effectiveness in the 2010 NPT RevCon was arguably more evident when 
it comes to the way it affected the negotiation process. At the core of the EU’s relevance 
in the NPT review negotiations is the Union’s long-standing concern with maintaining 
balance between the three pillars in all NPT proceedings as an ultimate guarantee of the 
Treaty’s strength and viability as a collective security instrument. This conviction is 
deeply rooted in the EU’s multilateralist identity, or its belief in the inherent advantages 
of multilateral cooperation over power politics or unilateral methods when it comes to the 
provision of international security (Dee, 2015a, p. 83). Ensuring the balance between the 
three NPT pillars in the RevCon outcome document was viewed by EU diplomats as a 
concern ‘overriding’ individual ambitions and a necessary measure to maintain and 
strengthen the NPT regime in the context of deep fissures between its participants 
(Interviews 7 and 29, 2014). In practical terms, this standing implied the EU’s willingness 
to guide and assist other participants throughout the negotiation process in reaching a 
point of consensual agreement. 
 Successfully navigating the process and managing relationships between 
negotiators required the EU to play one or several meaningful roles capable of producing 
collective benefits. The EU therefore attempted to play a moderator role in the discussions 
on the Middle East WMD-free zone, building bridges between the US and the Arab states. 
Because the EU is regarded as a neutral party in the Middle East peace process, it 
proposed – together with Ireland as a designated chair of the debate – compromise 
language formulations that could satisfy both the NAM and P5 (Interviews 9 and 30, 
2014). Moreover, the EU offered its diplomatic machinery to host a first meeting of 
parties on the way to the 2012 Middle East conference. Although the idea to host an EU 
seminar on the Middle East WMD-free zone was originally not included in the EU’s 
common position, it was welcomed by the main stakeholders and included in the final 
text (Final Document, 2010, p. 30; Interview 42, 2014). As a key EU diplomat 
summarized the rationale behind the EU’s involvement, ‘our aim was to achieve 
compromises that would guarantee success to the [Review] Conference’ (Interview 7, 
2014). Without the agreement on the Middle East, there likely would have been no 
consensus found on the entire outcome of the RevCon (Dhanapala, 2010). 
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Apart from bridge building and consensus seeking, the EU also acted as an 
information transmission belt (Dee, 2012). EU representatives, along with the UK, France 
and Germany, were invited to attend a group of core negotiators during the final week of 
the RevCon to finalize the agreement on the forward-looking Action Plan. Also, here ‘the 
EU showed its mettle as negotiator and bridge-builder, [even though] only 14 other 
delegations […] witnessed that performance’ (Müller, 2010, p. 12). More interestingly, 
another responsibility of the EU lay in keeping the rest of its members informed about 
the closed-door negotiations, and in ensuring their willingness to support the outcome of 
the talks (Interview 6, 2014). If the EU had not been involved, some vocal member states 
excluded from the informal gathering, such as Austria and Ireland, might not have found 
it comfortable to depend on information released by individual EU member states that 
participated in the group in their national capacity. 
 The EU effectively contributed to navigating the negotiation process towards a 
balanced outcome and, by doing so, demonstrated the feasibility of a multilateral 
approach to the NPT as a collective security mechanism. Both EU and non-EU diplomats 
acknowledged the ‘constructive’ and ‘stabilizing’ role played by the EU emphasizing 
that, without the EU’s participation, the negotiation process would have likely featured 
stronger divisions between the NWS and NNWS, as well as amongst the EU’s own 
member states (Interviews 25; 29; 30; 31, 2014). In the NPT context, trust and broad 
ownership, as the principal collective goods needed for an effective non-proliferation 
regime, are in regular short supply (Ruzicka and Wheeler, 2010), hence the EU’s 
diplomatic investment in these areas was highly relevant for the negotiation process 
during the 2010 RevCon. 
 
6.2.3 External cohesion 
EU actors demonstrated a considerable level of discipline in following the 
common line during the 2010 NPT RevCon. The comparison of statements delivered by 
the EU representatives and the diplomats of EU member states demonstrates a high level 
of compatibility between them. Those EU member states that spoke during the general 
debate endorsed the message delivered for the first time in the NPT context by the EU 
High Representative.16 Further, they pursued the EU’s main priorities as agreed upon in 
the common position: CTBT and FMCT in the disarmament pillar, the IAEA’s Additional 
                                                          
16 An overview of the EU member states’ statements, as well as positions of other negotiators, can be found 
at the web-page of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/; or, 
alternatively, at the web-page of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/npt/2010. 
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Protocol in the non-proliferation field and the multilateral fuel cycle arrangements in the 
area of peaceful uses. A similar pattern of cohesion also was visible in the Main 
Committees’ discussions in which EU statements were delivered by the Spanish 
Presidency. ‘Delegations waited for the Presidency to speak and briefly supported what 
the Spanish delegate said. National positions were rarely uttered’ (Müller, 2010, p. 12). 
The absence of meaningful contradictions on the floor between the EU and its 
member states can be interpreted through two interrelated perspectives. First, as the EU’s 
common position was largely based on the least common denominator, there naturally 
were issues that due to a lack of consensus between member states did not enter the 
document. It was a prerogative of member states then building upon the common position 
to go beyond it and cover more far-reaching elements in their national statements 
(Interview 6, 2014). For example, Austria proposed a Nuclear Weapons Convention with 
a verification mechanism in line with the EU’s general call for effective disarmament 
measures. It also suggested strong and more concrete proposals for the support of civil 
society that went beyond the EU common position’s minimalistic language 
(Spindelegger, 2010). Further, Belgium, in line with the EU’s vocal bid for the 
universalization of the NPT, explicitly asked India, Pakistan and Israel to join the Treaty, 
although the EU’s common position and its general statement avoided naming-and-
shaming practices regarding these non-signatories (Bauwens, 2010). Also, Hungary 
provided an extensive input on the NSG and Zangger Committee in the committee 
debates, which went beyond what the EU was prepared to say on export controls 
(Zanathy, 2010). As one diplomat commented on this aspect of EU external cohesion, ‘it 
is a fact of life that [member] states have their own views which go beyond which was 
possibly to agree’ (Interview 6, 2014). 
Second, the EU’s common position covered a broad range of issues as a reflection 
of the complex agenda of the NPT review negotiations and a compromise between its 
members. Individual member states, obviously, did not weigh all issues equally, 
prioritizing some more than the others in line with their specific national interests. For 
instance, ending the manufacturing of fissile material and dismantling the production sites 
was one of the EU’s aims that was clearly picked up by France during the negotiations 
(Danon, 2010). Germany was the main driving force behind inserting into the EU’s 
common position the language on the need for withdrawal of non-strategic nuclear 
weapons from Europe and pursued it, alongside the Netherlands, in the negotiations 
(Hoyer, 2010; Verhagen, 2010). Italy, in contrast, despite hosting this type of weapon on 
their territory, did not push for their inclusion in the disarmament process, mentioning 
115 
 
instead the necessity to prevent a nuclear weapon race in space (Manfredi, 2010). 
Although such cherry-picking tendencies among member states made the EU common 
position seem as a ‘Christmas tree’ or a la carte menu, it did not necessarily jeopardize 
the EU’s collective stance (Interviews 32 and 33, 2014). On the contrary, this 
differentiated specialization or division of labor among member states multiplied the 
EU’s messages in different negotiation committees. 
In terms of an ability to act collectively during the RevCon, the EU’s record is 
somewhat mixed. On one hand, the EU was quite a visible actor by way of delivering 
statements in all the Main Committees and reacting to the Chairman’s draft proposals 
(Interview 6, 2014). The EU also submitted four working papers including on the CTBT, 
strengthening the IAEA, nuclear safety cooperation and organized a side event to promote 
its common position among NGOs.17 As one influential observer put it, ‘there was more 
written EU input into the conference proceedings than ever before’ (Müller, 2010, p. 11). 
Many member states were willing to channel themselves through the EU, as the EU’s 
voice was an amplifier through which they could punch above their weight in the high-
level security negotiations (Interview 8, 2014). On the other hand, EU member states’ 
participation in different informal political groupings, such as the NAC, P5 and Vienna 
Group, demonstrated limitations of the EU’s collective action. This has been a problem 
in the past (Müller and Van Dassen, 1997, p. 66) and remained a source of concern also 
in the 2010 RevCon. According to several diplomats, member states’ participation in 
various NPT coalitions prompts them to develop a commitment to positions and texts 
oftentimes incompatible with the EU’s collective stance, and therefore contributes to 
divisions within the EU (Interviews 34 and 21, 2014). In particular, the NAC, of which 
Sweden and Ireland were members, submitted a working paper pushing for immediate 
disarmament measures that appeared to be at odds with the gradual disarmament process 
advocated by the EU’s common position (NPT, 2010). It must be noted, however, that 
some interviewees also highlighted a positive role played by the informal groupings as a 
source of information and knowledge for the EU and its member states (Interviews 6 and 
35, 2014). Taking into account the scores of the two indicators – single voice and joint 
diplomatic acts – the EU’s external cohesion in the 2010 NPT RevCon is assessed as 
moderately high. 
 
 
                                                          
17 Working papers of the EU and other participants can be found at the web-page of the 2010 NPT 
Review Conference, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/. 
116 
 
6.3 NPT II negotiations 
6.3.1 Goal achievement 
The EU laid down its objectives for the 2015 NPT Review Conference in the 
Council Conclusions adopted by member states in April 2015 (Council of the EU, 2015). 
In comparison to the 2010 Council Decision, which outlined the EU’s priorities and aims 
for the previous NPT RevCon, the Council Conclusions were shorter and less elaborate, 
arguably driven by the need to focus only on the core NPT issues (Interview 10, 2015). 
Apart from declaring ‘unwavering’ support for the NPT as a key international security 
instrument and upholding the plea for its universalization, the EU traditionally elaborated 
its stance on the three NPT pillars. On the first pillar, the EU reaffirmed its commitment 
to pursue nuclear disarmament, welcomed the weapons’ reductions undertaken so far and 
called upon the NWS to further cut their nuclear arsenals, including non-strategic nuclear 
weapons. The other EU priorities in this area contained familiar suggestions on the need 
for the CTBT, FMCT and revitalization of the Conference of Disarmament. On the most 
contentious part of the NPT agenda related to the impact of nuclear weapons, the EU 
barely noted ‘the severe consequences associated with nuclear weapons use’ 
acknowledging that ‘different views are being expressed’ among its member states 
(Council of the EU, 2015, p. 4). On non-proliferation, the EU foremost praised the central 
role of the IAEA’s safeguards system as a fundamental component of the effective non-
proliferation regime, and highlighted the primary responsibility of the UNSC in dealing 
with non-compliance situations. The Council Conclusions also contained specific 
language on North Korea, Syria and Iran, condemning the non-compliance with the NPT 
obligations of the first two and welcoming the progress on the Iranian nuclear case. On 
peaceful uses, the EU raised its concerns about nuclear security and safety, highlighting 
the important contributions of the IAEA and multilateral Nuclear Security Summits. 
Finally, on the informal fourth pillar, the WMD-free zone in the Middle East, the EU 
reaffirmed its commitment to the prospective zone, and urged the relevant parties to get 
back on track with organizing the Conference, envisaged by the outcome of the 2010 NPT 
RevCon (Council of the EU, 2015). 
 The EU’s objectives at the 2015 NPT RevCon appeared to be considerably 
unambitious, even against the benchmark of the EU’s common position at the previous 
RevCon. The EU’s position on nuclear disarmament represented much of the same way 
the disarmament process has been pursued so far: a gradual, step-by-step process, at the 
core of which is a reduction of nuclear weapons stockpiles. The EU essentially rolled over 
its stance on the CTBT, FMCT and CD, without adding new input. On the issue that 
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proved to be detrimental to the process and outcome of the negotiations – the 
humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons – the EU was unable to formulate a clear 
position with its member states, basically agreeing to disagree. Regarding peaceful uses 
and the Middle East, the majority of the EU’s proposals were either backward-looking or 
uncontroversial, with the exception of the reference to high-level Nuclear Security 
Summits, one of which was hosted by the Netherlands in 2014. Most of the EU’s far-
reaching proposals, including many in the area of non-proliferation, for which the EU 
advocated in 2010 – the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, the issue of withdrawal and 
multilateral fuel cycle arrangements – did not find their way to the Council Conclusions. 
Devoid of forward-looking elements and weak on substance, the EU’s common position 
thus represented the lowest common denominator, which did not depart far from the 
existing state of NPT affairs (Interviews 12 and 16, 2015). 
 
Table 9. The EU’s goal achievement in the 2015 NPT Review Conference. 
NPT pillar Outcome Reference in the 
draft outcome 
document 
Goal achievement 
Disarmament  
(6 items) 
3 achieved 
2 partially achieved 
1 not achieved 
Para. 123-154 Medium 
Non-proliferation 
(4 items) 
1 achieved 
1 partially achieved 
2 not achieved 
Para. 10-55 Low 
Peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy  
(5 items) 
2 achieved 
1 partially achieved 
2 not achieved 
Para. 56-122 Medium 
The Middle East 
(1 item) 
N/A Para. 164-172 N/A 
 
 The 2015 NPT RevCon did not reach an agreement on the final document, and 
this complicated the measurement of the EU’s goal achievement in this negotiation set. 
Given the absence of an agreed outcome against which the EU’s objectives can be 
compared and contrasted, it is obviously difficult to determine the magnitude of the EU’s 
effect on the negotiated text. What offers a solution is a focus on the latest version of the 
provisional final document (NPT, 2015) released by the RevCon chair just a day before 
the US, the UK and Canada broke the consensus over the proposal on the WMD-free zone 
in the Middle East (Rauf, 2015). It is plausible to assume that, with the exception of the 
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Middle East provisions, the rest of the text at this stage represented a mutually acceptable 
compromise, and this provides a good illustration of how the potential final agreement 
could have been had it not been rejected on the last day of the RevCon.18 
 A comparison between the EU’s Council Conclusions and the RevCon’s draft 
final document reveals a low-to-moderate level of congruence, generally akin to the 
pattern observed in 2010. As Table 9 demonstrates, the EU again was moderately 
successful in deploying its disarmament and nuclear safety language in the negotiated 
text. In contrast, only one of the four items on the EU’s wish-list for the non-proliferation 
pillar ended up fully in the draft final document. Although the EU’s Council Conclusions 
also contained a point regarding the WMD-free zone in the Middle East, it is left out of 
the analysis, as RevCon participants did not reach a consensus over the respective part in 
the draft final document. Similar to the assessment of the EU’s goal attainment in the 
2010 NPT RevCon, the low-to-medium congruence level between the EU’s negotiation 
goals and the draft outcome agreement is discounted against the largely status quo-
oriented character of its goals, resulting in a low score for the EU’s goal achievement. 
 
6.3.2 Relevance 
The EU’s effect on the negotiation process that unfolded during the 2015 NPT 
RevCon appears to be insignificant. In contrast to the 2010 NPT RevCon, in which the 
EU successfully contributed to navigating negotiations to a consensus point and helped 
to preserve a delicate balance of interests, the EU’s relevance in the following NPT review 
cycle was considerably limited. This is not to say that the EU has shifted away from its 
long-standing position as a champion of the NPT and, by extension, belief in multilateral 
diplomacy and international institutions. On the contrary, days before the RevCon, EU 
policy makers reasserted their ‘unwavering support for all three pillars of the Treaty and 
reminded that the EU is ‘one of the most important contributors to the strengthening of 
the Treaty’ (Council of the EU, 2015, pp. 2 and 7). However, there is little evidence to 
suggest that in the given set of negotiations, the EU indeed managed to invest a sufficient 
amount of diplomatic capital and resources convertible into collective goods that benefit 
international community. 
                                                          
18 Some observers, such as Mukhatzhanova (2015) and Potter (2016), argue that if it had not been for the 
Middle East, the RevCon outcome document would have been blocked by a group of NNWS due to their 
discontent with the disarmament sections of the draft. As these concerns were not raised during the 
concluding session of the RevCon as a sufficient ground for blocking consensus, it is assumed here that the 
RevCon did not reach an agreement because of the contested text on the Middle East WMD-free zone. 
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First, unlike in 2010, the EU did not decide to submit its common position as a 
working paper to the RevCon proceedings. By not articulating its common position in 
this way among negotiators, the EU arguably has missed a convenient opportunity to 
demonstrate to the outside world how the balance between different NPT pillars can be 
preserved and, consequently, what shape the compromise between the NWS and NNWS 
can take. Importantly, some EU member states’ diplomats still maintained that once the 
EU reached an agreement internally, this could a have a positive spillover effect for NPT 
negotiations at large, hence reiterating the vision of the EU as a source for good for the 
non-proliferation regime in principle (Interviews 15 and 17, 2015). At the same time, 
however, the interviewees accepted that in the context of the 2015 NPT RevCon, the EU’s 
bridge-building role was limited. Even though the EU reached an internal agreement in 
the form of the Council Conclusions, the fact that the document had no elaborate language 
on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear weapons’ use – the most contentious issue 
during the RevCon negotiations – fed the conviction that the EU had nothing to offer to 
ensure the success of the negotiation process (Interview 19, 2015). 
Second, the EU was not invited to the final week’s ‘friends of the chair’ 
negotiation group, convened by the RevCon’s President Taous Ferroukhi (Rauf, 2015). 
In 2010, this kind of informal negotiation appeared to be critical for finding a compromise 
on controversial parts of the text, as well as a crucial venue for the EU’s bridge-building 
activities. Five years later, however, the EU was deprived of the possibility to supply the 
discussions with its middle ground, compromise language, and therefore to influence the 
negotiation process at the point when the RevCon reached its momentum. The EU’s 
inability to ease tension and restore trust between the P5 and NNWS on how to proceed 
with disarmament and the Middle East WMD-free zone – ‘constructive’ and ‘stabilizing’ 
role, for which the EU is usually praised in the NPT context (Interviews 25 and 29, 2014), 
– was also recognized by external observers (Berger, 2015). 
Third, the EU appeared to be less forthcoming during the 2015 NPT negotiations 
in comparison to the previous RevCon. The EU’s top diplomat in the field, Special Envoy 
for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Jacek Bylica, was present only during the first 
and the final week of the RevCon, delegating the task of representing the EU in-between 
to lower ranked or less knowledgeable EEAS diplomats. This has likely contributed to 
the situation, as described by a non-EU interviewee, that third countries diplomats had 
difficulty in identifying and reaching out to their EU counterparts during the negotiations 
(Interview 22, 2015). In sum, if the 2015 NPT RevCon had gone off and proceeded in the 
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absence of the EU, it would have likely had little impact on the process of negotiations, 
highlighting the EU’s low score in relevance to this negotiation case. 
 
6.3.3 External cohesion 
 With a clear underperformance in terms of goal achievement and relevance, the 
EU’s effectiveness in the 2015 NPT Review Conference appeared to be scaled down to 
the basic dimension related to EU external cohesion. Yet even here, the EU’s record was 
not particularly remarkable. When it came to the ability to act collectively, the mixed 
pattern observed in the previous RevCon held. On one hand, the EU submitted three 
agreed upon working papers on nuclear safety, non-proliferation safeguards and the 
application of the CTBT, in addition to the three statements delivered in the NPT Main 
Committees. Apart from written input, the EU also organized two side-events at the 
margins of the RevCon, promoting The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation and its own global role in nuclear safety and security.19 These are the best 
examples of the EU’s diplomatic initiatives and activities endorsed by member states. On 
the other hand, the EU was less active in reacting to the draft proposals circulated within 
the RevCon bodies. One notable exception was Latvia’s intervention in the Subsidiary 
Body II on the Middle East WMD-free zone, carried out on behalf of the EU, in its 
capacity of the rotating Council Presidency (Interview 10, 2015). Moreover, EU member 
states continued to actively participate in the issue-based groupings and coalitions, with 
some negative implications for EU external cohesion. The ninth NPT review cycle 
featured the rise of a new cross-regional grouping, the Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), of which Germany, the Netherlands and Poland became 
members. Co-founded by Australia and Japan, the grouping aimed at working across all 
NPT pillars and building bridges between the NWS and NNWS, a middle-ground niche 
that has been claimed by the EU on multiple occasions (Mukhatzhanova and Potter, 2015; 
Koenders, 2015). The Vienna Group, the majority of which are EU member states, 
submitted a working paper on withdrawal from the NPT, although this topic had been 
considered to be the EU’s hobbyhorse in the past (Mathews, 2015). EU member states’ 
participation in NPT groupings and coalitions showed the limitations of EU collective 
action and willingness to focus on priorities other than the EU agenda (Smetana, 2016). 
As one member state diplomat commented, there was ‘less appetite for joint actions’ at 
the 2015 RevCon than before (Interview 20, 2015). 
                                                          
19 Working papers of the EU and other participants can be found at the web-page of the 2015 NPT 
Review Conference, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/. 
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 The mixed record of the EU’s joint diplomatic activities during the NPT 
negotiations is a continuation of a pattern that also was observed in the previous case 
study. However, how the 2015 RevCon differs from its previous counterpart in the context 
of EU external cohesion is the Union’s weaker single voice. To a great extent, EU actors 
did follow a common line in their statements, especially when it came to the second and 
third pillars of the NPT.20 All 26 EU member states, except for the Netherlands and the 
UK, which took the floor during the general debate, explicitly endorsed the EU’s 
statement delivered by High Representative Federica Mogherini. Further comparison 
between the statements of EU actors at the plenary and committee debates reveals a 
significant degree of match and complementarity. Again, the logic was familiar: member 
states were either building upon agreed EU language in an attempt to take it further, as 
the UK did on the importance of P5 meetings (Pollard, 2015) or Germany on negative 
security assurances (Biontino, 2015) during the exchanges in the Main Committee I; or 
they were cherry-picking from EU common position specific issues without necessarily 
promoting others – Italy’s stance on non-proliferation education (Della Vedova, 2015), 
France’s endorsement of non-proliferation research and training (Journès, 2015), or 
Belgium’s promotion of civilian nuclear energy, are cases in point (Frankinet, 2015). 
 This positive dynamic notwithstanding, EU member states have displayed serious 
discord over the debates on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in the 
disarmament fora of the RevCon. The disagreement on the subject already has been 
admitted in the EU Council Conclusions, and the member states’ disputing positions did 
not appear to be reconciled during the EU coordination meetings at the RevCon. There 
were two lines of contestation regarding the HINW in the member states’ statements on 
the floor. First, member states disagreed whether the humanitarian discourse, which grew 
rapidly during the last NPT review cycle, highlighted previously unknown evidence 
regarding the devastating consequences of nuclear weapon detonation. While the UK 
Minister did not admit any novelty about these concerns (Anelay, 2015), the Irish 
counterpart highlighted the three international conferences on the HINW held in Norway, 
Mexico and Austria, which arguably showed ‘that the risks of a nuclear detonation are 
greater than we realised’ (Flanagan, 2015, p. 3). Furthermore, Austria and France engaged 
in public wrestling on the issue of nuclear risks during the second week RevCon debates 
                                                          
20 An overview of the EU member states’ statements, as well as the positions of other negotiators, can be 
found at the web-page of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/; or, 
alternatively, at the web-page of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/npt/2015. 
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held in the disarmament committee, further exposing the EU’s disunity on the topic 
(Observation Notes 1, 2015). 
Second, EU actors stopped short of developing a common line regarding the link 
between the humanitarian dimension and the pace and scale of the disarmament process. 
Austria delivered a statement on behalf of 159 NPT members, outlining in detail the 
HINW, and signaling readiness to engage into negotiations to ban nuclear weapons (Kurz, 
2015). An alternative approach was outlined by Australia, with 25 other states that did 
recognize the humanitarian dimension, but nevertheless stressed the importance of a 
gradual disarmament process and dialogue with the P5 (Bird, 2015). Importantly, the two 
initiatives manifested a division within the majority of EU member states that are neither 
NWS, nor active pro-disarmament advocates: Sweden and Denmark (in addition to 
Ireland) joined the Austria-led statement, while the rest followed Australia with Finland, 
signing up for both positions. The mixed record with which the EU spoke with a single 
voice in addition to a mediocre level of joint diplomatic activities allows to estimate the 
EU’s external cohesion at the 2015 NPT RevCon as medium, at best. 
 
Table 10. EU effectiveness and its dimensions across the three case studies. 
Cases | EU 
effectiveness 
Goal 
achievement 
Relevance 
External 
cohesion 
Assessment 
ATT + +/- + High 
NPT I - + + Medium 
NPT II - - +/- Low 
 
6.4 Summarizing the findings 
The EU’s effectiveness in the three selected cases of multilateral arms 
negotiations varied considerably (see Table 10). In the ATT negotiations, the EU was 
very successful in shaping the parameters and provisions of the outcome document in line 
with its ambitious negotiation objectives. By the same token, the EU managed to maintain 
a high level of external cohesion among its member states. The Union, however, was less 
effective when it came to its relevance in the negotiation process. Judged by the standard 
of enhancing collective benefits, the EU’s relevance was mixed: it contributed to the 
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overall inclusiveness of the ATT negotiations, simultaneously silencing a group of 
significant arms-importing states. Given the particular combination of values across 
different dimensions of effectiveness, the EU’s performance in the ATT negotiations 
represents an imperfect type of outcome effectiveness, falling just short of full or 
maximum effectiveness by a margin of its unfulfilled relevance. On a cross-case level, 
this record can be assessed as high effectiveness, taking into account the differential 
weights of the main concept’s attributes, explained in the Chapter 3 (3 [goal achievement] 
+ 1 [relevance] + 1 [external cohesion] = 5). 
In the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the EU showed a different pattern of 
effectiveness. In this negotiation, setting the EU was highly relevant in terms of building 
bridges and seeking consensus among negotiation participants, and therefore shaping the 
way the negotiated agreement was achieved. In contrast, the EU’s record in attaining the 
declared negotiation goals crumbled, especially given that the objectives the EU put 
forward were largely unambitious. Overall, EU actors maintained a high level of external 
cohesion, even though the degree to which the member states channeled themselves 
through the EU in these negotiations appeared to be weaker than in the case of the ATT. 
This combination of values across different attributes of EU effectiveness allows to place 
the EU’s performance in the 2010 NPT RevCon into the category of process effectiveness. 
Because of the low goal achievement score, the empirical weight of which is considered 
higher than that of relevance, the EU’s record in this set of the NPT negotiations is 
conceived as medium effectiveness on a cross-case dimension (0 [goal achievement] + 2 
[relevance] + 1 [external cohesion] = 3). 
The case of 2015 NPT Review Conference differs from the previous two. In this 
set of multilateral negotiations, the EU was neither successful in shaping the draft 
outcome document, nor was it able to significantly influence the negotiation process. 
Unlike the previous NPT RevCon, the EU’s low record in achieving its declared 
objectives was coupled with its low relevance, as the EU did not appear to be in a position 
to invest in common goods and benefits necessary for strengthening the NPT regime. 
What is more, the EU’s diplomatic performance in the 2015 NPT RevCon uncovered 
problems with its own external cohesion, thus even challenging the basic dimension of 
EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations. EU member states were half-heartedly 
joining the ranks under the EU banner to launch diplomatic initiatives during the RevCon. 
And even though EU actors managed to follow a common line on non-proliferation and 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, there were serious problems with projecting the united 
stance on the disarmament pillar of the NPT. 
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The EU’s multilateral diplomatic conduct at the 2015 NPT RevCon can be 
characterized as an imperfect type of damage limitation effectiveness. Beyond influencing 
outcome or process of negotiations, this type of effectiveness sheds light on another layer 
of the concept – often overlooked by researchers and practitioners, and possibly even 
viewed as ‘side-effects’ (Iklé, 1987, p. 43) of the EU’s participation in multilateral 
negotiations  – which is an effect on EU member states themselves (Interview 36, 2014). 
In other words, the EU engages in external negotiations and uses them as an arena to 
harmonize positions among its constituent members, thereby shielding itself from 
imminent internal conflicts. From this perspective, the EU’s effectiveness in the NPT 
negotiations boils down to the EU ‘negotiating with itself’ and trying ‘to get its act 
together’ (Interview 37, 2014; Interview 22, 2015). This significantly lowers the level of 
ambition for the EU’s participation in multilateral negotiations, but, at the same time, 
does not allow to dismiss effectiveness altogether. As one EU diplomat reckoned, it was 
already an achievement that the EU agreed to enter the 2015 NPT RevCon with some sort 
of common position, rather than completely empty-handed (Interview 11, 2015). From a 
comparative perspective, though, the EU’s effectiveness in the 2015 NPT RevCon was 
undoubtedly low: (0 [goal achievement] + 0 [relevance] + 0,5 [external cohesion] = 0,5). 
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CHAPTER 7. EXPLAINING EU EFFECTIVENESS IN MULTILATERAL 
ARMS NEGOTIATIONS 
 Building upon the findings of the three previous chapters, the current chapter 
brings together the scores and values of causal factors and the outcome with the intention 
to explain the varying degree of EU effectiveness in the selected cases of multilateral 
arms negotiations. The analysis is conducted in two steps. First, a comparative cross-case 
investigation is performed, with an intent to single out casual factors that covariate with 
EU effectiveness. Second, based on the results of the paired comparisons, two cases are 
selected for a within-case investigation in order to explore causal pathways that link the 
identified factors with the outcome. It is demonstrated that the factor of EU member 
states’ interest convergence appears to fully covariate with varying degrees of EU 
effectiveness, but its explanatory power is not as strong as the cross-case comparison 
might indicate. Other factors, such as EU internal policy and global power distribution, 
also account for various aspects of EU effectiveness, while some factors – international 
constellation of interests and EU internal policy – are causally relevant for member states’ 
interest convergence, through the factor of which they shape EU effectiveness indirectly. 
 
7.1 Comparative cross-case analysis 
Table 11 illustrates the results of the empirical assessment of the internal and 
external causal factors and the outcome of interest – EU effectiveness – across the three 
cases of multilateral arms negotiations. As it is shown, the highest level of EU 
effectiveness – defined as an imperfect type of outcome effectiveness – was found in the 
case of the ATT negotiations. Here, the EU’s exemplary performance is accompanied by 
the developed internal policy built around well-elaborated norms and rules of arms export 
control; the high level of member states’ interest convergence at the core of which was a 
shared intent to build an ambitious global arms trade regime; and the medium level of 
institutional coordination when it comes to the division of competences and 
responsibilities between the European Commission, Council of Ministers and the EEAS. 
On the external side, the ATT negotiations featured the asymmetrical distribution of 
power in the EU’s favor; the legal institutional setting in which the EU enjoyed a status 
short of full membership rights, and where some EU member states (France and the UK) 
appeared in a privileged position as members of the UN Security Council; and the broad 
consensus around the need of global rules to regulate conventional arms sales. 
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Table 11. Comparative overview of the causal factors and outcome. 
 
  
Cases | Factors Internal policy 
Institutional 
coordination 
Member states’ 
interest 
convergence 
Global 
distribution of 
power 
Legal 
institutional 
setting 
International 
constellation of 
interests 
EU 
effectiveness 
ATT Strong Medium High Asymmetrical 
Exclusive, strict, 
unequal 
Consensual  High 
NPT I Moderate High Medium Symmetrical 
Exclusive, strict, 
unequal 
Consensual Medium 
NPT II Moderate Medium Low Symmetrical 
Exclusive, strict, 
unequal 
Polarized Low 
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 In the eighth NPT review cycle, which ended with the 2010 Review Conference, 
the EU score record was more modest. What has been characterized as EU process 
effectiveness was matched with rather moderate domestic disarmament and non-
proliferation acquis, the similarly mixed level of member states’ interest homogeneity, 
marked by a strong convergence on non-proliferation issues in the shadows of a 
disagreement over disarmament, and the smooth institutional coordination in the run-up 
to the RevCon, led by the rotating Council Presidency. When it came to external factors, 
the EU’s medium effectiveness in the 2010 NPT RevCon was juxtaposed with the 
interdependent structure of the multilateral negotiations, which denied the EU a favorable 
position in terms of power distribution, the EU’s handicapped legal status within the 
negotiations, as it is not an official party to the NPT, and the consensual international 
constellation of interests, largely driven by the shared motivation to rescue the Treaty 
from fading into oblivion. 
Finally, the third case study – the ninth NPT review cycle and the 2015 Review 
Conference – evidenced the EU’s low effectiveness level, whereby its performance 
essentially came down to preserving external cohesion and limiting damage emanating 
from the broken ranks among member states. The EU’s poor effectiveness record is 
accompanied by a medium level of institutional coordination, marked with several 
complications related to the new Lisbon Treaty provisions and the non-legally binding 
character of the outcome document, a low level of interest convergence at the core of 
which was the member states’ discord regarding the strategic balance between 
disarmament and non-proliferation pillars and a polarized international environment in 
which both nuclear and non-nuclear camps adopted inflexible negotiation positions. With 
regards to internal policy, global distribution of power and legal institutional setting, these 
factors took on the same values as in the previous case study. 
As most of the causes and the outcome vary, the multi-case comparison of all three 
instances of multilateral arms negotiations in which the EU participated allows to test for 
co-variation between EU effectiveness, which ranges from high to medium and low, and 
the six internal and external causal factors measured accordingly through a multi-
categorical scale. As the cross-case comparison informed by the MoCV shows, the only 
causal factor that fully correlates with EU effectiveness is member states’ interest 
convergence. As the degree of EU effectiveness decreases from high to medium and to 
low in the ATT, NPT I and NPT II cases accordingly, so does the level of EU member 
states’ interest convergence. The values of both variables match in all three analyzed 
cases, which can be expressed through 1.0 Spearman rank-order coefficient. Hence, EU 
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effectiveness and member states’ interest convergence are positively correlated, which is 
in line with the expectation assumed in the study’s explanatory framework (Chapter 3). 
 However, member states’ interests alone do not account for variation in EU 
effectiveness. Another EU-internal (domestic policy) and two EU-external (global 
distribution of power and international constellation of interests) factors co-variate with 
EU effectiveness in line with their hypothesized causal effect, albeit not to a full extent. 
As EU effectiveness drops from high in the ATT case to medium in the NPT I case, the 
strength of domestic policy also declines from strong to medium. Yet, when EU 
effectiveness further decreases in the NPT II case, the value of internal policy remains 
unchanged. A similar pattern of co-variation is demonstrated by the global distribution of 
power, suggesting that the two factors might also be related to each other. In contrast, 
international constellation of interests remains consensual in both ATT and NPT I cases, 
even though EU effectiveness declines, but switches to a polarized character once EU 
effectiveness drops to low in the third negotiation case. Hence, all three causal factors 
match the outcome’s value in two out of three case studies (the Spearman rank-order 
coefficient is 0.875), signaling a significant explanatory potential. 
As it appears in Table 11, the institutional coordination and legal institutional 
setting do not co-vary with EU effectiveness, demonstrating the weakest explanatory 
power among all six causal factors. Although the assumed causal link between 
institutional coordination and EU effectiveness suggests that the high value of the cause 
will likely contribute to enhanced effectiveness, no such positive relationship can be 
inferred from the cross-case comparison. While the institutional coordination varies 
between medium and high in the three negotiation cases, the level of EU effectiveness 
decreases from high to medium and low. Similarly, the legal institutional setting seems 
to be unrelated to the outcome, as it remains constant throughout the case studies, while 
EU effectiveness varies. What follows from the analysis is that the institutional 
coordination and legal institutional setting can be discarded as independent causal factors 
in this study. It is important to note, however, that more cases are needed in order to rule 
out the potential contingent effect that the two factors can exercise upon the outcome. For 
example, a researcher can add three other cases of multilateral negotiations in which the 
EU participated under inclusive, loose and equal institutional rules, and observe whether 
the same cross-case pattern holds throughout the new cases. Unless the contingent effect 
of the two institutional factors is not ruled out with the help of additional cases – 
something that goes beyond the scope of the current study – a researcher cannot claim 
with full confidence the complete elimination of these factors from the study. 
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As a next step in the cross-case analysis, a pairwise case comparison is utilized in 
order to further elucidate the reasons behind the varying degrees of EU effectiveness in 
the analyzed cases of multilateral arms negotiations. A comparison of the ATT and NPT 
I points to the logic of the MoD. The difference in the level of EU effectiveness is 
associated with the differences in the levels of domestic policy development, member 
states’ interest convergence and global distribution of power, while the international 
constellation of interests remains constant. Hence, the ATT and NPT I comparison 
indicates a highly indeterminate MoD, wherein the causal effect can potentially be 
attributed to the three factors, simultaneously rendering a complex explanation. 
A second comparison of the NPT I and NPT II is more fruitful in light of the MoD 
logic. As this pair of cases has more characteristics in common than the former, it is easier 
to isolate a casual factor of interest that covariates with the outcome. Indeed, a comparison 
of the NPT I and NPT II reveals a decline of EU effectiveness from medium to low, 
alongside a decrease of EU member states’ interest convergence from medium to low, 
while the values of internal policy and global power distribution remain unchanged. 
Hence, comparing the second pair of cases allows to control the two factors that co-varied 
along the level of member states’ interest convergence in the first comparison, which is 
an added value of a multi-case comparative design. Yet, as it is evident from the Table 
11, the second comparison is still not an ideal MoD, as a causal effect can be attributed 
not only to the role of member states’ interests, but also to the international constellation 
of interests, which changes from consensual in the NPT I to polarized in the NPT II. 
The cross-case comparison of the EU’s participation in three different episodes of 
multilateral arms negotiations allows to formulate the following conclusions. First, the 
cross-case pattern shows that EU effectiveness in the selected negotiation cases is 
overdetermined, and its variation requires a complex explanation. Of the six causal factors 
assumed to be instrumental in explaining effectiveness, four co-vary either fully or 
partially with the outcome. Hence, the initial empirical analysis indicates that an account 
of EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations involves multiple factors (both 
agency and structure-related), and is unlikely to be reduced to a mono-causal explanation. 
Second, member states’ interest convergence appears to have the strongest explanatory 
power in relation to EU effectiveness, but member states’ interests alone do not account 
for variation in EU effectiveness. The positive correlation of this factor with the outcome 
can be related to the influence of internal policy and global power variables (ATT and 
NPT I comparison) and the international interests (NPT I and NPT II comparison) on EU 
effectiveness. Third, the institutional coordination and legal institutional setting appear to 
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be the least important in explaining EU effectiveness. As the two factors do not seem to 
be related to the outcome in the way their causal effect has been hypothesized, both can 
be discarded as independent causal variables in this study. 
Even though the comparison on a cross-case level helped to generate important 
findings, there is a set of questions that remains unanswered and which are, in fact, 
pertinent to the weaknesses of the small-N comparative design based on the logic of 
Mill’s methods of comparison. First, it is unclear how exactly the member states’ interest 
convergence and the other three causal factors, singled out after the comparative analysis, 
bring about the particular instance of EU effectiveness. In other words, how can one be 
certain that the variation in the four identified factors indeed makes a difference to EU 
effectiveness, and that the correlation is not spurious or a mere coincidence? Apart from 
the missing link between the outcome and potential causes, the cross-case comparison is 
not particularly helpful in differentiating causal effects among different factors, which is 
crucial for disentangling complex causal explanations. For instance, do the factors of 
internal policy, global power, and international interests, which demonstrate the identical 
pattern of covariation, enjoy an equal explanatory power regarding EU effectiveness? 
Finally, it is not clear at this point of analysis how the four causal factors singled out after 
the comparison are related to each other - or whether they demonstrate an independent 
causal effect. A similar manner in which the internal policy and global power covariate, 
for example, can suggest the presence of a causal conjunction – a combination of factors 
that exercises a casual effect jointly. A within-case analysis based on process tracing can 
help to address these shortcomings and inconsistencies inherent to a small-N cross-case 
comparison. The following section therefore focuses on the within-case analysis of the 
ATT and NPT I negotiations, the two cases that revealed a positive value of the outcome 
of interest in the paired comparisons.21 
 
7.2 Within-case analysis of the selected cases 
Accounting for EU effectiveness in the ATT and NPT I negotiations lends itself 
well to a search for causal processes and mechanisms at the within-case level, since the 
cross-case analysis is not particularly useful in discriminating between the potential 
casual factors of the overdetermined outcome. In the first case, the EU’s high (outcome) 
effectiveness, a crucial component of which was the level of its goal attainment, is 
associated with the EU’s strong internal policy, the high level of member states’ interest 
                                                          
21 Within-case analysis is typically conducted in a single case study in which an outcome of interest 
occurs (George and Bennett, 2005; Bennett and Checkel, 2015). 
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convergence and the asymmetrical power position in relation to other negotiators. In the 
second case, the EU’s medium (process) effectiveness, a key element of which is the EU’s 
high relevance in the negotiation process, is attributed to the medium level of member 
states’ interest convergence and the consensual constellation of international interests. In 
order to disentangle the causal complexity in the two cases and to uphold confidence in 
causal claims as to whether and how these factors make a difference in the outcome, a 
researcher is confronted with several causal scenarios. First, only one or two of the 
identified factors explains the outcome, while the causal power of the rest is spurious. 
Second, several factors, working either independently or jointly, make a difference to the 
outcome. Third, all or some factors are causally related to each other and produce the 
outcome of interest through a causal sequence. A process-tracing of the EU’s participation 
in the ATT and NPT I negotiations helps to probe these causal scenarios in a way that is 
based on abductive reasoning, when a researcher travels back and forth between data and 
expectations, upholding and discarding hypothesized explanations, until the best possible 
explanation is refined that can fully account for the outcome (Toshkov, 2016, pp. 288–
290; Beach and Pedersen, 2016, pp. 311–312). 
 
7.2.1 Tracing EU effectiveness in the ATT negotiations 
Given the high potential explanatory power of the role played by EU member 
states’ interest homogeneity in the ATT negotiations as revealed by the cross-case 
comparison, an examination of this factor promises to be a valid starting point for the 
within-case investigation. Member states’ preference convergence can be related to EU 
effectiveness in the ATT case in several ways. With regard to goal achievement, for 
instance, it can be argued that the complementarity of interests allowed member states to 
develop ambitious targets before entering the negotiations, given the high common 
denominator among them and a lack of a need to compromise on the major parameters of 
the emerging ATT. Had France or Italy, driven by their national economic or security 
considerations, insisted on excluding ammunition or SALW from the scope of the Treaty 
or vetoed the inclusion of peace and security as a criterion for risk assessment, it would 
likely have resulted in lowering the overall ambition of the block, thus eventually 
preventing the EU from claiming the position of an advocate of a strong ATT. Moreover, 
it can also be argued that the unity of purpose among member states improved the 
collective standing of the EU as a negotiator, decreasing the likelihood of it being divided 
by external parties, such as China, India or Egypt – major arms importers with a clear 
interest in diluting the ATT. This is not insignificant in the context of UN multilateralism, 
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which is driven by sovereign nation states, and where the EU consisted of 28 members 
and deprived of a single representation, can become a target of predatory divisive tactics 
by powerful third states. 
The plausibility of these mechanisms and, by extension, the importance of 
member states’ interest convergence for the EU’s goal achievement, can be demonstrated 
through the developments around the ATT’s article 26. The article describes the 
relationship between the ATT and other international agreements, stipulating that the 
Treaty’s provisions do not take prevalence over defense cooperation agreements 
concluded between state parties (United Nations, 2013a, p. 13). This clause, cited in the 
implementation section of the previous ATT draft as article 5.2 (United Nations, 2012c), 
reportedly has been introduced by India, and was widely criticized by negotiation 
participants and observers as a major loophole to the Treaty, undermining its main 
purpose (Greene, 2012). Until the second UN ATT Conference in March 2013, the EU 
and its member states held a consistent view that the defense cooperation clause is 
problematic and requires revision or deletion. However, during the final round of 
negotiations, France declared its support for the clause on the basis of the right to self-
defense, a U-turn move that caught other EU member states off guard (Interview 23, 
2014). France’s about-face had a significant impact on the EU’s ability to promote a 
strong and robust ATT text in line with its objectives. As one EU negotiator unequivocally 
admitted, ‘it was very difficult to convince Indians to give up on the defense cooperation 
clause, because there was an interest of a member state at stake. That is why we did not 
take a direct stance on this debate’ (Interview 1, 2013). Although it has not been 
acknowledged publicly, it appeared that France decided to endorse the Indian clause in 
order to secure a sizeable bilateral commercial agreement on the sale of Rafale combat 
aircraft to India (Interview 28, 2013; Kumar, 2015, p. 100). 
Even though member states’ preference convergence facilitated the EU’s goal 
achievement, it does not seem to account for it. At best, homogeneity in EU member 
states’ preferences explains the maximalist nature of EU negotiation goals, but not the 
actual congruence between those goals and the outcome document. While it is true that 
when EU member states are united in their views on the most important negotiation items 
it increases the EU’s collective standing and opens the door for bargaining, it does not 
guarantee successful goal attainment. All EU member states shared the view that the EU 
should be a full member of the ATT, and a vast majority of them actively pushed for the 
RIO clause during the negotiations, including through diplomatic démarches at the 
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highest political level, but this collective determination did not appear to be sufficient 
enough to overcome China’s resistance (Interview 21, 2014). 
The evidence appears in even shorter supply when it comes to suggesting strong 
causal links between member states’ interest homogeneity and the second attribute of EU 
effectiveness – the EU’s relevance in the negotiation process. It can be argued that the 
considerable convergence between EU member states preferences in the area of global 
arms trade spared EU actors time and resources, which otherwise would have been used 
to harmonize positions and bridge differences in coordination meetings during the UN 
ATT conferences. This is a recurrent problem for the EU’s multilateral diplomacy, 
including at the NPT fora, when the EU was viewed as being too busy negotiating with 
itself (K. Smith, 2010b, p. 235; Macaj and Nicolaïdis, 2014, p. 1072). In the ATT context, 
in contrast, member states’ like-mindedness allowed to focus more on diplomatic 
outreach and other activities helpful to shape the negotiation process. However, this does 
not shed much light on why the specific format of regional seminars was chosen for this 
purpose and why the EU’s efforts to promote broad ownership of the ATT were not fully 
consistent. 
Where the explanatory power of member states’ interest convergence appears to 
be the strongest is in relation to the third component of EU effectiveness – external 
cohesion. Indeed, when member states are generally like-minded, it is only logical to 
expect them not to contradict or compete with each other on the negotiation floor. 
Member states largely ‘sang the same tune’ in their diplomatic interventions during the 
ATT negotiations because they share complementary interests on the rationale and the 
purpose of establishing global rules regulating arms transfers. Further, the fact that the 
EU was extremely vocal during the negotiations can also be attributed to this factor. Had 
the member states entered the negotiations with conflicting interests, it would have been 
more difficult for the EU to speak, as each such intervention would have required an often 
time-consuming and extensive search for common ground in the coordination meetings. 
Sharing similar preferences, member states were prepared to channel themselves through 
the EU, as in this way they could get more out of the negotiations, rather than if they acted 
only in their national capacity (Interview 1, 2013). 
As member states’ interest convergence only partially explains EU effectiveness 
in the ATT negotiations, it implies that the remaining two factors – internal policy and 
global power distribution – cannot be instantly discounted and must be scrutinized on the 
matter of working in parallel, in conjunction or in sequence with the factor of member 
states’ interests. There is an ample body of evidence suggesting that the factor of internal 
134 
 
policy is crucial for explaining the EU’s goal achievement in the ATT negotiations. 
Following UN Resolution 61/89’s request for governments to submit their views on the 
main points of the future Treaty, the EU drew attention to the EU Code of Conduct on 
Arms Exports and the EU Common Military List as best examples for the parameters and 
scope of the ATT (United Nations, 2007, p. 92). The EU advocated for a detailed criteria 
for arms transfer authorizations, illustrating them with the eight CoC criteria, and argued 
in favor of a comprehensive scope of the Treaty similar to its Common Military List that 
contains firearms, ammunition, weapons’ parts and components, software, and 
technology. Also, in their submissions, many EU member states acknowledged the 
benefits of the EU’s arms export control policy in identifying best practices for the future 
ATT. Spain, for example, openly stated that the EU’s CoC is an example ‘of the regional 
commitments on which the treaty should be based’ (Ibid., p. 201), while Poland, 
commenting on the ATT’s weapons scope, noted that ‘the specification of categories 
should be more comprehensive and precise, as in the European Union Munitions List’ 
(Ibid., p. 168). Jack Straw, the former Foreign Minister of the UK – the first UN Security 
Council member that backed the ATT and co-sponsored UN Resolution 61/89 – argued 
that ‘a new arms trade treaty will need to build on the good work done elsewhere. […] It 
should obviously draw on our experience of the EU code of conduct’ (Straw, 2005). 
Multiple interview evidence drawn from the conversations with the EU and member 
states’ diplomats also confirms that the EU considered its export control system to be a 
model worth emulating at the global level (Interview 1, 2013; Interviews 21 and 23, 
2014). 
Although this evidence upholds the causal significance of the domestic policy 
factor, it is not decisive in the explanation of EU effectiveness in the ATT process. Indeed, 
it might appear rather unsurprising that the EU and its member states praised their own 
domestic policy and practices during the negotiations. It is also not yet clear through 
which causal mechanisms and processes the internal policy factor is linked to the EU’s 
goal achievement. What strengthens the causal relevance of the internal policy factor is 
that EU arms export control rules and standards were taken on board by a significant 
number of third parties during the negotiations. Countries as diverse as Australia, Bosnia, 
Costa Rica, Croatia, Kenya, Macedonia, Montenegro, Norway, Jamaica, Serbia, South 
Africa and Turkey all referred to the EU’s CoC and endorsed it to a different degree in 
their national submissions (United Nations, 2007). As one non-EU diplomat claimed, ‘EU 
standards were widely recognized by the civil society and the countries of the Global 
South’ (Interview 39, 2014). By articulating its domestic policy, the EU placed itself into 
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a maximalist camp together with other negotiators from Africa, Latin America and the 
Caribbean who, just as the EU and its member states, called for establishing the highest 
possible international standards for conventional arms transfers. 
Certainly, the EU’s CoC and the Common Military List were not the only 
reference points during the negotiations. In the context of uncertainty, when the 
international community was confronted with the need to elaborate on globally-accepted 
rules of conventional arms trade for the first time, many UN member states were eager to 
cast their net widely while considering the (in)adequacy of existing instruments of arms 
transfer control. Hence, regional initiatives, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, the 
ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the Code of Conduct of 
Central American States on the Transfer of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other 
Related Material, or the OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers 
surfaced, among others, during the negotiations (Parker, 2008, p. 21). However, these and 
other regional instruments possessed several shortcomings in comparison to the EU’s 
policy framework. The Wassenaar Arrangement lacked adequate diplomatic 
representation in the ATT process, the ECOWAS Convention’s focus was limited to just 
one category of weapons, and the OSCE Principles were binding only politically, while 
the Central American CoC lacked a rigorous implementation mechanism. All these 
comparative advantages lent confidence to the EU policy-makers to claim that the EU’s 
‘experience with its own export control system demonstrates the feasibility of agreeing 
on [a global treaty], and confirms the effectiveness and efficiency of multilateral export 
control’ (Council of the EU, 2007, p. 1). 
These observations provide strong support for the assertion that internal policy is 
crucial for explaining the EU’s goal achievement in the ATT negotiations. As many EU 
negotiation objectives were derived from or built upon its export control system, the best 
way for the EU to maximize its goal achievement was to approximate the negotiation 
outcome with its domestic regulations. In other words, for the EU to reach its objectives 
in the ATT process, it implied extending or ‘uploading’ existing EU rules and standards 
to the global level. As one negotiation observer pointed out, ‘the EU has been a very pro-
active actor, also because basically it already has an ATT in place. […] So, the whole 
goal for the EU was to get everybody else to follow the same rules’ (Interview 4, 2014). 
Another interviewee concurred: ‘What we achieved in the end is something similar to 
what we have in the EU. It was an extension of EU framework’ (Interview 41, 2013). 
Which negotiation instruments were supposed to ensure a successful ‘uploading’ process 
of the EU’s model? The evidence at hand allows the inference of traces of the three 
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complementary mechanisms that link the EU’s domestic rules and standards with its goal 
achievement in the ATT negotiations. 
First, the EU shaped the negotiation outcome document through agenda-setting. 
The EU was the only regional organization to respond to the UN Secretary General’s call 
in 2007 for a general exchange of views on a treaty, even before the official negotiation 
process was launched. The EU’s rather unusually high level of activism during the 
Preparatory Committee meetings in 2010-2011 is also consistent with the agenda-setting 
mechanism. By highlighting the necessary building blocks of multilateral export control 
– scope, criteria, implementation, transparency – the EU shaped the architecture of the 
future ATT (Interview 21, 2014). Similarly, the 13 regional seminars organized by the 
EU around the same time period were instrumental, not only for awareness-raising, but 
also for streamlining the ATT process and preparing the agenda for the UN conferences 
(Interview 23, 2014). A third country diplomat who attended one of the seminars 
characterized them as ‘very influential’, making the EU one of the driving forces in the 
ATT process (Interview 28, 2014). 
Second, the EU engaged in diplomatic bargaining as much as its observer status 
in the UN allowed it to during the negotiations. Two episodes related to one of the EU’s 
main priorities – inclusion of SALW and ammunition in the treaty’s scope – are 
particularly illustrative. On the issue of SALW, the EU found itself in a dispute with 
China, which resisted the inclusion of SALW into the ATT’s scope, as this is a kind of 
weapons it produces (Interview 1, 2014). Eventually, China dropped its opposition to 
SALW in exchange for keeping gifts and loans out, something that the EU initially wished 
to be within the ATT’s remit (Bauwens, 2010). On the issue of ammunition, the EU 
confronted the US, the biggest world producer of ammunition, in an effort to change its 
stance on the issue. In particular, the high-level joint communique of the six EU arms-
exporting member states was reportedly addressed to the US industry skeptical of the 
ATT (Fabius et al., 2012; Interview 38, 2013). The end compromise was reached with 
including ammunition in the treaty, but restricting its scope to export activities only. 
Certainly, the EU was not alone in pushing for comprehensive scope provisions; many in 
Africa and the Americas pursued the same ambitious ends toin the negotiations. Yet, the 
EU and its member states were the only big arms producers in the maximalist camp, 
which added to their diplomatic leverage over the skeptical countries. 
Third, a crucial role in managing complex multilateral negotiations belongs to the 
chairs of the diplomatic forums, who keep track of rolling drafts and act as their 
gatekeepers (Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2011c). Since the EU is not a UN member, its 
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representatives were not entitled to chair any of the official ATT meetings, but the EU’s 
member states did. During the 2012 UN conference, the Netherlands chaired one of the 
two committees designated to draft a compromise text on the ATT’s scope and 
implementation (United Nations, 2012d). The following year, during the next UN 
conference, three EU member states – Sweden, the Netherlands and Finland – led the 
working groups on the issues of scope, transparency and other considerations, 
respectively (Interview 39, 2014). These observations offer the fingerprints of the third 
mechanism – drafting – through which the EU shaped the negotiation outcome, although 
more evidence is needed to determine the extent of the chairs’ freedom of maneuver in 
drafting the compromise texts. 
The factor of internal policy also appears causally significant for the second 
component of EU effectiveness – its relevance in the negotiation process. The EU’s 
initiative of organizing regional seminars for a broad set of state and non-state 
stakeholders was brought forth by a lack of understanding of the issues at stake in the 
ATT process, and the need to increase mutual learning and expertise-sharing on export 
control mechanisms. Hence, in the meetings the EU could not really help avoiding 
reference to its own experience of arms export control, based on the rules and regulations 
that happen to match the UN’s call for establishing high common standards for global 
arms transfers. However, as one EU member state diplomat admitted, ‘it would have been 
unwise to say publicly that the EU was a model’ (Interview 21, 2014). It is here where 
the external factor of global power distribution comes into play. Although the dividing 
line between importers and exporters becomes ever more unclear under the globalization 
of the arms trade, the ATT negotiations did feature a stand-off among arms-supplying 
and arms-demanding states, resembling the North-South divide in the global economy. 
That the pattern of the relationship between the two groups was not one of equality and 
parity should not come as a surprise. For any multilateral effort to regulate international 
arms transfers to be meaningful and effective, above all it needs to secure the willingness 
and commitment of arms suppliers (Bromley et al., 2012). Given the power asymmetries 
between negotiators, ‘the EU being so strong in favor of the Treaty may make this look 
like it was an “exporters club” [pushing] the imposition of the Western model to 
everybody else (Interview 4, 2014). This sheds light on the criticism of many arms- 
importing states about the discriminatory nature of the ATT process, a perception that 
was not entirely unjustified, given the dominating ‘exporter’s perspective’ in the Treaty 
provisions (Prizeman, 2012). Both factors of internal policy and global power distribution 
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are jointly instrumental in understanding the mixed picture of the EU’s relevance in the 
negotiation process. 
The EU-internal factors of member states’ interest convergence and domestic 
policy (in conjunction with the global power distribution) appear to fully account for the 
different facets of EU effectiveness in the ATT negotiations. So far, the explanatory 
power of the two factors has been examined independently of each other, as if both 
worked in parallel to contribute to the EU’s high (outcome) effectiveness. However, it is 
also important to probe into the relationship between the factors, not least because both 
internal policy and member states’ interests seem to overlap in explaining the high level 
of ambition inherent to the EU’s negotiation objectives. The idea that the two EU-internal 
factors are not unrelated is backed by several decisive observations. First, the operational 
provisions of the EU’s Code of Conduct on Arms Exports stipulate that ‘Member States 
will work within the framework of the CFSP to reinforce their cooperation and to promote 
their convergence in the field of conventional arms exports’ (Council of the EU, 1998, p. 
9). The same provision was later transposed to the EU’s Common Position (Article 7), 
which made this and other provisions of the CoC legally binding (Council of the EU, 
2008b). Second, a number of studies contended that the establishment of the Council’s 
COARM working group and the elaboration of the CoC in the 1990s set an upward pattern 
for increased convergence of national export control policies (Davies, 2002; Bauer and 
Remacle, 2004; Holm, 2006; Bromley, 2012). While a full harmonization is a distant 
target and the implementation of the EU’s Common Position lacks consistency, it is 
undeniable that national export control frameworks are more Europeanized now than they 
were decades ago. Third, the interview evidence also points to the causal link between 
the factor of internal policy and member states’ interest convergence. A member state 
diplomat held that the EU’s unity in the ATT negotiations was an effect of years of CoC 
experience, in particular its evolution from a political to a legal instrument (Interview 21, 
2014). It appears that without the existence of EU domestic rules and standards on arms 
exports, member states’ views on criteria, scope and operational provisions of the ATT 
would have been as different, as their national export control regulatory frameworks prior 
to the development of EU acquis. The within-case evidence therefore allows the inference 
of the existence of a causal sequence in which member states’ interest convergence 
regarding the ATT is actually a function of the EU’s domestic arms export control policy. 
In sum, the factor of internal policy appears to bear the most explanatory power 
in the ATT case, shaping EU effectiveness both directly and indirectly. The EU’s 
elaborate domestic rules and standards in the export control domain account for the EU’s 
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successful goal achievement and ambiguous relevance in the ATT negotiations. The 
external factor of global power distribution does not exercise a standalone effect on EU 
effectiveness, but needs to be viewed in combination with the factor of internal policy, 
where it both adds to (goal achievement) and subtracts from (relevance) its causal impact. 
Even though member states’ interest convergence was found causally relevant for EU 
effectiveness (external cohesion), this relationship appeared to be dependent upon the 
causal effect of the internal policy factor. 
 
7.2.2 Tracing EU effectiveness in the NPT I negotiations 
As in the previous case, the starting point in the within-case analysis of the 2010 
NPT RevCon rests upon the examination of how and to what extent member states’ 
interest convergence made a difference to EU effectiveness, the distinguishing element 
of which was the EU’s relevance in the negotiation process. The link between the factor 
of member states’ interests and the EU’s effect on the negotiation process in the 2010 
NPT RevCon is not straightforward, but it becomes clearer when one looks into the 
process of the EU’s preference formation for this negotiation setting. As explained in 
Chapter 4, member states’ interest homogeneity in the run-up to the 2010 RevCon was 
somewhat mixed: their interests converged greatly in the non-proliferation area, but not 
to the extent that it was sufficient to fully offset the long-standing differences in the views 
on disarmament and civilian nuclear energy. The wide array of member states’ interests, 
from supporters of nuclear weapons to nuclear umbrella states and nuclear abolitionists, 
created a burden for setting a high threshold for EU objectives, as two extreme sides 
risked cancelling each other out and, therefore, diluting the EU’s collective position. As 
one diplomat put it bluntly, ‘the EU is kind of nowhere in [the NPT] debate’ (Interview 
6, 2014). This explains why the greatest part of the EU’s common position in the 2010 
NPT RevCon, except for the detailed and ambitious non-proliferation goals, was status 
quo-oriented, and reflected the lowest common denominator. 
The EU thus entered the final phase of the eighth NPT review cycle with a largely 
conservative negotiation position that reflected an internal EU compromise. A middle 
ground negotiation position that fell not too far from the status quo did not require much 
diplomatic bargaining to be achieved. The logic was the following: given the composition 
of EU membership and the nature of the debates in the NPT regime, the internal EU 
compromise was a good predictor for where common ground lays at the international 
level (Interview 25, 2013). In line with its image as ‘a laboratory of consensus’ (Grand, 
2010, p. 25) and ‘a microcosm of the NPT parties’ (Interviews 34 and 36, 2014), the EU 
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submitted its entire common position as a working paper to the NPT proceedings in order 
to feed the final outcome document with its domestically-crafted compromise language. 
As one EU member state diplomat mentioned, ‘already because of our composition that 
we were able to agree among 27 member states was a good prediction of what could be 
possibly agreed among the whole membership of the NPT’ (Interview 6, 2014). At this 
point, considering its ‘homework’ completed, the core of EU tasks at the RevCon came 
down to guiding and assisting other participants throughout the negotiation process in 
reaching a point of consensus. The need to balance internal interests therefore has become 
the driving force of the EU’s external RevCon activities, which largely consisted of 
efforts at bridge-building and consensus-seeking among NPT negotiators. Ensuring the 
balance between the three NPT pillars in the RevCon outcome document was viewed by 
the EU diplomats as an ‘overriding priority’, a necessary measure to maintain and 
strengthen the NPT regime in the wider context of deep fissures among its participants 
(Interviews 7 and 29, 2014). 
Due to its diverse membership and a middle ground position, the EU appeared to 
be particularly well-suited for bridge-building efforts at the 2010 NPT RevCon. Because 
the EU is regarded as a neutral party with substantive diplomatic clout, its added value in 
negotiating a WMD free zone in the Middle East and mediating between the US and Arab 
states is acknowledged by both EU and non-EU diplomats (Interviews 30; 34; 40, 2014). 
Certainly, there was a number of other political groupings and coalitions, such as the 
NAC, NAM, P5 and Vienna Group of Ten, traditionally active in the NPT negotiations. 
However, most of them are issue-based groupings and none of them comprised both 
nuclear weapon states and nuclear abolitionists under a shared roof. The only coalition of 
states that did attempt to work across all the three NPT pillars was the Norwegian-led 
Seven Nation Initiative, which also included Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Romania, South 
Africa and the UK (Gahr Støre, 2008). Established in 2005, the group’s engagement was, 
however, short-lived, and the 2010 RevCon did not even witness any working papers or 
common statements issued by the group (Mukhatzhanova and Potter, 2015). These 
observations strengthen the confidence in the causal link between the delicate internal 
balance of member states’ interests and the EU’s external relevance in the eighth NPT 
review cycle. 
Member states’ interest convergence is also instrumental in understanding the 
EU’s external cohesion in the 2010 NPT RevCon. When it comes to the non-proliferation 
pillar, the logic of causal argument is similar to the one explained in the ATT case. 
Member states ‘sang the same tune’ alongside EU representatives, because they share the 
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same views on the risks and challenges to the non-proliferation norm, as well as how to 
strengthen it. The two other NPT pillars, disarmament and peaceful nuclear energy, are 
more puzzling though. In those two areas, member states’ interests diverge, but this did 
not result in major contradictions on the floor. The reason why member states stuck to the 
discipline, even though they do not share the same interests on these matters, might still 
be related to the factor of member states’ interest convergence. Any public clash on the 
RevCon floor would have born high costs for the overall balance of interests within the 
EU, which has not been as homogenous as in the ATT case, but also not as divergent as 
in the NPT II case.22 Even though the EU’s common position on disarmament and civilian 
nuclear energy was based on the lowest common denominator, there still were issues upon 
which member states could agree, and on which basis they could develop more ambitious 
elements in their national statements. Furthermore, because of the low level of consensus 
on disarmament, member states had the freedom to participate in other groupings. As one 
EU diplomat admitted, ‘you have to allow to member states to nationally also play a role 
to be able to respect the common position’ (Interview 7, 2014). 
As member states’ interest convergence appears to comprehensively account for 
EU effectiveness in the NPT I case, a question regarding the role of the international 
constellation of interests – another important factor in the negotiations as revealed by the 
cross-case comparison – emerges. At this point in the analysis, three potential scenarios 
can be put forward: the international constellation of interests is either unrelated to EU 
effectiveness, or it shapes EU effectiveness independently from the factor of member 
states’ interests through an alternative causal pathway, or it influences EU effectiveness 
through member states’ interest convergence in a causal sequence. 
The first scenario is the least plausible among the three. The design of the grand 
bargain implies that the NPT negotiations are mainly about an exchange between NWS 
and NNWS. It is difficult not to expect that the dynamics between these two forces will 
not affect the EU’s performance in the negotiations, especially given that the EU, through 
its member states, has a foot in both camps. The second scenario, in which EU process 
effectiveness is directly affected by the constellation of international interests 
independently from the role played by member states’ interest convergence, receives 
                                                          
22 One additional explanation as to why there has not been an open clash between EU actors on the 
negotiation floor can be related to the EU’s institutional coordination. In the 2015 NPT RevCon, Austria 
and France held a public fight about the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, an aspect that practically 
had no agreed upon language in the EU’s Council Conclusions. In contrast, the EU’s Council Decision 
adopted before the 2010 NPT RevCon was a much more elaborate document, covering all important aspects 
of the NPT’s agenda. 
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slightly more support. It can be argued that the consensual atmosphere surrounding the 
2010 NPT RevCon, in which major players were willing to compromise and work 
together on a meaningful outcome, created a demand for bridge-builders to lock in an 
increased level of trust and cooperation among the parties. Had the international interests’ 
constellation been polarized, just as it appeared to be in the 2015 NPT RevCon, it would 
have been more difficult for such actors to play a meaningful role. As one Polish diplomat 
commented about the 2015 RevCon, ‘the discrepancies of views among the countries and 
the key players were so tangible that any honest broker could not deliver at that time’ 
(Mogherini, 2015). However, this mechanism seems to explain how the factor of 
international interests facilitates the EU’s relevance in the negotiation process rather than 
how the former causes the latter. Moreover, it is difficult to argue convincingly that the 
constellation of international interests shapes EU effectiveness with no relation to EU-
internal factors, especially given that the disposition of EU member states’ interests is an 
integral part of this broader constellation of interests in the NPT regime. 
What therefore appears as the most plausible scenario is a causal pathway in which 
the factor of international constellation of interests influenced the level of EU member 
states’ interest convergence which, in turn, shaped EU effectiveness in the 2010 NPT 
RevCon. That the constellation of international interests is causally related to its 
counterpart factor at the EU level is supported by a number of important observations. As 
stated above, EU member states are not isolated from broader interest dynamics in the 
field of nuclear politics. On the contrary, member states on both sides of the NPT’s grand 
bargain – France and the UK on one hand, and Austria, Ireland and Sweden on the other 
hand – participate and occasionally coordinate in political groupings, such as P5 and 
NAC, that are active in various international forums (the CD, the UN First Committee, 
etc.) beyond the NPT review process. More specifically, the consensual constellation of 
international interests in the run-up to the 2010 RevCon spilled over into the EU’s internal 
discussions on NPT matters, shaping the attitudes of its member states. As one diplomat 
observed, ‘when we were meeting, all EU member states around the table, preparing, 
there was a desire to achieve success in 2010, because of the failure in 2005, the new 
expectations from the Obama administration’ (Interview 7, 2014). The preoccupation 
with the health of the non-proliferation regime and with the need to achieve a result in 
2010 became a unifying force among EU member states. Despite their long-standing 
differences, member states were not eager to expose them, instead adopting a rather 
flexible attitude towards each other, as well as externally: ‘We were quite prepared to do 
compromises on all fronts’ (Interview 9, 2014). 
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The evidence of a causal link between the international constellation of interests 
and EU member states’ interest convergence is also supported by observations derived 
from alternative sources of data. A declassified document, for example, revealed Spain’s 
commitment ‘to “take advantage of the momentum” that President Obama has created on 
nonproliferation and disarmament issues’ and to be more proactive and ambitious in its 
role of EU Presidency in forging internal consensus than otherwise would have been 
possible under ordinary circumstances (Wikileaks, 2009a). Another document showed 
that France, the most conservative EU member state with regard to disarmament, found 
itself at odds with and under pressure from other EU partners fueled by growing 
international expectations to revive the stalled disarmament agenda on the eve of the 
RevCon (Wikileaks, 2009b). However, as one diplomat put it, ‘even if France was 
sometimes more reluctant to follow, they could not be negative, particularly if they have 
another nuclear weapon states, like the US with Russia’ prepared to make concessions 
necessary to ensure the success of the 2010 RevCon (Interview 7, 2014). 
A number of secondary sources also concur that similarities or differences 
between EU member states on NPT matters mirror patterns of relations between NWS 
and NNWS at the global stage (Katsioulis and Mölling, 2010; Müller et al., 2013; Dee, 
2015b). Katsioulis and Molling (2010), for instance, make a reverse, but unambiguous, 
claim that ‘if the general framework [of negotiations] is confrontational, […] the EU 
cannot contribute to a positive outcome of the Review Conference because any 
confrontations will also be reflected inside the EU’ (p. 12). There is no need to construct 
a meticulous counterfactual case to briefly consider the validity of this causal mechanism, 
since the third case of this study – the 2015 NPT RevCon – illustrates it to the greatest 
possible extent. Without diving into a detailed within-case investigation, it is highly 
plausible to argue that the increased discourse about and activities around the 
humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, which emerged outside the EU shortly after the 
2010 RevCon, drove serious internal rifts among its member states that not only prevented 
the EU from playing any meaningful role in the negotiations, but also jeopardized its 
external cohesion. 
In sum, the factor of member states’ interest convergence comprehensively 
accounts for EU effectiveness in the 2010 NPT RevCon. Because of the diverse 
composition of EU membership, covering the entire interest spectrum and driven by the 
need to preserve internal consensus, the EU engaged into balancing various interests 
externally among three NPT pillars as the only way to ensure the sustainability of the 
regime. The hard-won internal compromise also explains why member states largely kept 
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their ranks, even though some of them also participated in other political groupings. 
However, member states’ interest convergence did not exercise an independent causal 
effect, but was instead shaped by the factor of international interests’ constellation. By 
forging the degree of member states’ interest convergence, the consensual constellation 
of international interests indirectly shaped EU effectiveness in the 2010 NPT RevCon. 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS 
 The final chapter summarizes the main findings of the study in light of the research 
questions put forward in the introduction. Additionally, it outlines broader reflections on 
the study’s results from the viewpoint of their external validity and relevance for 
academic researchers and policy practitioners. 
 
8.1 Main findings of the study 
This study examined the European Union’s involvement in multilateral arms 
negotiations. Proliferation of arms and weapons fuels conflicts, violence and terrorism 
worldwide, and presents a serious threat to national and international security and 
stability. Ironically, arms affairs is an area in which the need for collective action and 
multilateral cooperation is arguably the most difficult to be reconciled with the dominant 
role of states in international society. Because the issues of state sovereignty, integrity 
and survival are at stake, weapons-related security challenges are set to be handled under 
circumstances in which states are clearly the key actors and in which resistance to any 
significant role of non-state players, such as the EU, is almost inevitable. Against the 
odds, the EU is a regular participant in multilateral arms negotiations, be it in the area of 
conventional arms or weapons of mass destruction. Just as states, the Union formulates 
negotiation objectives, presents its position to other negotiators, engages in diplomatic 
bargaining and exchange, and coordinates members of its negotiation team – essentially, 
it carries out all the main elements of modern diplomatic conduct, short of voting. Being 
a successful role model for multilateralism itself, the EU is an active and committed 
player in promoting a rules-based global order through multilateral cooperation and, as 
this study demonstrates, is able to shape policy outcomes and have an added value for 
collective deliberation and decision-making in multilateral arms forums. 
 
8.1.1 To what extent is the EU an effective actor in multilateral arms negotiations? 
The EU demonstrated various degrees of impact in the three selected cases of 
multilateral arms negotiations. This allowed to distinguish three different patterns of EU 
effectiveness, which constitute the first major finding of this study. In the ATT 
negotiations, the EU was very successful in shaping the parameters and provisions of the 
outcome document in line with its ambitious negotiation objectives. Driven by the 
conviction that only a strong and comprehensive treaty can have a meaningful impact on 
the global arms trade, the EU influenced the most important sections of the draft ATT 
related to scope, criteria, implementation and transparency. By the same token, the EU 
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managed to maintain a high level of external cohesion among its member states. With the 
exception of several instances, such as when France and the UK deviated from the 
common line, member states and EU institutions by and large sang the same tune and 
acted in unison at the UN-sponsored negotiations on the ATT.  The EU, however, was 
less effective when it came to its relevance in the negotiation process. Judged by the 
standard of common goods and collective benefits, the EU’s relevance was mixed: it 
contributed to the overall inclusiveness of the ATT negotiations, but, at the same time, 
pushed to the sidelines a group of significant arms-importing states. 
Given the particular combination of values across different dimensions of 
effectiveness, the EU’s performance in the ATT negotiations was described as an 
imperfect kind of outcome effectiveness, just falling short of full or maximum 
effectiveness by a margin of its unfulfilled relevance. Outcome effectiveness is a subtype 
of EU effectiveness, at the core of which is a conceptual attribute of goal achievement or, 
speaking empirically, a set of effects on the negotiation outcome. From the perspective 
of goal achievement, which is the dominant view on effectiveness among scholars, the 
EU is considered to be an effective actor if as many points as possible of the EU’s 
objectives are reflected in the negotiated agreement. As goal achievement reflects an 
inherently internal standard for understanding EU effectiveness, an examination of the 
quality of the EU’s negotiation objectives is a part and parcel of this approach to EU 
effectiveness. On the comparative level, the EU’s performance in the ATT negotiations 
has been assessed as high effectiveness, taking into account the greater weight of goal 
achievement in comparison to the other components of EU effectiveness. 
In the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the EU showed a different pattern of 
effectiveness. In this negotiation setting, the EU emerged highly relevant in terms of 
building bridges between the US and Arab states, seeking consensus among all 
negotiation participants, and thus in shaping the way the negotiated agreement was 
achieved. By navigating the negotiation process towards an outcome that is balanced in 
relation to the three NPT pillars, the EU demonstrated the feasibility of a multilateral 
approach to the NPT as a collective security mechanism. In contrast, the EU’s record in 
attaining a long list of declared negotiation goals crumbled, especially given that the 
objectives that the EU put forward, with the exception of the non-proliferation part, lacked 
ambition and were too close to the existing status quo. Overall, EU actors maintained a 
high level of external cohesion, even though the degree to which member states channeled 
themselves through the EU during these negotiations appeared to be weaker than in the 
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ATT case. Nonetheless, EU member states showed a significant level of discipline and 
restraint, sticking to a common line in their interventions on the negotiation floor. 
This combination of values across different attributes of EU effectiveness allowed 
to place the EU’s performance in the 2010 NPT RevCon into the category of process 
effectiveness. This subtype of EU effectiveness is based on the conceptual attribute of 
relevance or, in other words, effects that the EU produces on the negotiation process. As 
an alternative component of EU effectiveness, relevance shifts the focus from the results 
of multilateral negotiations to the way the negotiated agreement is achieved. From this 
perspective, the EU is an effective actor when it creates and enhances value through a 
multilateral process, which is considered a collective benefit in itself. In comparison to 
goal achievement, relevance diversifies standards against which EU effectiveness in 
multilateral arms negotiations is assessed – from individual and inward-looking to 
collective and outward-oriented. The EU’s record in the 2010 NPT RevCon, however, 
has been conceived as medium effectiveness on a cross-case level, because of the low 
goal achievement score, the empirical weight of which is considered higher than that of 
relevance. 
The case of the EU’s performance in the 2015 NPT Review Conference differs 
from the previous two. In this set of multilateral negotiations, the EU was neither 
successful in shaping the draft outcome document, nor was it able to significantly 
influence the negotiation process. Unlike the previous NPT RevCon, the EU’s low record 
in achieving its declared objectives was coupled with its low relevance, as the EU did not 
appear in to be in a position to invest in the common goods and collective benefits 
necessary for strengthening the NPT regime. What is more, the EU’s diplomatic 
performance in the 2015 NPT RevCon uncovered problems with its own external 
cohesion, thus challenging even the basic dimension of EU effectiveness in multilateral 
negotiations. EU member states were half-heartedly joining the ranks under the EU 
banner to launch diplomatic initiatives during the RevCon. And even though EU actors 
managed to follow a common line on non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy, there have been serious problems with projecting a united stance on the 
disarmament pillar of the NPT. 
The EU’s multilateral diplomatic conduct at the 2015 NPT RevCon can be 
characterized as an imperfect type of damage limitation effectiveness. Beyond influencing 
outcome or process of negotiations, this type of effectiveness sheds light on another layer 
of the concept – often overlooked by researchers and practitioners – which relates to the 
effects on EU member states themselves. In other words, the EU engages in external 
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negotiations and uses them as an arena to harmonize positions among its constituent 
members, thereby shielding itself from imminent internal conflicts. From this inward-
looking perspective, the EU’s effectiveness in the arms negotiations boils down to the 
degree of cohesion among EU actors in terms of their messages and acts during the 
negotiations. This significantly lowers the level of ambition for the EU’s participation in 
multilateral negotiations, but, at the same time, does not allow to dismiss effectiveness 
altogether. Coordinating and crafting a common approach among 28 constituent entities 
is a challenging exercise, therefore the mere fact of getting member states on same page 
is a negotiation achievement by itself. From a comparative perspective, though, the EU’s 
effectiveness in the 2015 NPT RevCon was undoubtedly low, given the little weight of 
external cohesion in comparison to the other attributes of EU effectiveness. 
 
8.1.2 What explains EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations? 
To address the research questions of the study, this project relied on an integrative 
comparative case study design combining cross-case comparison and within-case 
analysis. This choice proved to be a fruitful strategy for drawing causal inferences in the 
Y-centered study preoccupied with the ‘causes-of-effects’, as the two elements of the 
research design are more powerful when sequentially combined, rather than when used 
in isolation. Drawn on Mill’s methods of comparison, the cross-case analysis of the EU’s 
participation in three different episodes of multilateral arms negotiations allowed to put 
forward the following conclusions. First, the cross-case pattern showed that EU 
effectiveness in the selected negotiation cases is overdetermined, and its variation 
requires a complex or eclectic explanation. Of the six causal factors assumed to be 
instrumental in explaining EU effectiveness, four – internal policy, member states’ 
interest convergence, global power distribution and international constellation of interests 
– either fully or partially co-varied with the outcome. This stage of empirical analysis 
therefore indicated that the account of EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations 
involves multiple causal factors (both internal and external to the EU), and is unlikely to 
be reduced to a mono-causal explanation. 
Second, the institutional coordination and legal institutional setting appeared to be 
least important in explaining EU effectiveness. While the legal institutional setting 
remained invariant, the score of institutional coordination did differ to a certain extent 
across the cases, but not in the way that allowed the inference of an association with EU 
effectiveness. As the two factors did not appear to be related to the outcome in the manner 
in which their causal effect has been hypothesized, both have been discarded as 
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independent causal factors in this study. At the same time, it is important to note that the 
cross-case analysis implied little about the presence of a potential interaction effect 
between the two institutional factors and the other variables. Unless this possibility is not 
ruled out with the help of additional cases – something that goes beyond the scope of the 
current project – a researcher is not in a position to claim with full confidence the 
complete elimination of these factors from the study. 
Third and most importantly, the cross-case comparison provided significant hints 
as to which factors can explain the variation of EU effectiveness. Member states’ interest 
convergence appeared to have the strongest explanatory potential, as it perfectly matched 
the pattern of covariation with the outcome. The factor of member states’ interests, 
however, was not the only candidate for an association with EU effectiveness. As a result 
of the paired comparisons, it came out that the positive correlation of this factor with the 
outcome could potentially be related to the influence of internal policy and global power 
variables (ATT and NPT I comparison) and international interests (NPT I and NPT II 
comparison) on EU effectiveness. As important as these findings are, the cross-case 
comparison, however, has left too much room for indeterminacy over EU effectiveness 
beyond the level that can allow to adequately answer the research question. It is here 
where the second stage of the empirical analysis on the within-case level started, with the 
intent to reduce the causal complexity, to differentiate between powers of the four casual 
factors and, most importantly, to uncover causal processes and mechanisms that link the 
identified factors with the outcome. 
The within-case analysis of the ATT and NPT I negotiations – the two cases in 
which the instances of EU effectiveness were the most pronounced – helped to collect 
casual process observations that strengthened, but also modified, the findings generated 
by the cross-case level of analysis. The factor of member states’ interest convergence 
indeed took central stage, but its explanatory power turned out to be weaker than the 
cross-case comparison might have indicated. First, the homogeneity of member states 
preferences accounted for EU relevance and external cohesion in the NPT I negotiations, 
but it was much less instrumental in understanding different dimensions of EU 
effectiveness in the ATT case. While the factor did explain the level of the EU’s external 
cohesion and provided useful analytical insights with regards to the quality of the EU’s 
negotiation objectives, the evidence appeared to be in short supply when it came to 
suggesting strong causal links between the role played by member states’ interests on one 
hand, and the EU’s goal achievement and relevance in the ATT negotiations on the other 
hand. Second, the factor of member states’ interest convergence was not independent in 
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shaping EU effectiveness. On the contrary, the within-case evidence allowed the 
inference of the existence of causal sequences in which different degrees of member 
states’ interest convergence were actually found to be a function of the EU’s domestic 
arms export control policy (the ATT case) and the particular constellation of interests on 
the international arena (the NPT I case). 
With regard to the other three factors, the internal policy in particular stood out as 
one carrying the most explanatory power over the high level of EU effectiveness in the 
ATT case. The EU’s elaborated domestic rules and standards in the export control domain 
persuasively accounted for the EU’s successful goal achievement and ambiguous 
relevance in the ATT negotiations. Moreover, because the factor of internal policy also 
conditioned EU member states’ interest convergence, one can argue that it shaped EU 
effectiveness both directly and indirectly. The internal policy factor thus appeared to be 
the force that made the difference in the level of EU effectiveness in the ATT 
negotiations. In the NPT I case, the factor of the international constellation of interest was 
also found causally relevant, determining the level of member states’ interest 
convergence. However, in contrast to the causal power of internal policy in the ATT 
negotiations, the factor of international interests did not appear to be a common cause in 
relation to the member states’ preferences and the outcome. In other words, its causal 
impact on EU effectiveness can only be understood indirectly though the effect it 
exercised on the balance of member states’ interests. Finally, the global distribution of 
power had seemingly the weakest explanatory potential in comparison to the other two 
factors. Its role in the ATT case can be best conceived as a complementary factor that did 
not exercise a standalone effect on EU effectiveness, but needs to be viewed in 
combination with the factor of internal policy, where it both adds to (goal achievement) 
and subtracts from (relevance) its causal impact. 
On a more aggregate level, these findings can be interpreted through the two 
foundational perspectives. Of the three major building blocks of social science 
explanation – power, interests and institutions – in which all six causal factors of this 
study were anchored, those related to power (internal policy and global power 
distribution) and interests (member states’ interest convergence and international 
constellation of interests) appeared to be causally relevant for EU effectiveness in 
multilateral arms negotiations. It can be further noted that interests-based explanations 
accounted for lower levels of EU effectiveness (NPT negotiations), while power-related 
causes were pivotal for higher levels of EU effectiveness (ATT negotiations). From this 
point of view, the results of the study challenge those intergovernmental accounts of the 
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EU’s impact on the international stage, which maintain that if the member states’ interests 
are not in line, the EU is destined for failure. The findings of this study showed that the 
member states’ interests are not the only game in town, and that the causal recipe for the 
EU’s success in the ‘high politics’ arena is actually more nuanced. The EU can be 
effective in multilateral arms negotiations even if the unity of member states is suboptimal 
(the 2010 NPT RevCon example). Moreover, what made the EU even more successful in 
this kind of negotiation was the EU’s own experience of multilateral policy development 
rather than the commonalities between member states’ standpoints, although the latter 
certainly facilitated EU effectiveness (the ATT example). 
The combination of power and interests-based reasoning at the center of the 
study’s explanatory framework highlights the utility of the realist-rationalist theoretical 
angle on the explanation of EU effectiveness. This might appear to be non-news given 
the domain of international security, from which the negotiation cases were drawn, and 
the even greater sensitivities attached to arms matters. What is more surprising, however, 
is the poor explanatory value of the institutions-based factors. The EU was found 
effective, even though the legal institutional setting, in which the multilateral arms 
negotiations unfolded, did not provide the EU with equal opportunities similar to those 
enjoyed by states. That the EU achieved results and influenced the process during the 
negotiations while not being a full member of the UN implies that the EU’s legal status 
in multilateral institutions is not sine qua non for it to be able to make a difference in a 
multilateral context. In the same vein, the EU showed higher effectiveness, even with the 
competence dispute between the European Commission and member states, and lower 
effectiveness when the institutional coordination was smooth and unproblematic. This 
suggests – perhaps also in line with the previously mentioned criticism about the 
preoccupation of the relevant literature with the EU’s internal arrangements for 
multilateral institutions – that the EU can achieve results and have an impact in 
multilateral arms negotiations, irrespective of the strength of its actorness. 
Another dimension through which the findings of the study can be scrutinized is 
from the level of the analysis perspective. The fact that the explanation of EU 
effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations incorporates both structural (global power 
distribution and international constellation of interests) and agent-based (internal policy 
and member states’ interest convergence) factors increases the confidence in the strength 
of the explanatory framework. Moreover, rather than exposing causal effect of these 
variables in isolation, it suggests a compelling picture of the nexus between EU-external 
and EU-internal factors. It can be argued that the overall explanation of EU effectiveness 
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is slightly tilted towards agent-based reasoning, given the discovered direct causal links 
between the factors of internal policy and member states’ interests and the outcome, as 
well as their ability to comprehensively account for various dimensions of EU 
effectiveness. The role of the external context, nonetheless, is not insignificant. The 
structural factors appeared to exercise their causal impact on EU effectiveness either 
through or in conjunction with the internal variables, but not separately from them. 
 
8.2 Reflections on contributions and challenges 
8.2.1 Potential for generalization 
One important question is related to the extent to which the findings of this study 
can be applied to other contexts beyond the examined cases. The issue of generalization 
or external validity of causal inferences is problematic in small-n observational studies, 
given the lack of possibility to examine the entire population of cases of interest 
(Rohlfing, 2012, pp. 200-211; Ruzzene, 2012). The problem, nevertheless, can be 
alleviated by the choices made behind the selection of cases. The three cases of 
multilateral arms negotiations – the ATT and the NPT Review Conferences – were 
selected for this project on the outcome or, in other words, based on the premise of, 
presumable variation in the EU’s effectiveness among them. Because it was decided to 
measure EU effectiveness in terms of differences in kind, the three cases of negotiations, 
in which the EU demonstrated three different patterns of effectiveness, represent typical, 
rather than diverse cases. This implies that causal insights derived from these cases can 
travel to similar cases that belong to the same category. For example, the ATT 
negotiations is a typical or representative case of other potential instances of multilateral 
arms negotiations in which the EU also demonstrated high (outcome) effectiveness. These 
cases would be the target group for generalization of the causal relationship, according to 
which internal and external power-based factors led to the EU’s high effectiveness, as 
shown by the ATT case. The similar logic of generalization to delimited groups of cases 
applies to the other two typical cases with the EU’s medium (process) and low (damage 
limitation) effectiveness. 
 This logic, however, assumes that the external projection of causal inferences 
takes place within the universe of cases specified by the boundary statements or scope 
conditions. In this study, the scope conditions defined the population of relevant cases of 
multilateral negotiations along the dimensions of substance (the domain of international 
arms affairs), space (the UN principal bodies) and time (after the introduction of the CFSP 
by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993). This pool of cases therefore includes the Review 
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Conferences of the Biological Weapons Convention, Review Conferences of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, negotiations of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty, Small Arms and Light Weapons instruments, the International Code of Conduct 
for Outer Space Activities and other instances of multilateral arms diplomacy in which 
the EU participated. 
It is possible to argue, however, that the insights generated by this study can also 
be relevant for cases that fall outside the boundaries of the specified population. As it has 
been mentioned in the introduction, the empirical field of multilateral arms negotiations 
as a subset of the international security diplomacy can be conceived as a somewhat ‘hard 
case’ for the EU’s meaningful role, given that the EU is a relative newcomer to this area 
of world affairs and the dominant role of states (including the EU’s own member states) 
in this field. Contrary to these expectations, the EU proved to be capable of achieving 
results in situations in which the Union’s effectiveness seemed least-likely. This outcome 
thus increases the confidence in the assumption that the EU can demonstrate comparable 
patterns of effectiveness in the areas of multilateral negotiations, such as environment, 
trade, human rights and food security, which are more susceptible to the EU’s influence. 
The same reasoning extends to the setting of multilateral negotiations. The EU 
can be expected to perform equally well, if not better, in non-UN contexts in which the 
rules of participation are less strict and more inclusive in relation to the EU. Further, given 
that the explanatory framework of this study cast the net as wide as to include both 
structural and agent-based reasoning along the explanatory categories of power, interests 
and institutions, it is likely that the structure of causal argument applied in this study can 
also travel outside the specified population of cases. The shape of the population therefore 
can be broadened by relaxing the substantive (beyond the field of arms affairs) and spatial 
(beyond the UN) boundaries, although this needs to be exercised with a degree of caution. 
Enhancing external validity of causal insights in this way can be marked by increased 
uncertainty related to the risk of causal heterogeneity due to the presence of new, 
unaccountable factors in the new layers of the population. Hence, a rigorous empirical 
testing of new cases will be required in order to lend stronger support to the generalization 
claims. 
 
 8.2.2 Implications for research 
 The main academic contribution of this study rests upon the further advancement 
of the latest generation of intellectual inquiry on the EU in world affairs that puts the EU’s 
results and effects at the forefront. Informed by the research gaps identified in the 
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literature review, this contribution can be structured along the following dimensions. 
First, the study pioneers a comprehensive conceptualization of EU effectiveness in the 
context of multilateral negotiations that goes beyond a simple understanding of 
effectiveness as goal attainment. By adding the second component of relevance, the study 
exposed a dimension of collectivity in the understanding of the effectiveness concept that 
could not be captured by individualistic and internal-oriented standards of goal 
achievement. The incorporation of the third component of EU effectiveness – external 
cohesion – was dictated by the need to accommodate a distinct character of the EU as an 
international negotiator different to that of state actors. The three conceptual attributes on 
the empirical level can be expressed through effects that the EU produces on the outcome, 
process and its member states during multilateral negotiations. The specification of the 
conceptual attributes and delineation of EU effectiveness from other adjacent concepts 
appeared to be an important stepping stone for its systematic empirical investigation 
across the case studies. The empirical definition of EU effectiveness, the specification of 
its three components and their different combinations into several sub-types of EU 
effectiveness can spur academic interest beyond a circle of EU scholars. 
 Second, the study adds value to the body of literature on the EU in multilateral 
institutions that was identified as the most relevant for the current project. More 
specifically, studying the EU’s effects in multilateral negotiations ought to be viewed in 
light of a need to remedy a strong preoccupation in the literature with various elements 
of EU actorness in multilateral institutions at the expense of understanding the impact of 
the EU’s diplomatic activities. Moreover, in order to address another popular tendency in 
the literature – the lack of attention to the external negotiation context and the EU’s 
engagement with it – the study integrated agent-based explanations with an equal number 
of structural factors into a balanced explanatory framework. On the empirical level, this 
research examined one of the most neglected areas in the study of EU foreign policy. By 
focusing on the instances of multilateral arms negotiations and the EU’s participation in 
them, the study generated academic knowledge in the area that is otherwise dominated 
by the input of think tanks and expert communities. Combining the negotiations on both 
conventional arms (the ATT) and weapons of mass destruction (the NPT) in a 
comparative design, the study appears to be the first attempt at cumulative knowledge 
production in this given empirical domain. 
 What are the potential avenues for future research in light of the findings and 
conclusions generated by this study? Taking into account the infancy of the research field, 
the study of the EU’s participation and impact in multilateral negotiations should continue 
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in order to transform it into a coherent and systematic body of scholarship. One obvious 
way to proceed is to extend the investigation of EU effectiveness to more cases of 
multilateral negotiations beyond the area of arms affairs. Such research can take on a 
design of small-n observational studies similar to the current project or medium-n 
comparative studies based on a specific method of qualitative comparative analysis 
(QCA). Studying the shape and magnitude of the EU’s effects in multilateral 
environmental, economic, health or transport negotiations will strengthen the 
comparative agenda of the research field and will ultimately allow to land at more 
systematic and generalized knowledge of the EU as an international negotiator. Even 
more in line with a plea to bolster comparative research, scholars can also study 
effectiveness of other state or non-state actors in specific multilateral institutions, and 
juxtapose them against the patterns of the EU’s outcome, process and damage limitation 
effectiveness. Relevant steps in this direction already have been undertaken by some 
scholars (Müller et al., 2013; Vrailas, 2017). 
 Another avenue for future research is related to further theorization in the field. 
This study demonstrates the utility of analytical eclecticism and problem-specific 
explanatory frameworks in accounting for complex and multi-faceted phenomena, such 
as EU effectiveness. The inferential leverage of eclectic explanations depends not only 
upon incorporating a reasonable number of complimentary factors in a single framework, 
but also from the ability to withstand empirical tests against seemingly contradictory 
theories. For example, one way to take this project further is to contrast the realist-
rationalist explanatory framework developed in this study with ideational explanations 
rooted in the social constructivist tradition. This step can first include an elaboration of 
possible EU-external (global norms diffusion) and EU-internal (socialization) factors, 
with subsequent empirical testing in the same three cases of multilateral arms 
negotiations. The explanatory weight of the study’s framework will be significantly 
strengthened if it appears that the empirical evidence does not fit the contending 
explanations. 
 
8.2.3 Implications for policy 
 Another important issue to consider is the implications of the obtained insights 
about the EU’s participation and performance in multilateral arms negotiations in the 
broader role of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor. There are two dimensions 
of such policy implications. On an optimistic side, through the effective support and 
promotion of the ATT and NPT, the EU strengthened its role as an international security 
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provider. The major intention behind the ATT was to improve human security by means 
of stepping up international arms transfer controls. While it is still too early to assess the 
ATT’s practical impact, experts and activists concur that the Treaty, if properly 
implemented, can have a major impact on preventing human rights abuses and armed 
violence (Amnesty International and IANSA, 2011; Kytömäki, 2015). It is quite telling 
that at the time the ATT entered into force in late 2014, half of the required number of 
ratifications came from the EU. Benefits of the NPT as a collective security mechanism 
are well-acknowledged and highly acclaimed, despite widespread complaints about the 
inequalities and injustice enshrined in the grand bargain (Horovitz, 2015). Without the 
NPT regime in place, the world would have likely witnessed major nuclear weapons 
proliferation, with up to several dozens of states possessing such weapons by now. The 
EU’s vast financial support of the IAEA and CTBT Organization is especially important 
in light of fulfilling the NPT’s raison d'être. 
 Moreover, by way of contributing to the ATT and NPT negotiations, the EU 
reiterated its commitment to multilateralism and rules-based global governance. The 
promotion of multilateral cooperation and support of international institutions always has 
been and, according to the recently adopted EU Global Strategy, still remains at the core 
of the EU’s international identity. It also became apparent that, even in times of being 
consumed by internal crises, the EU still can play a role of an example or model that is 
acknowledged and commended by the international community. As the EU’s High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini unequivocally 
claimed, ‘whenever multilateralism works, Europe is in the frontline’ (Mogherini, 2015). 
While the statement seems exaggerated, it hints at the EU’s principled and almost 
uncompromising support of multilateral global order. This is not insignificant, because 
the reluctance (China) or haphazardness (the US) of other big players towards 
multilateralism makes the EU the only one of its kind in this effort. 
 On a more pessimistic note, the pattern of causal relations in the NPT cases 
questions popular wisdom among EU diplomats and policy-makers about the EU as a 
microcosm of the NPT regime. While the idea itself is not inaccurate – the EU’s 
membership does include all sides of the NPT’s interest spectrum – it is the overreliance 
on it and the resulting consequences for policy choices that are problematic. The notion 
implies that the key for solving NPT problems lays within the EU. In contrast, this study 
shows that rather than being a cause of trouble, the frictions, if they appear, within the 
EU are symptomatic of broader divisions between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear 
weapon states. As one national diplomat put it, ‘in theory, “microcosm” works, but you 
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need to consider the context. [For example], Austria is in minority in the EU, but [in the 
NPT setting] it is in majority’ (Interview 12, 2015). This implies that EU officials, instead 
of focusing excessively on the search for internal consensus, might want to put more 
efforts towards learning about and addressing the external context and, in particular, its 
impact on the balance of commonalities and differences among EU member states. That 
this is a difficult task for the EU to handle in the context of nuclear politics is 
demonstrated by the recent UN-sponsored negotiations on the treaty prohibiting nuclear 
weapons, which neither the EU, nor the large majority of its member states, were able or 
willing to attend (United Nations, 2017). 
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ANNEX 2 – PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION NOTES 
 
Observation Notes 1 – participant observation notes prepared during the afternoon 
meeting of the Main Committee I of the NPT Review Conference on 11 May 2015. 
 
Observation Notes 2 – participant observation notes prepared during the afternoon 
meeting of the Main Committee I of the NPT Review Conference on 14 May 2015. 
 
 
 
